Ian Jackson wrote: > Instead, the Leadership is supposed to be the front-line mechanism for > oversight of Delegates, but it isn't working. That's one of the "more > fundamental problems" that I was suggesting would be a better focus.
I get your point, and I mostly agree. However, I wonder how that fits with 8.2: "The Project Leader may not make the position as a Delegate conditional on particular decisions by the Delegate" As I understand it, that means that the Leader cannot say "I give you this delegation, but you must do X". It may be argued that, by the same token, the Leader cannot say either "you must do X or I'll revoke your delegation", and even "since you don't want to do X, I'm appointing another delegate who will do it" seems questionable, for it's clearly a way to work around that prohibition. In other words, it looks like the DPL's power to "oversee" delegates is explicitly limited by the Constitution, and a GR is indeed the only way to overrule them, unless the TC is empowered to do that. > A similar situation doesn't arise for TC decisions about packages, > because there we have NMUs which can be used to implemente a decison. The difference is only that in this case there is a straightforward way to work around the resistance of a "person who does not want to do a task" (as per 2.1.1). I'm not convinced that this is enough reason why the TC shouldn't act also when there isn't. Gerardo
