Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red is what the body gives you, the sensation of red is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind also can recall past sensations of red to compare it with and give it a name "red", which a real person can identify as eg a red traffic light and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing the fact that red and green lights are in different positions). That would be a test of zombieness.
Roger Clough, [email protected] 10/20/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig > believes about the p-zombie. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie > > "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and > perception is a hypothetical being > that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that > it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a > zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel > any pain though it behaves > exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from > the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)." > > My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say > that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, > which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in > typing the first part of this sentence. Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is no solipsist. There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition, almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable, and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to some theory. Bruno > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 10/17/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of > overlycomplexcomputations ? > > > > > On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Stephen P. King > > Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that > consciousness, arises at (or above ?) > the level of noncomputability. He just seems to > say that intuiton does. But that just seems > to be a conjecture of his. > > > ugh, [email protected] > 10/16/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > Hi Roger, > > IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the > content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... > > > > So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the > existence of p-zombie? > > > Bruno > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
