Hi William R. Buckley You can speak to a potential test subject, but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind. This is the Turing test, the results of which are not certain. But it is the only test I can think of unless you want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc.
If it does not reply, it's a zombie. But just to be certain, if it does, as a Turing test, I would ask a series of questions a zombie (someone without a mind) would probably not know, such as 1) what color are your eyes ? 2) What color are my eyes ? 3) What is your mother's name ? 4) How many fingers am I holding up ? 5) What color is a plenget ? 6) Who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election? 7) What is your birth date? 8) Where were you born? 9) How tall am I ? 10) Am I taller than you are ? 10) Do you prefer vanillaberries to Mukle pudding ? etc. Roger Clough, [email protected] 10/19/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: William R. Buckley Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-18, 21:36:39 Subject: RE: A test for solipsism Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation, even if that conversation is with an illusion. For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference. Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe. wrb > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:everything- > [email protected]] On Behalf Of Roger Clough > Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM > To: everything-list > Subject: A test for solipsism > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig > believes about the p-zombie. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie > > "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and > perception is a hypothetical being > that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it > lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is > poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain > though it behaves > exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the > stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)." > > My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that > if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, > which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing > the first part of this sentence. > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 10/17/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of > overlycomplexcomputations ? > > > > > On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Stephen P. King > > Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that > consciousness, arises at (or above ?) > the level of noncomputability. He just seems to > say that intuiton does. But that just seems > to be a conjecture of his. > > > ugh, [email protected] > 10/16/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > Hi Roger, > > IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the > content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... > > > > So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the > existence of p-zombie? > > > Bruno > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
