I support adoption of pure PQC KEMs drafts with Intended status: Informational
(meaning that the IETF is not recommending using).
Any IPR that can be asserted against Kyber can be asserted against already
adopted hybrid methods incorporating Kyber.
If anything, one may attempt to argue that hybrids do not implement NIST's
MLKEM scheme
and are thus not covered by the NIST licenses.
Y(J)S
-----Original Message-----
From: Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 1, 2025 8:58 AM
To: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: [TLS] WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS
1.3
We are continuing with our pre-announced tranche of WG adoption calls; see [0]
for more information. This time we are issuing a WG adoption call for the
ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3 I-D [1]. If you support adoption
and are willing to review and contribute text, please send a message to the
list. If you do not support adoption of this draft, please send a message to
the list and indicate why. This call will close at 2359 UTC on 15 April 2025.
In response to other WG adoption calls, Dan Bernstein pointed out some
potential IPR (see [2]), but no IPR disclosure has been made in accordance with
BCP 79. Additional information is provided here; see [3].
BCP 79 makes this important point:
(b) The IETF, following normal processes, can decide to use
technology for which IPR disclosures have been made if it decides
that such a use is warranted.
WG members can take this information into account during this adoption call to
determine if we should adopt these drafts.
Reminder: This call for adoption has nothing to do with picking the
mandatory-to-implement cipher suites in TLS.
Cheers,
Joe and Sean
[0] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/KMOTm_lE5OIAKG8_chDlRKuav7c/
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement/
[2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/mt4_p95NZv8duZIJvJPdZV90-ZU/
[3] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/GKFhHfBeCgf8hQQvhUcyOJ6M-kI/
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