Hi Martin, The draft currently proposes setting "Recommended" to "N" for all SLH-DSA variants. The SLH-DSA variants defined in this document are consistent with OpenSSL 3.5 (see https://openssl-foundation.org/post/2025-04-08-openssl-35-final-release/).
Cheers, -Tiru On Sat, 17 May 2025 at 17:43, Martin Thomson <m...@lowentropy.net> wrote: > I'm opposed. This isn't just one signature algorithm, it is 12. All 12 > of which seem ill-suited to TLS. I get the desire for diversity, but this > is not the choice I'd make. > > On Fri, May 16, 2025, at 23:27, Sean Turner wrote: > > We are continuing with our WG adoption calls for the following I-D: Use > > of SLH-DSA in TLS 1.3 [1]; see [2] for more information about this > > tranche of adoption calls. If you support adoption and are willing to > > review and contribute text, please send a message to the list. If you > > do not support adoption of this draft, please send a message to the > > list and indicate why. This call will close at 2359 UTC on 30 May 2025. > > > > Reminder: This call for adoption has nothing to do with picking the > > mandatory-to-implement cipher suites in TLS. > > > > Cheers, > > Joe and Sean > > > > [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa/ > > [2] > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/KMOTm_lE5OIAKG8_chDlRKuav7c/ > > _______________________________________________ > > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org >
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