[TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Disallowing reuse of ephemeral keys

[Christian Huitema]

I like keeping as they are. Disallowing only makes sense if that prohibition can be enforced, and one of the peer refuses the connection if it detects key reuse. Would we want to do that? And, even if we wanted to accept the cost of refusing connections, could individual nodes actually detect reuse by a peer?  -- Christian Huitema  On Dec 12, 2024, at 10:11 AM, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov=40microsoft....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:  +1 in favor of option1.   Cheers,   Andrei   From: Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com> Sent: Thursday, December 12, 2024 9:43 AM To: Joe Salowey <j...@salowey.net> Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [TLS] Re: Disallowing reuse of ephemeral keys   I prefer option 1.   Russ On Dec 12, 2024, at 12:35 PM, Joseph Salowey <j...@salowey.net> wrote:   Currently RFC 8446 (and RFC8446bis) do not forbid the reuse of ephemeral keys.  This was the consensus of the working group during the development of TLS 1.3.  There has been more recent discussion on the list to forbid reuse for ML-KEM/hybrid key exchange.  There are several possible options here:   Keep things as they are (ie. say nothing, as was done in previous TLS versions, to forbid the reuse of ephemeral keys) - this is the default action if there is no consensus Disallow reuse for specific ciphersuites.  It doesn’t appear that there is any real difference in this matter between MLKEM/hybrids and ECDH here except that there are many more ECDH implementations (some of which may reuse a keyshare) Update 8446 to disallow reuse of ephemeral keyshares in general.  This could be done by revising RFC 8446bis or with a separate document that updates RFC 8446/bis   We would like to know if there are folks who think the reuse of keyshares is important for HTTP or non-HTTP use cases. Thanks, Joe, Deirdre and Sean   _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org

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