-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell
Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2017 10:58
To: Paul Turner <paul.tur...@venafi.com>; Ted Lemon <mel...@fugue.com>
Cc: Robin Wilton <wil...@isoc.org>; <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Is there a way forward after today's hum?







On 20/07/17 15:40, Paul Turner wrote:

> I’m assuming that you’re referring to multiple nations being between

> the TLS client and server. If a TLS client is set to not include the

> extension, it seems the TLS client would simply close the connection.

> It seems the client could choose whether it wanted to appease the

> nation states.



Through how many nations states did this email travel between you and I? Mail 
is maybe worse than the web, but that's just with our current deployments but 
who knows when they'll migrate a 5G VM for a web server close to my base 
station?



Can you clarify on the scenario a bit? Is one or more of the MTAs in the nation 
state (that wants to listen)? If so, it seems the nation state can get to the 
data with options 1, 2,  or 3 in my earlier message (options that are available 
with TLS 1.3 today). They don’t have to attempt to circumvent the method Russ 
eluded to at the beginning of this thread.



I'd assert there's no way TLS clients in general could know when to set or 
unset the "please wiretap me" evil bit in a ClientHello, regardless of how 
complex a configuration is used.



It seems like the guidance would be for all TLS clients to NOT include the 
extension by default. Anyone who wanted to enable it on their TLS client would 
have to explicitly turn it on through configuration. Since the client wouldn’t 
include the extension and the server would know that the client would abort the 
connection if it included the extension in return (a violation of TLS 1.3), the 
server would simply proceed in killing the connection itself. It doesn’t seem 
like there would be the need for complex configuration decisions to be made by 
TLS client users who have no intention of enabling it. Is that correct?



Cheers,

S.














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