You might also take a look at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_graph
We briefly discussed this awhile back: https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/2020-December/086342.html On 12/20/21 13:02, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote:
I think you mean by a "fork" what we call a "common cause". When two variables are correlated it may be that they have a common cause. Sober’s word, not mine. Yours is the meaning he seems to give it. The whole article concerns how a causal “fork” breathes life into hypothetical “inner” variables. The abstract concerns how a causal collision breathes life into hypothetical “inner” variables. You and glen agree that order is NOT important, so now I am going to have a rethink. Does it make any sense to distinguish between logical and temporal order? So B is true, given A, speaks to logical order. A CAUSES B speaks to temporal order, unless we have given up on the requirement that the Cause A cannot occur after A itself. N Nick Thompson thompnicks...@gmail.com <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> *From:* Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Frank Wimberly *Sent:* Monday, December 20, 2021 12:02 PM *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Dear Long Suffering Colleagues I think you mean by a "fork" what we call a "common cause". When two variables are correlated it may be that they have a common cause. --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Mon, Dec 20, 2021, 8:17 AM uǝlƃ ☤>$ <geprope...@gmail.com <mailto:geprope...@gmail.com>> wrote: I don't understand your criticism. What do you think is "cocked up"? [⛧] I'll take a swipe at what might be the problem: The concluding paragraph seems to make the point that forks *are* (reversed) collisions and collisions are (reversed) forks. The key may lie in some preemptive registration of words like "prediction". If you stick to words like "relation" and "correlation" and toss out all the mechanistic/causal language, it might be clearer how forks are collisions and vice versa. The only difference is the *direction* of inference. But to be clear, despite my guess above, I'm asking a question. What do you think is wrong, here? [⛧] For my own convenience, here's the link to the article I *think* we're talking about: methodological behaviorism, causal chains, and causal forks https://behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/BPv45_SOBER.pdf <https://behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/BPv45_SOBER.pdf> On 12/19/21 10:08 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: > */Yes! Right! Thankyou! /* > > That is now obvious to you because you know that stuff. But for three weeks it has been driving me crazy. > > > > Now for the second point. > > > > E1 and E2, each causally contribute to a behavior, B. In this case, postulating > > an inner state, I, that is caused by both E1 and E2, and which causes I, affects > > one's predictions concerning the relationship between environment and behavior. > > > > This is from the abstract of the article. Not only do we see the same slip-up with respect to I (I IS after all, the inner state), but we see also that the abstract entertains an article about causal convergence (“collision”), not causal forks. Yet every where else, in the title, or in the body, the article seems to be talking about forks. Even with my weak knowledge of formal logic and probability, I can see that that would make a huge difference. Can you confirm also that that is a cockup, so I don’t spend another month trying to make it make sense?
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