> I think we should abandon this effort and not publish.
> 
> When initially proposed this was supposed to be documenting a
> deployed reality. I could just about hold my nose with that,
> but adding in ECH (for which key exfiltration is not currently
> deployed, nor seemingly needed) and the IANA considerations make
> this much more unacceptable.
> 
> While I expected to be in the rough for the initial proposal I
> do hope others find this as unacceptable as I do and we don't
> publish.
> 
> Including ECH here is IMO not necessary - there is no history
> of needing that for debugging purposes so adding it based on
> speculation is IMO wrong and a fatal error.
> 
> This is now extensible (via IANA specification required) which
> is a problem as that means anyone can likely define new ways
> to exfiltrate secrets from TLS implementations without any WG
> overview. That IMO is another fatal error.
> 
> Less importantly, but still substantively, the draft does not,
> but should, recommend that this feature only be available via
> conditional compilation (where available) and not be part of
> any standard library or other release. If publishing, we should
> be aiming for the strongest possible implementation guidance
> in that respect.
> 
> Thanks,
> S.

It seems to me that there are multiple concerns about the real-world (rather 
than just technical) implications of this specification.
Might I suggest polling for opinions regarding the concerns at the IRTF working 
groups concerned with affected real-world implications?

Concretely, according to their RG charters:

- HRPC aims "To expose the relation between protocols and human rights, with a 
focus on
the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly."

- Similarly, PEARG aims to "understand the privacy implications in a wider 
context", although this may refer mainly to the specific privacy enhancing 
technologies intended by the RG members.

Best,

TBB

-- 

```
M.Sc. Thomas Bellebaum
Applied Privacy Technologies
Fraunhofer Institute for Applied and Integrated Security AISEC

Lichtenbergstraße 11, 85748 Garching near Munich (Germany)
Tel. +49 89 32299 86 1039
thomas.belleb...@aisec.fraunhofer.de
https://www.aisec.fraunhofer.de

```

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