I wanted to use Glen’s post below as the excuse for a self-indulgence, but the gods of time will of course not forgive me for doing it. So I behaved for a day or two...
TL/DR Let me say something about the little part of not wanting to do anything to endorse metaphysics (the final line in Glen’s post): What would I put in its place, for all the things that we do but can’t justify, except that we seem to “need” to do them to hold together any structured reasoning? I want to say there is something like a Principle of Good Manners, which consists of warning your interlocutor what kind of conversation he is about to end up in with you. Avoid terms like “belief”, or “synthetic a priori” as used in metaphysics. “Belief” is a promise to do cognitive psychology one isn’t nearly capable of doing and probably doesn’t even intend to do. Metaphysics feels to me too close to a retreat back into religious attitudes. But at least one can try to have a little self-awareness about how one behaves. For me the self-introduction/caveat would roll out something like: I engage in a kind of discourse that: 1. Has a place for some term: “the world”; 2. Grants a construction: “the world” “is” [something] as the only definite construction I know is in the discourse 3. The construction 2 is supposed to entail some kind of definiteness 4. All the rest has to be figured out, and will be referred to with provisional usages, in the usual sense of empiricist science. I mean this to somewhat systematize what the scientific realist view amounts to, and also what pragmatist approaches to estimation amount to, in the form of accounts of my own behavior. I will note that I believe the point 3 to be a continuous extension of what every molecule in my body, and all my cognitive routines, is already doing (i.e. a form of naive induction, because that is all a finite system is capable of doing). Peirce’s pragmatist conceptions of both meaning (all conceivable effects with practical bearing) and truth (what survives in the long run) are from the start declared as asymptotics. Since I don’t mind referring to ensembles with infinitely many members in math, I don’t mind using those cases as metaphors for what I might imagine doing with meaning or truth, so I don’t reject asymptotic formulae. For meaning, I can imagine a kind of infinite collection to which it points, though Peirce’s way of saying it is hard to ever operationalize. Since we don’t know what “conceiving of an effect” is, it is hard to do much with expressions like “all the effects that might conceivably have practical bearing”. But in a world where people dream up formal systems, bind them somehow to embodied actions in the phenomenal world, and then test for commutativity of the diagram that has, as its legs, derivations, predicates, predictions etc. in the formal layer, bindings of both condition-terms and outcome-terms through personal/social/practicial/embodied cognition to choices and actions, and realization of outcomes in “the world”, I can talk about all the collections of claims and outcomes that might be propagated by somebody who dreams up a concept term for something, and say that the estimators for Peirce’s notion of meaning (all the effects _actually conceived of_ by somebody at some place or time from the object that some concept term is supposed to be bound to) are estimators for a certain concept of realized meaning as an infinite ensemble of histories of realized consequences. Unwieldy, but not manifestly incoherent. The interesting question for me is whether trying to do the same thing for “truth” always leads to a degeneration of the term to something one must regard as a placeholder. That doesn’t mean it can be dispensed with; it regards that we then ask what is the role of placeholder terms in our thought and behavior. (This is what I meant in the other post about triangulation, toward which I wasn’t going to dump more words.) The difficulty with attaching careful language to Peirce’s formulation for truth, for anything else besides estimators, is that his whole way of speaking supposes there could be any indefinitely stable forms of characterization by people in the composite of the formal systems they dream up and try to articulate, and the ways they bind them in lived experience to choices and actions in nature. I don’t think that assumption works in any easy way. If one is going to be fallabilist, one should be fallabilist in everything. So it is not only that some concrete prediction might be wrong (the diagram through the formalism, the bindings, and the realization can’t be made to commute): that can certainly happen, e.g. in predictions from Cartesian space-x-time that don’t have Lorentz invariance where Minkowski spacetime does, or flat spacetimes versus curved ones for actual space (the flat ones are wrong). Those are the kinds of simple cases that Peirce and later Popper wanted to codify. They live in the world of estimators, and the ways that properties we find in the world, like successive approximation, projection to aspects of a phenomenon, and reductionism, imbue with practical meaning as they allow us to quite deeply replace concept systems but merely refine quantitative predictions. All that works fine, but it seems done to me, and not so interesting to talk about. Glen mentions the roles of consistency versus completeness in relation to truth-concepts, and says that in the world of estimation one requires consistency and relinquishes completeness. I agree, and I think we are forced to this. w.r.t. nature, it is not clear what “complete” ever means (though who knows; there could be fixed-point results in something someday that allow such meaning). But consistency as we actually require it is only ever possible for systems that are bounded in some way (usually by being finite, but maybe there are cases where countability is enough of a bound), and as long as any finite description remains outside a full unification-of-everything, we probably have to regard it as incomplete. But the other thing — the open-ended portfolio of what can ever be proposed for concept terms, and how they can be bound in experience to activity in the world and also to organizations in reasoning — looks like something that Peirce’s and Popper’s language turns its back on like a monster under the bed; having suggested that it exists, but in a language that precludes their ever being able to look at it directly. The star example for this, of course, is quantum mechanics. I objected to DaveW that this wasn’t a reversion to Bishop Berkeley (unless he somehow invented the particularity of QM and didn’t tell anybody), though the religious will always claim that any interesting and challenging problem anybody else faces shows that they (the religious) were right all along. But if I (intensely) dislike the habit of talking about QM as if “It was all about me, after all!”, what would I replace it with? WIth this: In classical physics, there was this notion of “a state” (meaning, a state of the world). What did that “state” stand for? Doesn’t matter; we are going to do computations about quantities we call “observables”. “State” is sort of a placeholder term. Then the phenomena with quantum coherence and superposition are discovered, and we construct a new math to handle them. That math also has two terms: “state” and “observable”, but now it requires that those terms are quite different, and that they relate to each other through some projection operator, which one can take as a gloss for “measurement”, or try to derive constructively through docoherent-histories methods, etc. From hindsight, we realize that “state” in classical mechanics wasn’t totally a placeholder; we know something about what we meant by it. We were identifying a classical “state” with “a collection of definite values for all observables”. Now both classical and quantum notions of “state” are still partly placeholder terms, but they are both made partly meaningful by the contrast between them, in that the classical state is coextensive with a collection of definite values for observables, and the quantum state is related to observables only through projection operators, which can generate distributions over their values. It’s an important lesson, though, what just happened cognitively. We had supposed in our language, and spent lifetimes tattooing into our “understanding", that for “the world” to have definiteness, the values of observables had to have definiteness. Had anyone asked, we might have said that it was unthinkable to refer to a definite world that didn’t have, at all times and for all observables, definite values. But that would have been the same error as Kant’s, who figured that Cartesian/Euclidean space-x-time was the only thing thinkable. The successful formulation of QM has retained a notion of the definiteness of the world in the term “state” in a form that doesn’t depend on definiteness of values for observables. It is thinkable, by people like Scott Aaronson who do this for a living, and I think for people like Jim Hartle and Murray and others. But “being thinkable” is this complex thing about what we tattoo into our cognitive bindings, and most old people could never really expunge their classical tattoos, and so they spend the rest of their lives objecting to the new system. Some of them went back into the religious quasi-solipsist framing (Yay — the world depends on my consciousness!), as the component in their worldview (in the negative sense of Weltanschauung) that was vague enough not to lead them into explicit contradictions with the phenomena. But that is not in QM; that’s what they were able to make of QM when it was offered to them to practice. Others could grow into the practice in better ways. It reminds me of Pidgin-Creole transitions in language. Oldsters who may coin a trade language are too late to make it grammatically rich, but a generation that grows through the right developmental stages can do so. I should note that, as a corollary to the aim for fallibilism in everything, I can say what it means w.r.t. the premise of scientific realism. There are people who think it is somehow underhanded to say “I am going to speak in a certain way, though I may not really believe it”. I said above that the Principle of Good Manners compels me to tell you some things about my way of speaking, which I have ways to know (being available to my own observation) that you may not yet (not having had to deal with me). I can observe that I talk this way, without claiming to understand why I do so, and thus not having to talk about what “I believe”, or even to suppose that that term refers to anything. What then supports my continuing to use this kind of discourse, as evidenced by my behavior? Apparently, the fact that in the scientific worldview we haven’t had yet to give up a precept of definiteness. We had to do some serious conceptual innovation in QM to be able to retain the precept but take away what we had unwittingly taken to be one of its foundations. But will we be able to do so forever? Can’t say. Right now, we treat spacetime through the concepts of a definite geometry, and general relativity is doing a great job, at least to a quite fine precision, in characterizing it. But just the fact that that concept doesn’t have a way to be superposable seems to cause a mathematical incoherence for models of universes that have black holes in them, and the incoherence isn’t telling us what, if anything, should be put up that might resolve it. If I can’t speak in the discourse of scientific realism, I don’t know what I might use in its place, since the whole religious thing is distasteful enough to me that I would probably refuse to use it out of plain stubbornness. But I certainly see that the realist discourse has to be regarded as provisional, if I am to talk of these things (including, reflexively, the language of the talking) in a way that isn’t manifestly inconsistent. Anyway, to stay close to the point: I don’t think a true pragmatist wants to foreclose the possibilities for conceptual understanding of the world that will ever be reachable by people. But that means Peirce’s gesture toward a stable _conceptuatlization_ of the world is probably non-realizable. And that a notion of what “convergence” in conceptualizations of the world might stand for is an awkward metaphor. The only place where we can coherently say what we mean by “convergence” is in respect to either quantity (by successive approximations), or perhaps projection (some phenomenal aspects considered, others put aside and incorporated later, as was done for the nature of electrons between J.J. Thompson’s cathode-ray picture and Bohr’s early and largely uninterpreted (and internally incoherent) atomic-state picture). Reductionism, in the sense of renormalization and hierarchies of phase transitions, provides a remarkable way of combining both approximation and projection. But the notion of “convergence in concept systems” purports to refer to qualitative things of indefinitely open types. Clearly the metaphor inherent in the only ways we know to use “convergence” for now doesn’t extend to cover qualitative change, and it’s not clear what idea we want to create that would carry the right things from the metaphor of convergence to actual ex-ante-unknown ensembles of conceptual innovations. That leaves us with Peirce’s asymptotic formulation of truth as a degenerate placeholder term, it seems to me. And I will again not try to go off into the role that such placeholder terms seem to have in cognition, being treated as definite and fixed at the same time as we can even be self-aware that we have no operational definition to put behind them. Anyway… that’s the rumination that I would try to put behind the other truncated comments, if pushed to explain why I make them. Eric > On Oct 16, 2024, at 1:55 PM, glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Awesome summary! So my demon has always been whether or not the theory of > truth (distinguishable from the theor[y|ies] of estimation) allows for > inconsistency. I.e. I'm looking for shared values in the understanding of > what is true. Drive-by shootings suggesting nothing's real or there is no > truth or whatever are fine for the pub, but not sustainably interesting. I > tend to boil it down to the 2 values of consistency and completeness. A > theory of truth must be able to say something about every possible claim. But > I'm willing to sacrifice unity/consistency. In the theory used to estimate, I > land the other way. Consistency is primary and completeness merely nice to > have. > > And this seems to put me at odds with most of (the tiny bit I've read on) > others' search for a theory of truth, which seem to me to allow for cavalier > estimation, whatever gets you where you need to go, versus fetishistically > consistent truth. > > Non-monotonic reasoning (e.g. Bayesian) seems to be THE type of reasoning for > curating estimators. But we don't seem to spend much time/effort filling out > the space of ways to do non-monotonic reasoning (cf Gelman's multiverse > analysis). We seem to accidentally land on something that works well enough > and run with it like a hammer chasing nails. But from what little I know of > science, progress is driven by consistency and transparency of methods, a > well-regulated journey, regardless of the properties of the destination. The > translation of the need for consistency from estimation to truth seems like a > metaphysical, almost mystical, commitment. > > On 10/16/24 09:27, Santafe wrote: >> Too many glosses on the word “truth”. Any of them is game, but with so many >> in play, and registers constantly being shifted, tracking a sentence becomes >> fraught most of the time. And statements that are central to the concept >> for one register would be not only inapt, but false or non-sequitur in >> another. >> All that is fine if the goal is entertainment, competition, blasts of >> indignation, or whatever-else. But if the goal is to get clearer on >> something about which one was not clear, the overloading is an impediment >> (recalling Johnson’s literal stone). (That is never a setback for anyone >> who never lacked clarity on anything and thus doesn’t need anything; that >> cup is already full.) >> I think there are good takes on Peirce from a modern perspective, that were >> suspected or suggested by him, but probably not available with late >> 19th-century experience, and probably not to someone with as mechanical a >> turn of mind as Peirce’s. >> One can ask what it means to say that a word is to index some concept, and >> that some concept is different from another in what we want from it. >> In that spirit, I think that in logic and in description of life, there are >> two concepts that are not the same in kind, one of which I would tag with >> “states of factual knowledge”, and the other with “truth”, as I would want >> to develop the term in a modern re-try of pragmatism as Peirce was headed >> toward it. >> There are lots of little technical details along the way, where one has to >> state what one wants to inherit from some historical figure, and what not, >> or what one wants to assert, irrespective of whether somebody else did >> before or not. >> It strikes me that the things pragmaticism (I will use Peirce’s word to make >> explicit that his, at this time, is the one I am after) got right are that >> we need 1) a theory of meaning, and 2) a theory of truth, which one has to >> have some theory of meaning and probably other schemata to articulate. The >> pragmatic maxim, as a theory of meaning, is fine as a historical >> placeholder, and I’m not putting a lot of time into that now, so won’t worry >> about whether or how it might need modern updates. All the work on >> embodiment, and maybe some of what goes under the heading “enactivism” is >> probably a useful source of examples and ideas. >> I would argue that what we should want from a modern pragmatism in regard to >> truth can be expressed through the following metaphor: the concept behind >> “states of factual knowledge” stands in relation to the concept behind >> “truth” something like the concept behind “sample estimator” stands in >> relation to “underlying generative value” in the practice of statistical >> inference over stochastic processes. Even in cases where the two are >> quantified and represented in the same kinds of units, they are two very >> different concepts. >> There is a lot more that needs to be said to triangulate what role that >> “truth”-tagged concept is playing, in cognition and language, including the >> depths that we don’t have good concept systems to articulate; here I want to >> acknowledge the need for it but not dump more words in that direction. >> My goal in the second-preceding paragraph is to go in the direction of the >> _meaning_ I want from the concept tagged by “truth” (in this register). >> Stipulating what one wants from the meaning of something does not entail >> that you have a route to obtain a value for it. So if Peirce thought (a >> rather Panglossian caricature) that states of knowledge converge in some >> reliable way toward asymptotically enduring fixed points, I would certainly >> not want to inherit that belief (or really, any belief). But I would know, >> as a Modern, that we have all sorts of experience with statistics that >> meander and do or do not converge, the rates of convergence if they do, the >> difficulty of search and the likelihood of success in search problems by one >> or another algorithm, the difficulty of selection or of preservation of >> something even if one happens upon it, and so on. And not particularly >> wanting to have beliefs, I very much want to be able to frame those kinds of >> questions and try to extract answers. Everything we have learned in one or >> another narrow, technical and in that sense artificial domain, strikes me as >> something we should expect to have a place in trying to understand the >> dynamics of states of factual knowledge. Again, I would expect the >> applications to look something like the application of Bayesian Model >> Selection to the real-world acts of adopting or rejecting various partial >> and conflicted phenomenological theories. In rare cases, the problem is so >> constrained that one can use the formal model somewhat literally or even >> quantitatively; in many others, it is a sort of metaphor or an even weaker >> cartoon, but still suggests a kind of structure to look for in the dynamic >> realized in the real world. >> Any of the above, however, only follows if the people involved share certain >> goals in the exchange of language, and that is not at all assured since >> people can and do have many quite distinct and even non-overlapping goals. >> There are communities that regard self-negating speech as not only >> inescapable, but privileged. I found myself wondering yesterday whether >> post-modernism should be seen as along the path to enlightenment (NOT the >> European kind!). I don’t think any of what I said above can be regarded as >> even meaningful, and certainly not worth engaging in, from a prioritization >> of self-negating speech. >> There is speech as sabotage; what I regard Kellyanne as having discovered as >> her path to self-importance; a thing she appeared to want when she was young >> but did not see a route to achieving through the conventional channels. And >> of course, the advocate for the saboteur will say (invoking the original >> saboteurs) that that person is a resistance fighter against whomever we are >> aggrieved at. >> There is the weird case of Rorty, who for me marks the full decadence of >> Peirce’s hope for a theory of truth into its energetic and spiteful >> negation. I don’t know how to stack him in this menagerie. He and >> Kellyanne are clearly both smart, and Rorty is very smart in many >> dimensions. My understanding is that, in personal life, they both are/were >> also gracious and decent in their treatment of people. Rorty’s >> social-justice aims were also, to my eye, well-chosen and insightful. But >> Rorty is not on a mere campaign of sabotage, and his tool isn’t merely >> random obstruction to derail anybody else’s attempt to make any point. He >> has much more structure. Yet to my eye the gambit is still logically pretty >> empty. Peirce wanted something from the word “truth”, and he got however >> far he could toward articulating what he hoped for. Rorty simply declares, >> obiter-dictum, that the same word will be used henceforth as whatever is an >> obstacle to social-justice utilitarianism (crucially, as Rorty analyzes what >> the utility is and what serves it; aka among other things he is an >> intellectual bully), and it has no other or actual meaning. Where Peirce >> used Pragmatism as aiming at a theory of meaning and a theory of truth, >> Rorty simply re-glosses Pragmatism as a synonym for social-justice >> utilitarianism. Obviously, as a social practice, one can do that, and if >> the tribe that likes that usage can kill all the members of the tribe that >> disagrees with it, the dead ones can’t be said to have “achieved” anything. >> (The others are inclined to say they haven’t “won” anything, but I don’t >> think the dead ones were after “winning”; rather “achieving”.) But simply >> refusing to engage somebody else’s project by reglossing the term and >> declaring eminent domain over it isn’t interesting. We already have a term >> for utilitarianism, from Mill, and the social-justice version of it is a >> sub-variant (not even all that sub). >> So I don’t know. I think there is stuff to do. But only if one wants to do >> that, instead of some other thing. >> Eric >>> On Oct 16, 2024, at 10:26, glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> I think I agree with Jon, here. But I'd word it (very) differently. And >>> although Marcus' response is in Eric's vein, it only targets "close to the >>> metal"/brute facts, not derived facts (with variation on both >>> "facts"/primitives and "derivations"/logics). >>> >>> While I'm an avowed pluralist, my commitment isn't to an infinity of truths >>> or, worse, the undefinedness of truth. Maybe there are trillions of truths >>> (allowing for each biological organism to have "their truth", uniquely). >>> But to go so far as to suggest there are infinite truths or that truth is >>> undefined is a bridge too far. That would be like arguing there are no such >>> things as parallel lines in any spatial system, no agreement to be had no >>> matter what the context. >>> >>> My confidence in a plurality is bounded to a few, I think, N≥3 or so, but >>> maybe something closer to "N=7±2", reflecting something like the affordance >>> of sensemaking minds. And to be clear, that small set of N truths can >>> wander in some kind of Peircian sense, I guess, except without assuming >>> it'll monotonically converge to a static/permanent set of N fixed member >>> truths. >>> >>> In this wandering space of paraconsistent logics, we may still follow the >>> framework Eric sets out. Truth(s) can be something like moments or high >>> order stabilities that allow us to settle contested claims, even if only >>> temporarily. But here I see more of a tie between truth and law ... maybe, >>> deep down, my antipathy toward evolutionary psychology is simply that the >>> discipline is too young? Social convention comes from somewhere ... >>> somewhere bound to reality, even if the binding is through a wobbly causal >>> network with randomness at every node. Can convention be completely unbound >>> to truth? That seems like an extreme claim to me. >>> >>> On 10/15/24 12:28, Jon Zingale wrote: >>>> FWIW, I think Eric is correct to highlight the relationship between being >>>> *increasingly promulgated to the semi-divine stature* and the >>>> disappearance of *demos*. However, I am resistant to a characterization >>>> that renders demos as *abstract* rather than *virtual*. I am resistant to >>>> the idea that demoi are implemented rather than immanent. While there may >>>> come a day where master-slave relations become complete and fully >>>> actualized and demos (relegated to the abstract) is solely manifested via >>>> deputization, I maintain a level of wishful-hoping that for as long as we >>>> engage one another, demos de facto exists and immanently so. >>>> This subtlety, for me, parallels on the one hand, the ontological status >>>> of infinitesimals in founding the differential calculus, and on the other, >>>> discussions I am having with Nick around the nature of *facts*. To my >>>> mind, disinformation isn't simply the overturning of truth values >>>> intension with a concept. Rather, disinformation campaigns (like other >>>> forms of fascism) aim to atomize networks of relations. Atomization can >>>> happen at various levels, sometimes at the level of the ideas and at other >>>> times at the level of repositories. Demos, like concept, is inherently >>>> non-discrete even if only nilpotent. In the end, I suppose both that the >>>> denial of demos is expensive and that collective perceptions can stay >>>> irrational longer than I can stay solvent. >>> >>>> On 10/15/24 12:14, Marcus Daniels wrote: >>>>> Jump out of your car when driving on the freeway or inject bleach to kill >>>>> the COVID, and enjoy Your Truth. >>> >>>>> On 10/15/24 11:02, Prof David West wrote: >>>>>> Eric, >>>>>> Going all postmodern on you — there is no such thing as *Truth*, only >>>>>> *Somebody's Truth*. >>>>>> This is painfully evident at the moment in the fallacy of "fact >>>>>> checking," all the assertions of "misinformation," and "follow the >>>>>> science." >>>>>> I do not see totalitarians of any stripe engaged in 'destroying' the >>>>>> truth; only in demanding that *Their Truth* is the one and only *Truth*. >>>>>> And, totalitarians are not the only ones engaged in this >>>>>> endeavor—everyone who has or wants to have power of whatever degree does >>>>>> the exact same thing. >>>>>> davew >>>>>> On Tue, Oct 15, 2024, at 12:39 PM, Santafe wrote: >>>>>>> You know, I don’t mind the phrase “above the law”. It may not be >>>>>>> tailored to lower-level mechanistic arguing about one or another case, >>>>>>> but it acknowledges a system context in which a society will operate >>>>>>> under some kind of hierarchy of prerogatives. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don’t normally think about law in such hierarchies, and do more often >>>>>>> about truth. But I think similar arguments are appropriate for both, >>>>>>> with certain modulations. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What (re. power) do we want from truth in a society? We want truth to >>>>>>> stand as a referee over all contesting claims. This is why >>>>>>> authoritarians, but even more totalitarians, have as a first-line >>>>>>> priority the killing of truth. Not just evading it or disregarding it, >>>>>>> but publicly setting it on fire, to make the point that there will be >>>>>>> _no_ referee over the exercise of power by whoever happens to be >>>>>>> holding it. Arendt has some wonderful passages on the way the Nazi >>>>>>> movement was, from before its takeover through its ending, a project of >>>>>>> substituting fictitious worlds for the real world in the lives of their >>>>>>> followers. This (now coming from me, not Arendt) is why the hopeful >>>>>>> totalitarian doesn’t tell borderline lies or ambiguous lies; he tells >>>>>>> extravagant, absurd lies, to make the point that any holdout hope for >>>>>>> truth will be ground up and blown away in the movements movement. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The fragility of a role for truth in a society is that a commitment to >>>>>>> it has to be a kind of escrow. The society has to grant truth >>>>>>> legitimacy and authority, and then the various members have to be >>>>>>> confined within that commitment when their own interests would motivate >>>>>>> them to escape it. Ulysses at the mast, or something like that. >>>>>>> Rawls’s veil of ignorance. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The question of what law is, and who it is answerable to, is different >>>>>>> because it is entirely conventional, unlike truth which has a very >>>>>>> individually-judgeable aspect. But will the society’s legitimated >>>>>>> notion of “law” be a tool for use by a king? By specifically the >>>>>>> God-Emporer (Mao or, increasingly, Xi) or Louix IV or Napoleon? Will >>>>>>> it be a tool for use by the holder of an office (Putin? Trump “if >>>>>>> you’re the president they (SCOTUS) let you do it”)? Or is >>>>>>> law-the-system claimed or intended to have prerogatives above those of >>>>>>> specific persons, or of offices w.r.t. their occupants, and if so, in >>>>>>> what is that prerogative vested? The charateristically vague notion of >>>>>>> a “democracy” supposes that there should be some abstract entity — the >>>>>>> “demos” — in which the prerogative of law is vested. But since >>>>>>> abstract entities don’t operate in the material world, what we have is >>>>>>> some edifice of institutions etc. that is meant to suitably instantiate >>>>>>> a “demos”. We can complain about all the ways an actual, realized >>>>>>> system fails to instantiate a demos well, or is aimed at a wrong >>>>>>> concept of one. But that complaint is different from the distinction >>>>>>> that, as the Maoist government promulgated him as increasingly >>>>>>> semi-divine, there was no concept of a “demos” at all that had >>>>>>> prerogatives above him. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think we lose that relevant notion of hierarchy of prerogatives if we >>>>>>> abandon the “above” in “above the law”. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Lot of hair-splitting for no substance; I know… >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Eric >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 15, 2024, at 12:22, glen <geprope...@gmail.com >>>>>>>> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree. We're dancing around the meaning of "above the law" and it's >>>>>>>> a terrible phrase. But people use it. So you have to have some way to >>>>>>>> parse it (again, based on the *rest* of whatever it is someone says). >>>>>>>> Hardline positions like what Jochen and Dave are taking can help >>>>>>>> develop such parsing strats, at least they help me. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On a similar note, this article was very interesting to me because of >>>>>>>> both my long-term interest in "mindreading" (which I'll now call >>>>>>>> "mentalizing", I guess) and my more recent interest in replacing >>>>>>>> things like ontologies with LLMs: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Defining key concepts for mental state attribution >>>>>>>> https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00077-6 >>>>>>>> <https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-024-00077-6> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 10/15/24 09:11, steve smith wrote: >>>>>>>>> I hope I'm not (just) muddying the water here, but I think "buffered >>>>>>>>> from the remedies of law" might be better than "above the law"? I >>>>>>>>> think it applies not to just the wealthy and powerful but to other >>>>>>>>> ideosyncratic reasons like obscurity, anonymity, >>>>>>>>> unpredictable-behaviour, etc... >>>>>>>>> On 10/15/24 9:00 AM, glen wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Well, OK. I agree with the gist. But rather than target Congress, >>>>>>>>>> the Admin, and bureaucrats, I'd target wealthy people, whatever >>>>>>>>>> their day job might be. There are people mostly above the law. Musk >>>>>>>>>> is one of them. But more importantly, there's a couple of handfuls >>>>>>>>>> of companies that own the world: Blackstone, KKR, Carlyle, Bain, >>>>>>>>>> etc. To boot, those companies "are people", are effectively >>>>>>>>>> immortal, and can't seriously be punished for any crime they might >>>>>>>>>> commit. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And this point is definitely a systemic one. Even if every single >>>>>>>>>> member of the entire government were biased against those who wield >>>>>>>>>> this power, the system has too many weak points to hold them >>>>>>>>>> accountable. When faced with a super villain like Musk, it takes a >>>>>>>>>> champion (at least one, but more often a team) to counter-game the >>>>>>>>>> system (e.g. Whitehouse, Warren, Wyden, etc.). And the champions >>>>>>>>>> usually eventually succumb to biology or corruption. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 10/14/24 15:52, Prof David West wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> True, citing exceptions to specific laws does not indict the >>>>>>>>>>> */system/*: /"We mean the entire legislative, executive, and >>>>>>>>>>> judicial enterprise."/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> However, the way the phrase,/"no one is above the law,"/ is >>>>>>>>>>> popularly used, especially now and in the political context, it is >>>>>>>>>>> not a systemic assertion, but a personal one: hold X accountable >>>>>>>>>>> because no one is above the specific law that X ostensibly >>>>>>>>>>> violated. _I will accept chastisement for being equally sloppy in >>>>>>>>>>> usage_. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Also, I would argue that the system has been corrupted to such a >>>>>>>>>>> point that a whole class of people in particular roles are above >>>>>>>>>>> the law systemically: >>>>>>>>>>> - Congress abdicated its responsibility to enact laws, ceding it to >>>>>>>>>>> bureaucrats. >>>>>>>>>>> - Those same bureaucrats usurp the role of the judiciary by >>>>>>>>>>> indicting and trying those who violate their laws (and they are >>>>>>>>>>> laws, including criminal felony laws), crafting their own rules of >>>>>>>>>>> evidence and procedure, and determining guilt or innocence with no >>>>>>>>>>> recourse to the 'Systems' judiciary. >>>>>>>>>>> - If you include the explosion in use of 'executive decree'; you >>>>>>>>>>> might argue that a substantial part of the executive branch of >>>>>>>>>>> government in the U.S. is 'above the law'. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> davew >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Oct 14, 2024, at 12:15 PM, glen wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> I think that was Jochen that said it, not Russ. But your >>>>>>>>>>>> refutation is >>>>>>>>>>>> either a fallacy of ambiguity or composition. By "the rule of >>>>>>>>>>>> law", we >>>>>>>>>>>> don't mean the rule of any particular law ... like a city statute >>>>>>>>>>>> against walking your alligator down the street or whatever. We >>>>>>>>>>>> mean the >>>>>>>>>>>> entire legislative, executive, and judicial enterprise. Of course, >>>>>>>>>>>> particular slices of the population are exempt from some particular >>>>>>>>>>>> law. E.g. London cabbies used to be allowed to urinate wherever >>>>>>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>>>>>> regard to the typical laws governing such. That doesn't imply that >>>>>>>>>>>> London cabbies are "above the law". I suppose you could say they're >>>>>>>>>>>> above that particular set of laws. But "exempt" isn't synonymous >>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> "above", anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't think the SCOTUS ruling on immunity claims the President is >>>>>>>>>>>> above the law, contrary to the implications of the left's rhetoric, >>>>>>>>>>>> only that they're exempt from some/most/all laws when executing the >>>>>>>>>>>> role of their office. It's bad. But it's not bad in the way the >>>>>>>>>>>> rhetoric implies. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 10/14/24 09:27, Prof David West wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry Russ, but /"Nobody should be above the law if the rule of >>>>>>>>>>>>> law has any meaning in a democratic society,"/ is an absurd idea. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Assuming the US is a democratic society (in some sense), I would >>>>>>>>>>>>> defy you to find any existing law that does not have exceptions >>>>>>>>>>>>> that place someone, in some role or in some cirsumstance, "above" >>>>>>>>>>>>> that law. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> davew >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Oct 14, 2024, at 8:58 AM, John Kennison wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *From:* Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>>> on behalf of Marcus Daniels >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mar...@snoutfarm.com <mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com <mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, July 16, 2024 3:02 PM >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com>>>; >>>>>>>>>>>>>> russ.abb...@gmail.com <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <russ.abb...@gmail.com <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Subject:* [EXT] Re: [FRIAM] tolerance of intolerance >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don’t think that’s fair. It depends on the opponent and what >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they represent both in terms of ideology and the sociological >>>>>>>>>>>>>> phenomenon they are a part of. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *From:*Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>>> *On Behalf Of *Jochen Fromm >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, July 16, 2024 11:52 AM >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *To:* russ.abb...@gmail.com <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com>>; >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] tolerance of intolerance >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> A president who murders his opponents would not be better than >>>>>>>>>>>>>> an evil dictator in an authoritarian state. Putin's opponents >>>>>>>>>>>>>> like Navalny, Litvinenko and Nemtsov were all brutally poisoned >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and/or murdered. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But you are right, this possibility exists after the recent >>>>>>>>>>>>>> decision of the supreme court. It seems to be a result of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> democratic backsliding. Nobody should be above the law if the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> rule of law has any meaning in a democratic society. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -J. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -------- Original message -------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> From: Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com>> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:russ.abb...@gmail.com>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Date: 7/16/24 7:48 PM (GMT+01:00) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:friam@redfish.com <mailto:friam@redfish.com>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] tolerance of intolerance >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Why has no one pointed out the possibility that if Trump wins, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Biden could take advantage of his newly declared immunity and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have him assassinated? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- Russ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Jul 16, 2024, 6:24 AM glen <geprope...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yeah. It's one thing to wish it or want it. It's another to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think more in Marcus' terms and come up with a more complex >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategy not involving stupid 20 year olds and no violence at >>>>>>>>>>>>>> all. I still hold out hope for my own personal conspiracy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory. Biden becomes the nominee. After the convention fades, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Admnistration announces Biden has gone to the hospital for >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bone spur surgery. Kamala takes over temporarily and campaigns >>>>>>>>>>>>>> furiously for Biden-Harris. Biden is re-elected. Biden recovers >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and gets through the Oath (fingers crossed). Then he goes back >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the hospital with some minor thing like a dizzy spell. Kamala >>>>>>>>>>>>>> takes over again. Biden's condition worsens. First Female >>>>>>>>>>>>>> President. Biden recovers and becomes America's Grandpa. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Come on Deep State. Make it happen. 8^D >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/15/24 17:30, Russ Abbott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I wonder what Scott's response would have been to those of us >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> who, in response to the shooting, thought: better luck next >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/15/24 17:28, Marcus Daniels wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It ignores the option of doing things quietly and indirectly. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/15/24 16:46, glen wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [Scott's] Prayer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fscottaaronson.blog%2f%3fp%3d8117&c=E,1,irEARj2UuX0io2vsvo5UtQltYddWunshQQtMQfJZHxfHRYf3FJxoInm0IYVm9IwI4psALvtsK1hXymeqyUC5R_tfW5jZF7zWWQQ1odUIr2o6avItdKxsAJw,&typo=1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fscottaaronson.blog%2f%3fp%3d8117&c=E,1,irEARj2UuX0io2vsvo5UtQltYddWunshQQtMQfJZHxfHRYf3FJxoInm0IYVm9IwI4psALvtsK1hXymeqyUC5R_tfW5jZF7zWWQQ1odUIr2o6avItdKxsAJw,&typo=1> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fscottaaronson.blog%2f%3fp%3d8117&c=E,1,QL0WRnoyblSkIf4AvUE9OJjbfulLIAmV4kaOMzv6lQXTwCmW2EkBdX41PHQpVDSu-p7sRh4gsqE26d1Giz5pL5Nj5av4laZQ11Mt76uPpQE,&typo=1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fscottaaronson.blog%2f%3fp%3d8117&c=E,1,QL0WRnoyblSkIf4AvUE9OJjbfulLIAmV4kaOMzv6lQXTwCmW2EkBdX41PHQpVDSu-p7sRh4gsqE26d1Giz5pL5Nj5av4laZQ11Mt76uPpQE,&typo=1>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fscottaaronson.blog%2f%3fp%3d8117&c=E,1,NLO_67atoq3F2A4fB5urAh8xb9NkFr6meKf_b2Ya-AZDIOD9qAQghy5M1IF_Q05hIzoBKb18k6r7vb4BiGopaOxkFFYtJyPv-EeoOVuU&typo=1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fscottaaronson.blog%2f%3fp%3d8117&c=E,1,NLO_67atoq3F2A4fB5urAh8xb9NkFr6meKf_b2Ya-AZDIOD9qAQghy5M1IF_Q05hIzoBKb18k6r7vb4BiGopaOxkFFYtJyPv-EeoOVuU&typo=1> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fscottaaronson.blog%2f%3fp%3d8117&c=E,1,VkCRM_BeShuRcsrz7BIuFbLjt-HSBDroXWGmBOeDO6BmTy31h_kdbYCzyPKN_Rg0M2BUO3p_mBX6qdrZ3C3Q5zqIGvcu2DuESkkHbT0_HJ1D7RPe8Dij&typo=1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fscottaaronson.blog%2f%3fp%3d8117&c=E,1,VkCRM_BeShuRcsrz7BIuFbLjt-HSBDroXWGmBOeDO6BmTy31h_kdbYCzyPKN_Rg0M2BUO3p_mBX6qdrZ3C3Q5zqIGvcu2DuESkkHbT0_HJ1D7RPe8Dij&typo=1>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm currently surrounded by people who believe intolerance is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> properly not tolerated. Scott's message, here, seems >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> extraordinary Christian, to me. (Real Christian, not the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Christianism displayed in things like megachurches and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatnot cf >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fraymondsmullyan.com%2fbooks%2fwho-knows%2f&c=E,1,mlWEnEdNzLv04QI10AIP0LMUOn93iXch1nMegLlQPAOq-cYBIqujJW4gdYUEuQTKpPUzp1ea879JC3t5SphDwTnV7qr07N3d5N_qWLqcAjurOEOKwUZoDA,,&typo=1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fraymondsmullyan.com%2fbooks%2fwho-knows%2f&c=E,1,mlWEnEdNzLv04QI10AIP0LMUOn93iXch1nMegLlQPAOq-cYBIqujJW4gdYUEuQTKpPUzp1ea879JC3t5SphDwTnV7qr07N3d5N_qWLqcAjurOEOKwUZoDA,,&typo=1> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fraymondsmullyan.com%2fbooks%2fwho-knows%2f&c=E,1,9VLze-Ya03T3kg-RkUd0H2MT8KzhjXM1_P3mWd2yhwzMisAO6YtkAVx_s8XT8vXCkAhdFAGojgJWrOEnJm3bqkoFhlRobx71sav3C5aNAQ,,&typo=1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fraymondsmullyan.com%2fbooks%2fwho-knows%2f&c=E,1,9VLze-Ya03T3kg-RkUd0H2MT8KzhjXM1_P3mWd2yhwzMisAO6YtkAVx_s8XT8vXCkAhdFAGojgJWrOEnJm3bqkoFhlRobx71sav3C5aNAQ,,&typo=1>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fraymondsmullyan.com%2fbooks%2fwho-knows%2f&c=E,1,kd1puIuKqRwYLdYLvOGXWmcK8yvoq-6V6UyCgEYrWEMcCgau9Jh9EDf4mId5w8MTz65ekcYWJKhQArb0V_-b-5JigQzIBkIaSINdHdVQGa-sdMe-lAQ,&typo=1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fraymondsmullyan.com%2fbooks%2fwho-knows%2f&c=E,1,kd1puIuKqRwYLdYLvOGXWmcK8yvoq-6V6UyCgEYrWEMcCgau9Jh9EDf4mId5w8MTz65ekcYWJKhQArb0V_-b-5JigQzIBkIaSINdHdVQGa-sdMe-lAQ,&typo=1> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fraymondsmullyan.com%2fbooks%2fwho-knows%2f&c=E,1,NurRTSqj5GjO0P5dvBQvndqnW4TBWCCpQjK5xVXcDuHkiaqJ1XOtzFeGSRgp5MO9z3vTP4RZWXFMT7rTd68npa8dNPeUXmmgquZsMXu1Aw,,&typo=1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fraymondsmullyan.com%2fbooks%2fwho-knows%2f&c=E,1,NurRTSqj5GjO0P5dvBQvndqnW4TBWCCpQjK5xVXcDuHkiaqJ1XOtzFeGSRgp5MO9z3vTP4RZWXFMT7rTd68npa8dNPeUXmmgquZsMXu1Aw,,&typo=1>>>). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This faith that "going high" will, in the long run, win out, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems naive to me. The temptation to "hoist the black flag >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and start slitting throats" isn't merely a thresholded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reaction, it's an intuitive grasp of the iterated prisoner's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dilemma, tit-for-tat style strategies, and Ashby's LoRV. But >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm open to changing my mind on that. Maybe I'm just too >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> low-brow? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > -- > ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,WIOosuuriWP30LP_oO1-KNv6tXrlv18hVWREMkOC_SDuUzGt71b859NooznYnRYVcc-Z-ZO2dmjDM7IcQPuT9DLNGVP-LvscCEEPeYuK19BXFZ1yofVfBw,,&typo=1 > to (un)subscribe > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,abyv7O51FHDr6f8tCN6IYzyWWe8XCoXmAQHK2Hi03x7ooyCykZHfjyJce0r9L8MXa5YZQj4Xb_0B2sbmwGoM-ttHW6B0MFotxnRgx4A5BpLtJQ,,&typo=1 > FRIAM-COMIC > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,8p2dZzE6imzjIWjBciQlhKg6GqWTTFjaKDTF09bmT8nIUTYWz7jQ0QHUmvHbVcnuJOb318o88TYZsFqvHGJy06g-OTrQPVN0UkzdGV5cAN3dkkQR&typo=1 > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,QqsnVD11vZR1vFRnQ_9tRG5e6eZIgMIDf40H_d8fmnl-PoVCnIafM5a4S2eGkpTRuNY4CHXxRszFPtoPTtMXNj__lYA-FqBaSDupN6Cdqw,,&typo=1 > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
