It is a mathematical cryptographic term, and as such is incontrovertible. I say leave it in.
Regards, Uri Sent from my iPhone > On May 18, 2017, at 16:58, Timothy Jackson <tjack...@mobileiron.com> wrote: > > One small nit. > >> ECDHE provides perfect forward secrecy > I thought we had decided to change “perfect forward secrecy” to just “forward > secrecy” since “perfect” is such a difficult standard to reach? > > Tim > — > Tim Jackson | Product Security Architect | MobileIron, Inc. > > On 5/18/17, 10:45 AM, "TLS on behalf of Daniel Migault" <tls-boun...@ietf.org > on behalf of daniel.miga...@ericsson.com> wrote: > > Hi Simon, > > Thank you for the review. I believe we have addressed your comments in our > version 04. Please see my comments inline. > > Yours, > Daniel > > -----Original Message----- > From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Simon Friedberger > Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 5:59 PM > To: i...@ietf.org > Cc: tls@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> > (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer > Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard > > Nits: > > RFC 4279 reference is missing. > MGLT: It seems the reference is mentioned in the current version in the > Normative reference as well as in the introduction at line 127, in section > 3 line 143. In case you meant another reference, please let us know. > > > > "TLS 1.3 and above version, " should probably be "TLS 1.3 and above" > or "TLS 1.3 and higher versions" > MGLT: Changed to "TLS 1.3 and higher versions" > >> On 04/05/17 18:41, The IESG wrote: >> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG >> (tls) to consider the following document: >> - 'ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer >> Security (TLS)' >> <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> as Proposed Standard >> >> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits >> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the >> i...@ietf.org mailing lists by 2017-05-18. Exceptionally, comments may >> be sent to i...@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the >> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. >> >> Abstract >> >> >> This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport >> Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The cipher suites are all based on >> the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key >> (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption >> with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK >> provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect >> forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and >> integrity protection. >> >> >> >> >> The file can be obtained via >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ >> >> IESG discussion can be tracked via >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ballot/ >> >> >> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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