-----Original Message----- From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2017 08:22 To: Paul Turner <paul.tur...@venafi.com>; Ted Lemon <mel...@fugue.com> Cc: Robin Wilton <wil...@isoc.org>; <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] Is there a way forward after today's hum? Hiya, On 20/07/17 13:04, Paul Turner wrote: > Let’s use the oppressive government institution that I believe you’ve > mentioned (pardon me if I got that wrong) with a connection over the > Internet in this case. Sorry, I'm not sure what you mean there, but guessing, yes, there can be multiple nation state actors who would try to compel use of this mitm, and for a proposal in this space that also causes intractable problems when a connection is supposed to be mitm'd by more than one of those, or one is not clear which is the appropriate nation state attacker to appease. I’m assuming that you’re referring to multiple nations being between the TLS client and server. If a TLS client is set to not include the extension, it seems the TLS client would simply close the connection. It seems the client could choose whether it wanted to appease the nation states. Did I misunderstand? > Can you reply in that context? I’m truly interested in understanding. > It wasn’t a “try”. Hopefully the above helps, but it may also help to say that the appropriate context I'd consider for TLS is essentially all the applications of TLS and all the deployments that'd eventually be updated with whatever proposal is on the table. Agreed. It is critical to consider all of the possible use cases. (Prior to getting it off the table when it's shown to be a bad plan:-) Cheers, S.
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