Because feelings are higher order emotions, and empathy is *being in* the same
higher order state as another, it's not *necessary* that the lower order states
match. I.e. person A feels X as a higher order state of Y. But person B feels X
as a higher order state of Z. Empathy's a form of robustness (multiple
generator states result in the same/similar phenomenon).
This makes your phrasing "slightly less convincing" important. As an example, in a meeting the
other day, somebody asserted that "women experience pain differently from men". In that context, it
was a fine thing to say ... a recognition of diversity. But it's not only unsubstantiated, it's probably
false. That's because the inter-individual variation in *expressions* of pain (we can't measure experience,
only behavior while experiencing) absolutely swamps inter-group variation. I.e. the difference between how
any 2 men or any 2 women "experience" pain is much higher than any difference between that of all
women vs. all men or the average woman or the average man, etc.
Granted pain is, I think, more of an emotion than a feeling, at least acute pain, maybe
not chronic pain. But the point still stands. When can we be wrong about our assessment
of others feelings? And to what extent do we have fine-grained control over feelings?
There seems to be a subset of researchers who think empathy requires person B feel *both*
their own idiogenic feelings *and* person A's feelings in order for to be called
"empathy". I.e. empathy isn't *being in* that exogenous high order state so
much as being in an even higher order state where you feel both (your own and their)
feelings ... what? ... simultaneously maybe?
That has to be the case for your story, here. And if so, then I agree. It
should be easier to regulate a 2nd order state than a 1st order state. And the
higher the order, the easier it would be to be disciplined about it ... I guess
up to a point, like where the inferential chain is so long and wobbly it tricks
you into believing pseudo-profound bullshit.
p.s. Sorry for all the emphasis marks (*). Sometimes I can't help it.
On 10/17/24 09:47, Marcus Daniels wrote:
I think my gating is dynamic. For example, a week ago a guy didn’t look and
pulled in front me on my bicycle when I had the right of way. I hit him hard
enough to break bones. He circled back and seemed fearful and contrite. Had
his emotions been even slightly less convincing, and especially if I thought he
could absorb the cost, I would have made an example out of him. That’s a
combination of mentalizing and empathy. But like a strong immune response, I
will sometimes drive the empathy to zero in seconds. It just doesn’t make
sense to me why people would not discipline their feelings in such situations.
*From: *Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> on behalf of glen
<geprope...@gmail.com>
*Date: *Thursday, October 17, 2024 at 9:18 AM
*To: *friam@redfish.com <friam@redfish.com>
*Subject: *Re: [FRIAM] tolerance of intolerance
Yes. The model need not be structurally analogous to the referent. And the proof is in the
pudding. If your estimator works better than those around you, as Eric seems to say, your
cup's plenty full. But for me, there's a kind of frustration. I have friends who skillfully
use filter bubbles. They may still, sporadically, have to interact in some relatively deep
way with some outsider who doesn't have access to the lessons a failed prediction can
teach. And they have coping mechanisms for those interactions (e.g. a Peter Principle boss
or co-author). For some reason, I don't have the facility with the filter bubble. Or maybe
I'm addicted to chaos <https://youtu.be/ntrMqThnzTU?si=pzlZj0OFd_rDjnf1
<https://youtu.be/ntrMqThnzTU?si=pzlZj0OFd_rDjnf1>>.
But there's still something there. Art like The Curse
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Curse_(American_TV_series
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Curse_(American_TV_series>)> seem like genius to me. They're little
more than a derivation from things like Jackass <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jackass_(franchise
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jackass_(franchise>)>. But these things dig at something deep. Some of
us, for whatever reason, experience empathy (which I'll define as "experiencing another's feelings",
where feelings are higher order emotions). This trait seems distinct from mentalizing (modeling another's mind).
I'm pretty good at mentalizing, say, a Trump supporter. I don't have empathy
for the Trump supporters I've met, though. And that seems important. It
suggests to me that my estimator *could* be more accurate and efficient if I
could somehow feel what they feel, especially if I could turn it on and off at
will.
On 10/16/24 11:53, Marcus Daniels wrote:
I take the asocial view: Reliable, rapidly retargetable prediction methods are
all that matter. Can one anticipate what will happen in the world and get
ahead of it?
With that capability, there is no need to use truth as a cudgel. The power
the prediction methods provide are a deeper source of power. Sure, the truths
can be high order stabilities. Who cares?
--
ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ
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