Roger Different Qualia are a result fo different phisical effect in the senses. So a machine does not need to have qualia to distinguish between phisical effectds. It only need sensors that distinguish between them.
A sensor can detect a red light and the attached computer can stop a car. With no problems. http://www.gizmag.com/mercedes-benz-smart-stop-system/13122/ 2012/10/20 Roger Clough <[email protected]> > Hi Bruno Marchal > > In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that > a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia > are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms > what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red > is what the body gives you, the sensation of red > is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind > also can recall past sensations of red to compare > it with and give it a name "red", which a real > person can identify as eg a red traffic light > and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing > the fact that red and green lights are in different > positions). > That would be a test of zombieness. > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 10/20/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51 > Subject: Re: A test for solipsism > > On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > > > Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig > > believes about the p-zombie. > > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie > > > > "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and > > perception is a hypothetical being > > that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that > > it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a > > zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel > > any pain though it behaves > > exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from > > the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)." > > > > My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say > > that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, > > which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in > > typing the first part of this sentence. > Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. > But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, > without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they > might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is > no solipsist. > There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition, > almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p > features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory > which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable, > and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to > some theory. > Bruno > > > > > > > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > > 10/17/2012 > > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > > From: Bruno Marchal > > Receiver: everything-list > > Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 > > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of > > overlycomplexcomputations ? > > > > > > > > > > On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > > > > On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > > > > Hi Stephen P. King > > > > Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that > > consciousness, arises at (or above ?) > > the level of noncomputability. He just seems to > > say that intuiton does. But that just seems > > to be a conjecture of his. > > > > > > ugh, [email protected] > > 10/16/2012 > > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > > > > Hi Roger, > > > > IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the > > content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... > > > > > > > > So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the > > existence of p-zombie? > > > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > > . > > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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