Re: Measurability is not a condition of reality.

Bruno Marchal Sun, 21 Oct 2012 06:35:17 -0700


On 20 Oct 2012, at 20:55, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Then the measure addict people believe in a lot of things that arenot measurable: they believe in an external reality .

Not the computationalist (one they get the consequences of compcorrectly). They believe in a sharable dreams as they are not solipist.Is there or not a physical universe? The question is not even welldefined, once you know that the physical reality has to emerge fromdreams coherence conditions, coming from the constraint of arithmetic.

They believe in a certain pitagoric cult to measurement, that is notmeasurable.

All the consequences of comp are testable, and indeed QM confirms themup to now. Not Newton mechanics, not GR, but QM confirms even theformal details.

They believe that their perception is transparent, and that his mindplay no role, because it translates a complete objective andaccurate view of reality. Therefore the mind and his relation withmatter is not worth to study. They believe in things not measurable,like countries, specially their own (which they would laugh If i saythat their country is a bunch of atoms. Apparently theirreductionism is selective).

I agree with you, all this is not serious. But it is the completecontrary of comp, which has a precise theory of mind (Boole, Boolos,computer science, mathematical logic, arithmetic) and it explainswhere the beliefs in matter and consciousness come from, withoutpostulating them, except at the start in the definition of comp.

With comp, there are no "bunch of atoms" in the reality, only in themind of infinities of numbers. They have to be modalities of self-reference.

Keep well distinct materialism and computationalism, as they arecompletely opposite.

They believe in their loved ones that are dead (they do not existaccording with their point of view, but they sometimes talk withthem, dedicate books to them and act like if they are observingthem. They bet, trust and believe in persons, despite the fact thatthey are nor measurable.. They believe in their leaders. Theybelieve in some scientist that are liars. but they believe themwithout making measures and experiments for themselves. It seems thaalmost all that they believe derives from a sense of authority, likeany other persom.
And they do it well on believing in these nor measurable things,because if they doint believe, they would be paralized and will killsomeone or kill themselves.

COMP + materialism leads to nihilism, person elimination, godelimination, etc. Unfortunately, for historical circumstances, mostscientist believes in both comp and materialism, but this is justlogically contradictory (and that is not entirely obvious, so you canconsult the argument).


Bruno


2012/10/20 Roger Clough <[email protected]>
Hi Alberto G. Corona

I have no problem with that, the problem I have
is that I believe that nonphysical things (things,
like Descartes' "mind", not extended in space)
like spirit, truly exist.  But to materialists,
that's nonsense, because being inextended it
can't be measured and so doesn't exist.
And life is just a unique form of matter,
so can be created.  And what is man but a
bunch of atoms ?



Roger Clough, [email protected]
10/20/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-20, 08:48:39
Subject: Re: Re: A test for solipsism


Roger

Different Qualia are a result fo different phisical effect in thesenses. So a machine does not need to have qualia to distinguishbetween phisical effectds. It only need sensors that distinguishbetween them.

A sensor can detect a red light and the attached computer can stop acar. With no problems.?



http://www.gizmag.com/mercedes-benz-smart-stop-system/13122/



2012/10/20 Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
also can recall past sensations of red to compare
it with and give it a name "red", which a real
person can identify as eg a red traffic light
and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing
the fact that red and green lights are in different
positions).
That would be a test of zombieness.
?
Roger Clough, [email protected]
10/20/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism

On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
> believes about the p-zombie.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
>
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
> perception is a hypothetical being
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that
> it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a
> zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel
> any pain though it behaves
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from
> the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
>
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say
> that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in
> typing the first part of this sentence.
Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.
But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,
without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they
might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is
no solipsist.
There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,
almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p
features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory
which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,
and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to
some theory.
Bruno
?
?
?
>
>
> Roger Clough, [email protected]
> 10/17/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
> overlycomplexcomputations ?
>
>
>
>
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi Stephen P. King
>
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> the level of noncomputability. He just seems to
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> to be a conjecture of his.
>
>
> ugh, [email protected]
> 10/16/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> Hi Roger,
>
> IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
>
>
>
> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the
> existence of p-zombie?
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> Groups "Everything List" group.

> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].

> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
[email protected]
> .
> For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
> .
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
?
--

You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.

To post to this group, send email to [email protected].