Please see my earlier comment regarding this draft:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/g3tImSVXO8AEmPH1UlwRB1c1TLs/
In summary: the functionality of this draft is already achievable by
using the client_certificate_type extension defined in RFC 7250:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7250 with certificate type
value = 0:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#tls-extensiontype-values-3.
The table in section 4.2 of RFC8446 even mentions that the extension can
be included in the ClientHello:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.2, thereby
ensuring that the server sends a CertificateRequest message in response
to the ClientHello received.
OpenSSL already implements this extension since it was needed for
support raw public keys (RPKs).
As stated earlier: if it is indeed the case that the
client_certificate_type extension is suitable for the use-case, then
perhaps it is preferable to not have a separate flag. Otherwise, it
would make the state machine at the server more complicated (for
example: handling a ClientHello with both the mTLS flag and the
client_certificate_type extension.
Therefore, like Ekr, I am mildly negative on adopting this document but
for different reasons.
--Mohit
On 4/3/24 00:52, Sean Turner wrote:
At the IETF 119 TLS session there was some interest in the mTLS Flag I-D
(https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fdraft-jhoyla-req-mtls-flag%2F&data=05%7C02%7Cmohit.sethi%40aalto.fi%7C42877de6d3d64135e49e08dc534a463b%7Cae1a772440414462a6dc538cb199707e%7C1%7C0%7C638476825681199391%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=ERzWFcuBlAfobNyGCcgKDhCl9wex9LOQ%2F3yPYC7idfU%3D&reserved=0);
also, see previous list discussions at [0]. This message is to judge consensus on whether
there is sufficient support to adopt this I-D. If you support adoption and are willing to
review and contribute text, please send a message to the list. If you do not support
adoption of this I-D, please send a message to the list and indicate why. This call will
close on 16 April 2024.
Thanks,
Deirdre, Joe, and Sean
[0]
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