On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 07:05:11AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote: > i mentioned it here, but perhaps it's not clear enough. > > "If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks > become possible. Specifically, attackers can use multiple replays to > exploit information leakage via side channels such as timing network > caches or measuring the speed of cryptographic operations." > > I've got some other comments to resolve Monday I'll try to get to this then, > but I'd also welcome suggested text on the PR.
I understood that the cache probing attack requires much less replays than the other side-channel ones. And furthermore, distributing the replays among zones makes the attack easier (because replay with the cached data hot doesn't tell that much). -Ilari _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
