On 05.12.24 11:03, Ben Smyth wrote:

If they aren't in the model, then analysis is only good up to KeyUpdate.

Sure, I completely agree. We have no guarantees on what is not in the formal model. More precisely, I would like the FATT to comment on the following:

Since issues have already been found by David, does FATT expect more potential issues around KeyUpdate and post-handshake messages that have /not/ yet been found? If yes:

 * (at least) one example of such potential issue.
 * What kind of tools are most suitable for such an analysis? I suspect
   a standard model checker (e.g., SPIN) would do (in contrast to
   symbolic security analysis tools, like ProVerif and Tamarin).

(OpenJDK got KeyUpdate wrong, there were use cases with no security.)
Sounds interesting. Do you have a pointer for me which describes the problem precisely?

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