On Wednesday 13 January 2016 12:32:05 Peter Gutmann wrote: > Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com> writes: > >So lets not repeat those mistakes > > Exactly, there are more than enough new ones for 2.0-called-1.3 to > make that we don't (necessarily) have to repeat existing ones > (although I'm sure we will in some cases). > > And that's exactly my point, we're throwing away 20 years of refining > TLS 1.x and more or less starting again with 2.0-called-1.3, with a > whole new set of mistakes to make. I really don't want to spend the > next 20 years patching all the holes that will be found in > 2.0-called-1.3, I've already had enough of that for the 1.x version.
The only thing I saw in the "TLS 1.2.1" proposal that isn't already available is the longer Finished hash and a new signature type. Something that an extension can easily fix, rest is just a matter of setting a policy *and following it* with respect to used extensions and settings. If you want to patch it up like this, please do. But TLS 1.3 fixes more problems. > TLS needs an LTS version that you can just push out and leave to its > own devices, for the same reason that other products also have LTS > versions, that lots of people have better things to do with their > life than playing bugfix whack-a-mole for the duration of it. You're asking for impossible. The problems mentioned were not introduced into the protocols intentionally to make them obsolete, they are there because they weren't seen as big enough to fix. That's the mistake I say we should not repeat - "no issue left behind, no matter how small". -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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