On Wednesday 13 January 2016 15:11:47 Dmitry Belyavsky wrote: > Hello Hubert, > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 2:52 PM, Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote: > > On Tuesday 12 January 2016 17:31:34 Watson Ladd wrote: > > > On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 5:12 PM, Peter Gutmann > > > > > > <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote: > > > > Yoav Nir <ynir.i...@gmail.com> writes: > > > > > > > > To expand on this, I'll take Ilari Liusvaara's comments: > > > >>Bleeding edge ideas? They essentially re-invented SIGMA, which > > > >>is > > > >>over 10 years old. The basic framework for doing 0-RTT is the > > > >>obvious one. The only new algorithm prsent since TLS 1.2 is > > > >>HKDF, > > > >>which is just 5 years old. > > > >> > > > >>So I don't see anything "experimential" ideas, mechanisms or > > > >>algorithms in there > > > >> > > > > When SSLv3 was introduced, it also used ideas that were 10-20 > > > > years > > > > old (DH, RSA, DES, etc, only SHA-1 was relatively new). They > > > > were > > > > mature algorithms, lots of research had been published on them, > > > > and > > > > yet we're still fixing issues with them 20 years later (DH = > > > > 1976, > > > > SSLv3 = 1996, Logjam = 2015). > > > > > > We all understand that the security of a protocol is not a > > > function > > > not of the primitives but of the way the protocol works. The > > > confusion between export and nonexport DH shares was noted almost > > > immediately in SSLv3. Furthermore, 512 bit DH is weak: I don't > > > know how this is a discovery in 2015, given that the reasons for > > > this were all worked out in the early 90's. So no, Logjam is not > > > a result of unknown issues appearing after 20 years, but ignoring > > > known issues. > > > > > > > TLS 2.0-called-1.3 will roll back the 20 years of experience we > > > > have > > > > with all the things that can go wrong and start again from > > > > scratch. > > > > > > > > SIGMA, at ten years old, is a relative newcomer to DH's 20 > > > > years > > > > > > > > when it was used in SSLv3, but in either case we didn't discover > > > > all the problems with it until after the protocol that used it > > > > was > > > > rolled out. We currently have zero implementation and > > > > deployment > > > > experience with 2.0-called-1.3 [0], which means we're likely to > > > > have another 10-20 years of patching holes ahead of us. This is > > > > what I meant by "experimental, bleeding-edge". > > > > > > There is an old joke about the resume with one years experience > > > repeated 20 times. All of the problems in TLS have been known for > > > decades, as I've repeatedly demonstrated on this list. All of them > > > were known to cryptographers at the time TLS was being designed > > > and > > > deployed. It does not take deployment to trigger analysis. > > > > Exactly this: BEAST and Lucky 13 "possible" problem was described in > > the RFC itself. Same thing for the "new" Bicycle attack - described > > in the RFC for TLS 1.0 and repeated in each version since. > > > > So lets not repeat those mistakes - if there are possible issues, > > lets fix those, now. > > But we should leave the description of the fixed problems somewhere to > avoid them in future.
yes, decisions and recommendations should have rationale attached to them. And especially for recommendations, I don't see why we couldn't incorporate them in the RFC - at least for one, if the rationale is proven wrong it will be easier to explain why the recommendation should be disregarded. -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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