I prefer option 1.

Russ

> On Dec 12, 2024, at 12:35 PM, Joseph Salowey <j...@salowey.net> wrote:
> 
> Currently RFC 8446 (and RFC8446bis) do not forbid the reuse of ephemeral 
> keys.  This was the consensus of the working group during the development of 
> TLS 1.3.  There has been more recent discussion on the list to forbid reuse 
> for ML-KEM/hybrid key exchange.  There are several possible options here:
> 
> Keep things as they are (ie. say nothing, as was done in previous TLS 
> versions, to forbid the reuse of ephemeral keys) - this is the default action 
> if there is no consensus
> Disallow reuse for specific ciphersuites.  It doesn’t appear that there is 
> any real difference in this matter between MLKEM/hybrids and ECDH here except 
> that there are many more ECDH implementations (some of which may reuse a 
> keyshare)
> Update 8446 to disallow reuse of ephemeral keyshares in general.  This could 
> be done by revising RFC 8446bis or with a separate document that updates RFC 
> 8446/bis
> 
> We would like to know if there are folks who think the reuse of keyshares is 
> important for HTTP or non-HTTP use cases.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Joe, Deirdre and Sean

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