Steve, you are not alone. On Sat, Feb 18, 2023 at 10:11 AM Steve Smith <sasm...@swcp.com> wrote:
> <on a tangent from a tangent among tangents> > > Thanks to EricC for introducing the very idea of a *tangent* to this > discussion. I would propose that "mental stuff" might be characterized > *by* tangents? The mathematical/geometric definition of *tangent* tends > to suggest a *reduction* of the curve or arc or path at a specific point > along it *to* the direction components of that point/vector in phase space. > > When we colloquially say something is a tangent (a geometric metaphor for > thought and discussion) we mean that at some point along the path of > logic/conversation/discussion/description *another* path diverges but in > fact follows the instantaneous or point-localized vector and is one of an > uncountable member of a family of curves with that direction component. > This implies that it is relevant to the original (implied) path but somehow > is unexpected or a divergence from what *somebody* regards as the original > arc of the conversation? > > In the spirit of an extravagant application of metaphor I realized as I > was trying to formulate *this tangent* that my underlying model of human > thought (individual and collective) is registered on a high dimensional > calculus of variations conceit. And in deference to Glen's regular > reminder to of us of the risk of excess meaning (also Reese and Overton > 1970) and premature binding/registration, I do believe that there are > elements of a romantic/nostalgic force-fit in this game I play here. > > It feels to me as if at "every point in a conversation" that there are a > plethora (uncountable but not infiinite?) of possible divergences and to be > healthy (whatever that means) there needs to be a tension between > predictable and interesting (if those are actual opposites?)... > > Perhaps I am alone in this intuition/conception but the collective > conversation that I apprehend *here* and in the larger world (exempli > gratia: the news-stream/social-media milieu), narrative arcs of "truth" > feel to me be not unlike least action paths or even Feynman path > integrals. The superposition of possible arcs/paths and something like > probability/possibility/plausability fields (family of curves weighted by > ???) within our (intersubjective ala Harari) realities. > > Listening to the "fake news media's" discussion of the "Faux (Fox/Murdoch) > News Media"'s troubles with the courts over the Dominion Voting Machine > ?Libel? suits gave me the distinct feeling that the former is (at the very > least) attempting to enforce some sort of cause-effect rules on the > news-sphere whilst the latter (Murdoch++) is trying to carve a shape in > rhetoric space which fits a pre-determined grand narrative that fits some > higher-order agenda/model. Some of the circular logic exposed (where, for > example, the Trump-team would make a claim which Faux folks would pick up > and echo as "it has been suggested" and then Trump-echo would call-respond > with "the media has reported" and thus the resonance in the echo chamber is > triggered/tuned, feels like a deliberate challenge to the prohibition of > causal loops in mechanics. > > Of course, they would (and not without some merit) claim the same of > "everyone else" in media? Meanwhile the binary distribution within our > political spectrum suggests a tension between two equal but disparate > cosmologies which attract ideation and opinion to those two "poles". > > > References: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haroun_and_the_Sea_of_Stories > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Library_of_Babel > > On 2/18/23 6:29 AM, Eric Charles wrote: > > I don't know what you mean by "mental stuff", of course. > > Well... In this context, I mean whatever the "psyche" part of panpsychism > entails. > > Given that I don't believe in disembodied minds, I'm with you 100% on > everything you do being "body stuff". Which, presumably, leads to the > empirical question of what types of bodies do "psyche", and where those > types of bodies can be found. > > You say further that: No. Neither the dirt nor I do "mental stuff". > > Well, now we have something to actually talk about then! Dave West, > unsurprisingly, stepped in strongly on the side of dirt having psyche in at > least a rudimentary form, I presume he would assert that you (Glen) do > mental stuff too. Dave also asserts that his belief in panpsychism *does* > affect > how he lives in the world. Exactly to the extent that his way of living in > the world is made different by the belief, panpsychism *is* more than > just something he says. > > Steve's discussion about what it would feel like to be the bit of dirt > trampled beneath a particular foot is a bit of a tangent - potentially > interesting in its own right. His discussion of when he, personally, starts > to attribute identity - and potentially psyche - to clumps of inanimate > stuff seems directly on topic, especially as he too has listed some ways > his behaviors change when he becomes engaged in those habits. > > > > > On Fri, Feb 17, 2023 at 2:36 AM ⛧ glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Doubling down on the incredulity fallacy? OK. Yes. There is something it >> is like to be trampled dirt. I don't know what you mean by "mental stuff", >> of course. I don't do any mental stuff as far as I know. Everything I do is >> inherently "body stuff". Maybe that's because I've experienced chronic pain >> my whole life. Maybe some of you consistently live in a body free >> experience? I've only experienced that a few times, e.g. running in a >> fasted state. And I later suffered for that indulgent delusion. >> >> No. Neither the dirt nor I do "mental stuff". So you need a more concrete >> question. >> >> On February 16, 2023 6:04:17 PM PST, Eric Charles < >> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >"an account of the seemingly analogous position of panpsychism" >> > >> >What is that more than something people say? >> > >> >Do *you* experience the dirt at your feet as having a mental life? If so, >> >tell me about it: What is the dirt like when it seems to be doing mental >> >stuff? What kind of mental stuff is it doing? >> > >> >If not: Have you seen anyone who earnestly thinks the dirt is doing >> mental >> >stuff? If so, what were *they* like? How was that belief pervasive in >> their >> >adjustments to the world? Based on your experiences with that person, how >> >do you think your ways of acting in the world would change if you adopted >> >such a position? >> > >> > >> ><echar...@american.edu> >> > >> > >> >On Thu, Feb 16, 2023 at 1:27 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > >> >> I don't grok the context well enough to equivocate on concepts like >> "have" >> >> and "category of being". But in response to Nick's question: "What is >> there >> >> that animals do that demands us to invent categories to explain their >> >> behavior?", my answer is "animals discretize the ambient muck". So if >> >> categorization is somehow fundamentally related to discretization, then >> >> animals clearly categorize in that sense. >> >> >> >> I mean, all you have to do is consider the frequencies of light the >> >> animals' eyeballs do or don't see. That's two categories right there, >> the >> >> light they do see and the light they don't. Unless there's some >> sophistry >> >> hidden behind the question, the answer seems clear. Reflection on what >> one >> >> does and does not categorize isn't necessary. I could even claim my >> truck >> >> discretizes fluids ... those that make it seize up versus lubricate it, >> >> those that it burns vs those that stop it cold. Etc. Maybe the >> question is >> >> better formulated as "What makes one impute categories on another?" >> Clearly >> >> my truck doesn't impute categories on squirrels. >> >> >> >> But Nick does follow that question with this "experience" nonsense. So >> my >> >> guess is there *is* some sophistry behind the question, similar to >> EricC's >> >> incredulous response to DaveW's question about phenomenological >> composition >> >> of experience(s). What I find missing in Nick's (and EricC's) >> distillation >> >> of experience monism is an account of the seemingly analogous position >> of >> >> panpsychism. Were I a scholar, I might take such work on myself. But >> I'm >> >> not and, hence, very much appreciate these distillations of dead white >> >> men's metaphysics and will take what I can get. 8^D >> >> >> >> On 2/16/23 09:22, Steve Smith wrote: >> >> > Might I offer some terminology reframing, or at least ask for some >> >> additional explication? >> >> > >> >> > 1. I think "behaviours" would be all Nick's Martians *could* >> observe? >> >> They would be inferring "experiences" from observed behaviours? >> >> > 2. When we talk about "categories" here, are we talking about >> >> "categories of being"? Ontologies, as it were? >> >> > >> >> > Regarding ErisS' reflections... I *do* think that animals behave >> *as >> >> if* they "have categories", though I don't know what it even means to >> say >> >> that they "have categories" in the way Aristotle and his >> legacy-followers >> >> (e.g. us) do... I would suggest/suspect that dogs and squirrels are >> in no >> >> way aware of these "categories" and that to say that they do is a >> >> projection by (us) humans who have fabricated the (useful in myriad >> >> contexts) of a category/Category/ontology. So in that sense they do >> NOT >> >> *have* categories... I think in this conception/thought-experiment we >> >> assume that Martians *would* and would be looking to map their own >> >> ontologies onto the behaviour (and inferred experiences and >> judgements?) >> >> of Terran animals? >> >> > >> >> > If I were to invert the subject/object relation, I would suggest >> that it >> >> is "affordances" not "experiences" (or animals' behaviours) we want to >> >> categorize into ontologies? It is what things are "good for" that make >> >> them interesting/similar/different to living beings. And "good for" >> is >> >> conditionally contextualized. My dog and cat both find squirrels >> "good >> >> for" chasing, but so too for baby rabbits and skunks (once). >> >> > >> >> > Or am I barking up the wrong set of reserved lexicons? >> >> > >> >> > To segue (as I am wont to do), it feels like this discussion >> parallels >> >> the one about LLMs where we train the hell out of variations on >> learning >> >> classifier systems until they are as good as (or better than) we >> (humans) >> >> are at predicting the next token in a string of human-generated tokens >> (or >> >> synthesizing a string of tokens which humans cannot distinguish from a >> >> string generated by another human, in particular one with the >> proverbial >> >> 10,000 hours of specialized training). The fact that or "ologies" >> tend to >> >> be recorded and organized as knowledge structures and in fact usually >> >> *propogated* (taught/learnt) by the same makes us want to believe >> (some of >> >> us) that hidden inside these LLMs are precisely the same "ologies" we >> >> encode in our myriad textbooks and professional journal articles? >> >> > >> >> > I think one of the questions that remains present within this group's >> >> continued 'gurgitations is whether the organizations we have conjured >> are >> >> particularly special, or just one of an infinitude of superposed >> >> alternative formulations? And whether some of those formulations are >> >> acutely occult and/or abstract and whether the existing (accepted) >> >> formulations (e.g. Western Philosophy and Science, etc) are uniquely >> (and >> >> exclusively or at least optimally) capable of capturing/describing >> what is >> >> "really real" (nod to George Berkeley). >> >> > >> >> > Some here (self included) may often suggest that such formulation is >> at >> >> best a coincidence of history and as well as it "covers" a description >> of >> >> "reality", it is by circumstance and probably by abstract conception >> ("all >> >> models are wrong...") incomplete and in error. But nevertheless still >> >> useful... >> >> > >> >> > Maybe another way of reframing Nick's question (on a tangent) is to >> ask >> >> whether the Barsoomians had their own Aristotle to conceive of >> >> Categories? Or did they train their telescopes on ancient Greece and >> >> learn Latin Lip Reading and adopt one or more the Greek's philosophical >> >> traditions? And then, did the gas-balloon creatures floating in the >> >> atmosphere-substance of Jupiter observe the Martians' who had observed >> the >> >> Greeks and thereby come up with their own Categories. Maybe it was >> those >> >> creatures who beamed these abstractions straight into the neural >> tissue of >> >> the Aristotelians and Platonists? Do gas-balloon creatures even have >> >> solids to be conceived of as Platonic? And are they missing out if >> they >> >> don't? Do they have their own Edwin Abbot Abbot? And what would the >> >> Cheela <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragon%27s_Egg> say? >> >> > >> >> > My dog and the rock squirrels he chases want to know... so do the >> cholla >> >> cactus fruits/segments they hoard in their nests! >> >> > >> >> > Mumble, >> >> > >> >> > - Steve >> >> > >> >> > On 2/16/23 5:37 AM, Santafe wrote: >> >> >> It’s the tiniest and most idiosyncratic take on this question, but >> >> FWIW, here: >> >> >> https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1520752113 >> >> >> >> >> >> I actually think that all of what Nick says below is a perfectly >> good >> >> draft of a POV. >> >> >> >> >> >> As to whether animals “have” categories: Spend time with a dog. >> >> Doesn’t take very much time. Their interest in conspecifics is (ahem) >> >> categorically different from their interest in people, different than >> to >> >> squirrels, different than to cats, different than to snakes. >> >> >> >> >> >> For me to even say that seems like cueing a narcissism of small >> >> differences, when overwhelmingly, their behavior is structured around >> >> categories, as is everyone else’s. Squirrels don’t mistake acorns for >> >> birds of prey. Or for the tree limbs and house roofs one can jump >> onto. >> >> Or for other squirrels. It’s all categories. Behavior is an >> operation on >> >> categories. >> >> >> >> >> >> I found it interesting that you invoked “nouns” as a framework that >> is >> >> helpful but sometimes obstructive. One might just have said “words”. >> This >> >> is interesting to me already, because my syntactician friends will >> tell you >> >> that a noun is not, as we were taught as children, a “word for a >> person, >> >> place, or thing”, but rather a “word in a language that transforms as >> nouns >> >> transform in that language”, which is a bit of an obfuscation, since >> they >> >> do have in common that they are in some way “object-words”. But from >> the >> >> polysemy and synonymy perspective, we see that “meanings” cross the >> >> noun-verb syntactic distinction quite frequently for some categories. >> >> Eye/see, ear/hear, moon/shine, and stuff like that. My typologist >> friends >> >> tell me that is common but particular to some meanings much more than >> >> others. >> >> >> >> >> >> Another fun thing I was told by Ted Chiang a few months ago, which I >> >> was amazed I had not heard from linguists, and still want to hold in >> >> reserve until I can check it further. He says that languages without >> >> written forms do not have a word for “word”. If true, that seems very >> >> interesting and important. If Chiang believes it to be true, it is >> >> probably already a strong enough regularity to be more-or-less true, >> and >> >> thus still interesting and important. >> >> >> >> >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Feb 15, 2023, at 1:19 PM,<thompnicks...@gmail.com> < >> >> thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >>> >> >> >>> FWiW, I willmake every effort to arrive fed to Thuam by 10.30 >> >> Mountain. I want to hear the experts among you hold forth on WTF a >> >> cateogory actually IS. I am thinking (duh) that a category is a more >> or >> >> less diffuse node in a network of associations (signs, if you must). >> Hence >> >> they constitute a vast table of what goes with what, what is >> predictable >> >> from what, etc. This accommodates “family resemblance” quite >> nicely. Do >> >> I think animals have categories, in this sense, ABSOLUTELY EFFING YES. >> Does >> >> this make me a (shudder) nominalist? I hope not. >> >> >>> Words…nouns in particular… confuse this category business. Words >> >> place constraints on how vague these nodes can be. They impose on the >> >> network constraints to which it is ill suited. True, the more my >> >> associations with “horse” line up with your associations with “horse”, >> the >> >> more true the horse seems. Following Peirce, I would say that where >> our >> >> nodes increasingly correspond with increasing shared experience, we >> have >> >> evidence ot the (ultimate) truth of the nodes, their “reality” in >> Peirce’s >> >> terms. Here is where I am striving to hang on to Peirce’s realism. >> >> >>> The reason I want the geeks to participate tomorrow is that I keep >> >> thinking of a semantic webby thing that Steve devised for the Institute >> >> about a decade ago. Now a semantic web would be a kind of metaphor >> for an >> >> associative web; don’t associate with other words in exactly the same >> >> manner in which experiences associate with other experiences. Still, I >> >> think the metaphor is interesting. Also, I am kind of re-interested >> in my >> >> “authorial voice”, how much it operates like cbt. >> >> >>> >> >> >>> >> -- >> glen ⛧ >> >> -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> archives: 5/2017 thru present >> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >> > > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > -- Merle Lefkoff, Ph.D. Center for Emergent Diplomacy emergentdiplomacy.org Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA mobile: (303) 859-5609
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