My relay has gone off the consensus. Fingerprint: E7FFF8C3D5736AB87215C5DB05620103033E69C3 Alias: rasptor4273 Am running Tor 0.2.5.14 on Debian, Raspberry Pi 2B. I upgraded to that version on September 3rd.
I grepped through these: https://collector.torproject.org/archive/relay-descriptors/consensuses/ and the latest entry I found for my alias is in the file ./17/2017-09-17-13-00-00-consensus. Not sure what other information I can provide. Do let me know if I can do anything else to help troubleshoot. Best, Joep On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 9:14 PM, George <geo...@queair.net> wrote: > David Goulet: > > Hello everyone! > > > > Since July 2017, there has been a steady decline in relays from ~7k to > now > > ~6.5k. This is a bit unusual that is we don't see often such a steady > behavior > > of relays going offline (at least that I can remember...). > > > > It could certainly be something normal here. However, we shouldn't rule > out a > > bug in tor as well. The steadyness of the decline makes me a bit more > worried > > than usual. > > > > You can see the decline has started around July 2017: > > > > https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html?start= > 2017-06-01&end=2017-10-23 > > > > What happened around July in terms of tor release: > > > > 2017-06-08 09:35:17 -0400 802d30d9b7 (tag: tor-0.3.0.8) > > 2017-06-08 09:47:44 -0400 e14006a545 (tag: tor-0.2.5.14) > > 2017-06-08 09:47:58 -0400 aa89500225 (tag: tor-0.2.9.11) > > 2017-06-08 09:55:28 -0400 f833164576 (tag: tor-0.2.4.29) > > 2017-06-08 09:55:58 -0400 21a9e5371d (tag: tor-0.2.6.12) > > 2017-06-08 09:56:15 -0400 3db01d3b56 (tag: tor-0.2.7.8) > > 2017-06-08 09:58:36 -0400 64ac28ef5d (tag: tor-0.2.8.14) > > 2017-06-08 10:15:41 -0400 dc47d936d4 (tag: tor-0.3.1.3-alpha) > > ... > > 2017-06-29 16:56:13 -0400 fab91a290d (tag: tor-0.3.1.4-alpha) > > 2017-06-29 17:03:23 -0400 22b3bf094e (tag: tor-0.3.0.9) > > ... > > 2017-08-01 11:33:36 -0400 83389502ee (tag: tor-0.3.1.5-alpha) > > 2017-08-02 11:50:57 -0400 c33db290a9 (tag: tor-0.3.0.10) > > > > Note that on August 1st 2017, 0.2.4, 0.2.6 and 0.2.7 went end of life. > > > > That being said, I don't have an easy way to list which relays went > offline > > during the decline (since July basically) to see if a common pattern > emerges. > > > > So few things. First, if anyone on this list noticed that their relay > went off > > the consensus while still having tor running, it is a good time to > inform this > > thread :). > > > > Second, anyone could have an idea of what possibly is going on that is > have > > one or more theories. Even better, if you have some tooling to try to > list > > which relays went offline, that would be _awesome_. > > > > Third, knowing what was the state of packaging in > Debian/Redhat/Ubuntu/... > > around July could be useful. What if a package in distro X is broken and > the > > update have been killing the relays? Or something like that... > > > > Last, looking at the dirauth would be a good idea. Basically, when did > the > > majority switched to 030 and then 031. Starting in July, what was the > state of > > the dirauth version? > > > > Any help is very welcome! Again, this decline could be from natural > cause but > > for now I just don't want to rule out an issue in tor or packaging. > > (Replying to OP since it went OT) > > As some of you know, TDP did a little suite of shell scripts based on > OONI data to look at diversity statistics: > > https://torbsd.github.io/oostats.html > > With the source here for further tinkering: > > https://github.com/torbsd/tdp-onion-stats/ > > Maybe something we could look at is "exception reports", which in some > industries means regular reports that look at anomalies or "exceptions" > which display out-of-the-ordinary statistics, generally prompting some > sort of action. > > In other words, daily reports would be run on, say, bw consensus by > country, and if there was some statistically significant change over N > periods of time, it would be noted. Or if a particular OS drops or > jumps. Or if a particular AS jumps or declines for relays, bridges, > whatever. > > If done right, a bunch of these reports could point to particular > changes to the network that need further investigation, and in some > cases, might quickly point to the related issue. Eg, countryX shutdown > ISP with a particular AS number, etc. > > The more reports coupled with careful optimization over time could > become an alarm system for Tor network changes, instead of just "er, > such-and-such distro didnt update their packages then, I just found out > in git." > > Thoughts? > > g > > > -- > > > 34A6 0A1F F8EF B465 866F F0C5 5D92 1FD1 ECF6 1682 > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > >
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