On Tue, 21 May 2024 17:10:15 GMT, Sebastian Lövdahl <d...@openjdk.org> wrote:
>> 8327114: Attach in Linux may have wrong behaviour when pid == ns_pid >> (Kubernetes debug container) > > Sebastian Lövdahl has updated the pull request incrementally with two > additional commits since the last revision: > > - Remove unused `SELF_PID_NS` > - Rewrite in line with suggestion from Larry Cable On 5/22/24 11:58 AM, Sebastian Lövdahl wrote: > > I haven't but I will BTW which linux capabilities should be > enabled in order to prevent a /proc/... style attach due to lack > of permissions to access target's /proc fs? Rgds - Larry > > I know for sure that |CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE| prevents access to > |/proc/<pid>/root| at least. I don't know if there's any distinction > between the different privileges a process can have to be honest, but > I somehow got the impression that having /any/ privilege restricts > access to |/proc/<pid>/root| (among others). But right now I cannot > recall what gave me that impression. There's a long list of > capabilities though: > https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!OuFFfoYFVnGvARkAQ11WdUPoVHR3GXEc-XbeZfOWFHFrQAJxR6-suOx9_j-qekgTrr5V66CAb7K0i0zi_0JV3zd5SA$> > > it lives ...it lives!!! > > I love it when a patch comes together! > > :) > > thx for testing this before my 1dt cup of coffee! > > Great feeling indeed! Ah, the best cup of the day, have a good one :) > likewise Slainte Mhath! - Larry > — > Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/pull/19055*issuecomment-2125541556__;Iw!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!OuFFfoYFVnGvARkAQ11WdUPoVHR3GXEc-XbeZfOWFHFrQAJxR6-suOx9_j-qekgTrr5V66CAb7K0i0zi_0JG0EA7Zg$>, > > or unsubscribe > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/ANTA67VJZL3MIT2HANZ3BLDZDTTG7AVCNFSM6AAAAABHDNNTT6VHI2DSMVQWIX3LMV43OSLTON2WKQ3PNVWWK3TUHMZDCMRVGU2DCNJVGY__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!OuFFfoYFVnGvARkAQ11WdUPoVHR3GXEc-XbeZfOWFHFrQAJxR6-suOx9_j-qekgTrr5V66CAb7K0i0zi_0IYrO2-pA$>. > You are receiving this because you were mentioned.Message ID: > ***@***.***> > --------------Rdb42IWaMAGxS5O004yPY6ws Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit <!DOCTYPE html><html><head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"> </head> <body> <br> <br> <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/22/24 11:58 AM, Sebastian Lövdahl wrote:<br> </div> <blockquote type="cite" ***@***.***"> <blockquote> <p dir="auto">I haven't but I will BTW which linux capabilities should be enabled in order to prevent a /proc/... style attach due to lack of permissions to access target's /proc fs? Rgds - Larry</p> </blockquote> <p dir="auto">I know for sure that <code class="notranslate">CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE</code> prevents access to <code class="notranslate">/proc/<pid>/root</code> at least. I don't know if there's any distinction between the different privileges a process can have to be honest, but I somehow got the impression that having <em>any</em> privilege restricts access to <code class="notranslate">/proc/<pid>/root</code> (among others). But right now I cannot recall what gave me that impression. There's a long list of capabilities though: <a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!OuFFfoYFVnGvARkAQ11WdUPoVHR3GXEc-XbeZfOWFHFrQAJxR6-suOx9_j-qekgTrr5V66CAb7K0i0zi_0JV3zd5SA$"; rel="nofollow" moz-do-not-send="true">https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html</a></p> <blockquote> <p dir="auto">it lives ...it lives!!!</p> <p dir="auto">I love it when a patch comes together!</p> <p dir="auto">:)</p> <p dir="auto">thx for testing this before my 1dt cup of coffee!</p> </blockquote> <p dir="auto">Great feeling indeed! Ah, the best cup of the day, have a good one :)</p> </blockquote> <br> likewise Slainte Mhath!<br> <br> - Larry<br> <br> <blockquote type="cite" ***@***.***"> <p style="font-size:small;-webkit-text-size-adjust:none;color:#666;">—<br> Reply to this email directly, <a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/pull/19055*issuecomment-2125541556__;Iw!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!OuFFfoYFVnGvARkAQ11WdUPoVHR3GXEc-XbeZfOWFHFrQAJxR6-suOx9_j-qekgTrr5V66CAb7K0i0zi_0JG0EA7Zg$"; moz-do-not-send="true">view it on GitHub</a>, or <a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/ANTA67VJZL3MIT2HANZ3BLDZDTTG7AVCNFSM6AAAAABHDNNTT6VHI2DSMVQWIX3LMV43OSLTON2WKQ3PNVWWK3TUHMZDCMRVGU2DCNJVGY__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!OuFFfoYFVnGvARkAQ11WdUPoVHR3GXEc-XbeZfOWFHFrQAJxR6-suOx9_j-qekgTrr5V66CAb7K0i0zi_0IYrO2-pA$"; moz-do-not-send="true">unsubscribe</a>.<br> You are receiving this because you were mentioned.<img src="https://github.com/notifications/beacon/ANTA67VXC2SXHYIOCXNVH3DZDTTG7A5CNFSM6AAAAABHDNNTT6WGG33NNVSW45C7OR4XAZNMJFZXG5LFINXW23LFNZ2KUY3PNVWWK3TUL5UWJTT6WEYLI.gif"; alt="" moz-do-not-send="true" width="1" height="1"><span style="color: transparent; font-size: 0; display: none; visibility: hidden; overflow: hidden; opacity: 0; width: 0; height: 0; max-width: 0; max-height: 0; mso-hide: all">Message ID: <span><openjdk/jdk/pull/19055/c2125541556</span><span>@</span><span>github</span><span>.</span><span>com></span></span></p> <script type="application/ld+json">[ { ***@***.***": "http://schema.org";, ***@***.***": "EmailMessage", "potentialAction": { ***@***.***": "ViewAction", "target": "https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/pull/19055#issuecomment-2125541556";, "url": "https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/pull/19055#issuecomment-2125541556";, "name": "View Pull Request" }, "description": "View this Pull Request on GitHub", "publisher": { ***@***.***": "Organization", "name": "GitHub", "url": "https://github.com"; } } ]</script> </blockquote> <br> </body> </html> --------------Rdb42IWaMAGxS5O004yPY6ws-- ------------- PR Comment: https://git.openjdk.org/jdk/pull/19055#issuecomment-2125551168
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