This patch allows xenstore-watch to exit even if no changes to its
XenStore key have occured in a specified interval (in seconds), via
a new -T parameter.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c | 64 ++--
1 file changed, 48
Hello,
Does Xen under any circumstances ever modify GPA -> HPA translations
_while_ a HVM guest is running? I could find no cases where that would
happen, but I would appreciate an authoritative answer.
Thanks,
Razvan
___
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Xen-de
Hello,
As a test, I've modified xen-access.c to this simplified skeleton:
http://pastebin.com/48WYwW00
then started up an x86 Windows 7 HVM guest, and ran it with:
# ./xen-access write
once the login screen appeared. The guest promptly crashed with this
backtrace:
http://pastebin.com/Bz0GeFt
Hello,
xen-access.c does roughly this:
for (;;) {
poll_evt_channel();
if (new_events) {
while (ring_buffer_has_requests) {
pull_request();
process_request();
put_response();
}
On 04/05/16 18:35, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 5, 2016 at 6:13 AM, Andrew Cooper <mailto:andrew.coop...@citrix.com>> wrote:
>
> On 05/04/16 11:55, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > xen-acces
On 04/05/2016 07:10 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 05/04/16 16:55, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> On 04/05/16 18:35, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 5, 2016 at 6:13 AM, Andrew Cooper >> <mailto:andrew.coop...@citrix.com>> wrote:
>>&g
Theoretically it is possible for mem_access_emulate_each_rep to be
true even when current->arch.vm_event == NULL, so add an extra
check to hvmemul_virtual_to_linear().
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --
On 04/07/16 20:27, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 07.04.16 at 10:39, wrote:
>> Theoretically it is possible for mem_access_emulate_each_rep to be
>> true even when current->arch.vm_event == NULL, so add an extra
>> check to hvmemul_virtual_to_linear().
>
> Mind saying what those theoretical condition
On 04/07/16 20:54, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 04/07/16 20:27, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 07.04.16 at 10:39, wrote:
>>> Theoretically it is possible for mem_access_emulate_each_rep to be
>>> true even when current->arch.vm_event == NULL, so add an extra
On 04/08/16 00:17, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 07.04.16 at 19:54, wrote:
>> On 04/07/16 20:27, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 07.04.16 at 10:39, wrote:
Theoretically it is possible for mem_access_emulate_each_rep to be
true even when current->arch.vm_event == NULL, so add an extra
che
ase.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h | 15 +--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
index 0954b59..0544836 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
+++ b/xen/incl
On 04/08/16 10:10, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> It is meaningless (and potentially dangerous - see
> hvmemul_virtual_to_linear())
> to set mem_access_emulate_each_rep before xc_monitor_enable() (which allocates
> vcpu->arch.vm_event) has been called, so return an
On 04/08/16 11:17, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 08/04/2016 08:16, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> On 04/08/16 10:10, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>> It is meaningless (and potentially dangerous - see
>>> hvmemul_virtual_to_linear())
>>> to set mem_access_emulate_each_r
ase.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
Changes since V1:
- Fixed the if() condition.
- Introduced an rc return variable to simplify the code.
---
xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h | 16 +---
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h b/
ase.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper
---
Changes since V2:
- Updated the if() condition as recommended by Andrew Cooper.
- Added Andrew Cooper's Reviewed-by.
---
xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h | 16 +---
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(
This patch only allows introspection-related MSR write events to
be sent out, improving performance. Should additional events be
required, they can then simply be added to the list of
vmx_introspection_force_enabled_msrs[].
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 14
On 04/11/16 22:18, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 07:41:54PM +0300, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> This patch only allows introspection-related MSR write events to
>> be sent out, improving performance. Should additional events be
>> required, they can th
On 04/12/16 07:31, Jan Beulich wrote:
Tamas K Lengyel 04/11/16 9:47 PM >>>
>> --- a/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/public/vm_event.h
>> @@ -166,6 +166,31 @@ struct vm_event_regs_x86 {
> >uint32_t _pad;
> >};
> >
>> +struct vm_event_regs_arm {
>> +uint32_t r0;
>>
On 04/12/2016 12:38 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 12/04/16 05:26, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> On 04/11/16 22:18, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>> On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 07:41:54PM +0300, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>>> This patch only allows introspection-related MSR wr
.
This replaces the previously posted "xen: Filter out MSR write
events" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 4 +--
tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c | 6 ++--
xen/arch/x86/hvm/event.c | 3 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c |
On 04/12/2016 05:42 PM, Julien Grall wrote:
> Hello Razvan,
>
> On 12/04/2016 15:34, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> Previously, subscribing to MSR write events was an all-or-none
>> approach, with special cases for introspection MSR-s. This patch
>> allows the vm_event consu
On 04/12/16 20:49, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> index 1fec412..1be058a 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> */
>
> #include
> +#include
> #incl
.
This replaces the previously posted "xen: Filter out MSR write
events" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
Changes since V1:
- Removed ARM stubs.
- Corrected domain_unpause(d) omission.
- Moved enable / disable and query functions from vm_event.c to
monitor.c.
---
tools/lib
On 04/13/2016 12:47 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
>> index 1fec412..4c96968 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
>> @@ -22,6 +22,58 @@
>> #include
>> #include
>>
>> +static int arch_monitor_en
LOCK-prefixed instructions are currenly allowed to run in parallel
in x86_emulate(), which can lead the guest into an undefined state.
This patch fixes the issue.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
tools/tests/x86_emulator/test_x86_emulator.c | 12
xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
On 04/13/2016 05:50 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> index 1fec412..4c96968 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,58 @@
> #include
> #include
>
> +static
On 04/13/2016 05:52 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
> >> diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> >> index 2457698..875c09a 100644
> >> --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> >> +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> >> @@ -1107,8 +1107,7 @@ struct
On 04/14/16 07:35, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/13/16 7:53 PM >>>
>> LOCK-prefixed instructions are currenly allowed to run in parallel
>> in x86_emulate(), which can lead the guest into an undefined state.
>> This patch fixes the is
On 04/14/16 09:09, Juergen Gross wrote:
> On 14/04/16 07:56, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> This indeed doesn't guard against LOCKed instructions being run in
>> parallel with and without emulation, however that is a case that should
>> almost never occur - at least not
On 04/14/2016 11:07 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 14/04/2016 06:56, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>
>>>> --- a/xen/common/domain.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/common/domain.c
>>>> @@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid, unsigned
&g
On 04/14/2016 11:18 AM, Juergen Gross wrote:
> On 14/04/16 10:01, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 14/04/2016 08:46, Juergen Gross wrote:
>>> On 14/04/16 08:31, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>>> On 04/14/16 09:09, Juergen Gross wrote:
>>>>> On 14/04/16 07:56, Razv
On 04/14/2016 07:35 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
>> >+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
>> >@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
> >#include
> >#include
> >
>> >+DEFINE_PERCPU_RWLOCK_GLOBAL(emulate_locked_rwlock);
> You should try hard to make this static.
On second though, this woul
On 04/14/2016 08:56 AM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>>> >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>>> >> @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
>> > >#include
>> > >#include
>> > >#include
>>> >> +#incl
On 04/13/2016 06:05 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 9:01 AM, Andrew Cooper
> mailto:andrew.coop...@citrix.com>> wrote:
>
> On 13/04/16 15:56, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> > On 04/13/2016 05:52 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> &
On 04/14/2016 01:35 PM, David Vrabel wrote:
> On 13/04/16 13:26, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> LOCK-prefixed instructions are currenly allowed to run in parallel
>> in x86_emulate(), which can lead the guest into an undefined state.
>> This patch fixes the issue.
>
> I
On 04/14/2016 06:33 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 14, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Jan Beulich <mailto:jbeul...@suse.com>> wrote:
>
> >>> Razvan Cojocaru <mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>> 04/14/16 11:37 AM >>>
&
On 04/14/2016 06:31 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/14/16 10:50 AM >>>
>> On 04/14/2016 07:35 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
On 04/14/2016 06:40 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/14/16 1:43 PM >>>
>> On 04/14/2016 01:35 PM, David Vrabel wrote:
>>> On 13/04/16 13:26, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>>> LOCK-prefixed instructions are currenly allowed to run in parallel
On 04/14/2016 06:44 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/14/16 7:57 AM >>>
>> On 04/14/16 07:35, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/13/16 7:53 PM >>>
>>>> @@ -1589,6 +1591,8 @@ x86_emulate(
>>
On 04/14/16 19:33, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> The monitor_get_capabilities check actually belongs to the monitor subsystem
> so
> relocating and renaming it to sanitize the code's name and location.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel
> Cc: Razvan Cojocaru
> Cc: Keir
.
This replaces the previously posted "xen: Filter out MSR write
events" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
Changes since V2:
- Bumped XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION.
- Introduced struct monitor_msr_bitmap as recommended by Andrew
Cooper, which allowed removing some pointer
On 04/15/16 12:02, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> +else if ( (msr >= 0x8000) && (msr <= 0x80001fff) )
> +{
> +msr &= 0x1fff;
> +__set_bit(msr, &d->arch.monitor_msr_bitmap->high);
> +}
This of course should be 0xc000 and 0xc
On 04/15/16 20:12, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:02 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
> mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>> wrote:
>
> Previously, subscribing to MSR write events was an all-or-none
> approach, with special cases for introspection MSR
On 04/15/16 20:38, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 11:19 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
> mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>> wrote:
>
> On 04/15/16 20:12, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:02
.
This replaces the previously posted "xen: Filter out MSR write
events" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Acked-by: Wei Liu
---
Changes since V3:
- Fixed high MSR range.
- Added comment about where to find MSR indices to xenctrl.h.
- Added Wei Liu's ack.
---
tools/libxc/in
On 04/14/2016 07:08 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/14/16 5:45 PM >>>
>> On 04/14/2016 06:40 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> To be honest, just having remembered that we do the write back for locked
>>> instructions using CMPXCHG, I'd
On 04/18/2016 07:45 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/18/16 2:40 PM >>>
>> On 04/14/2016 07:08 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/14/16 5:45 PM >>>
>>>> On 04/14/2016 06:40 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>&g
On 04/21/16 03:39, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> Without specifying the altp2m flag on the response the view never got
> switched.
> Also, add extra information printouts that can be useful during debugging.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel
> ---
> Cc: Razvan Cojocaru
> Cc
On 04/22/16 21:07, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 17/04/16 20:15, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/event.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/event.c
>> index 56c5514..9c17f37 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/event.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/event.c
>> @@ -
.
This replaces the previously posted "xen: Filter out MSR write
events" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
Changes since V4:
- Added arch_monitor_init_domain() and arch_monitor_cleanup_domain()
as suggested by Tamas Lengyel and Andrew Cooper.
- Factored out common MSR ran
On 04/26/2016 11:49 AM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> Previously, subscribing to MSR write events was an all-or-none
> approach, with special cases for introspection MSR-s. This patch
> allows the vm_event consumer to specify exactly what MSR-s it is
> interested in, and as a side-effect
On 04/26/2016 12:26 PM, Julien Grall wrote:
> Hi Razvan,
>
> On 26/04/2016 09:49, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> diff --git a/xen/common/vm_event.c b/xen/common/vm_event.c
>> index 2906407..1ba12cb 100644
>> --- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
>> +++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
&
On 04/26/16 19:03, George Dunlap wrote:
> On 19/04/16 17:35, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/19/16 1:01 PM >>>
>>> I think this might be because the LOCK prefix should guarantee that the
>>> instruction that follows it has exclusive use of
On 04/27/2016 09:22 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 26.04.16 at 19:23, wrote:
>> On 04/26/16 19:03, George Dunlap wrote:
>>> On 19/04/16 17:35, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>> Razvan Cojocaru 04/19/16 1:01 PM >>>
>>>>>
On 04/26/2016 06:28 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
> > @@ -55,6 +61,9 @@ void vm_event_cleanup_domain(struct domain *d)
> > v->arch.vm_event = NULL;
> > }
> >
> > +xfree(d->arch.monitor_msr_bitmap);
> > +d->arch.monitor_msr_bitmap = NULL;
> > +
>
vents" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
Changes since V5:
- Modified patch description to mention the new monitor functions.
- Fixed duplicated xzalloc() / xfree() code.
- Moved the monitor setup code (memset()s from vm_event_init_domain()
to arch_monitor_init_domain().
- Now r
On 04/27/16 23:33, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> Since in-guest debug exceptions are now unconditionally trapped to Xen, adding
> a hook for vm_event subscribers to tap into this new always-on guest event. We
> rename along the way hvm_event_breakpoint_type to hvm_event_type to better
> match the variou
On 04/29/16 05:44, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>> From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com]
>> Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 3:48 PM
>> +
>> +static void *monitor_bitmap_for_msr(struct domain *d, u32 *msr)
>> +{
>> +ASSERT(d->arch.monitor_msr_bit
vents" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Acked-by: Wei Liu
---
Changes since V6:
- Fixed monitor_enable_msr() (thanks to Kevin Tian).
- Added Wei Liu's ack.
---
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 9 ++-
tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c | 6 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/event.c
Hello,
Just for my internal patch book-keeping, I assume this patch did not get
into staging because of the code freeze and is planned for 4.8?
http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-04/msg01444.html
Thanks,
Razvan
___
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On 04/09/16 08:54, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> It is meaningless (and potentially dangerous - see
> hvmemul_virtual_to_linear())
> to set mem_access_emulate_each_rep before xc_monitor_enable() (which allocates
> vcpu->arch.vm_event) has been called, so return an
roducing the PRIVILEGED_CALL type.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel
> ---
> Cc: Razvan Cojocaru
> Cc: Ian Jackson
> Cc: Stefano Stabellini
> Cc: Wei Liu
> Cc: Julien Grall
> Cc: Keir Fraser
> Cc: Jan Beulich
> Cc: Andrew Cooper
>
> v2: introduce VM
On 04/29/16 23:27, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
>
>
>
> > diff --git a/xen/common/vm_event.c b/xen/common/vm_event.c
> > index 2906407..a29bda8 100644
> > --- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
> > +++ b/xen/common/vm_event.c
> > @@ -818,7 +818,6 @@ int vm_event_mo
On 05/03/2016 11:14 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 29.04.16 at 18:12, wrote:
>> On 04/09/16 08:54, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>> It is meaningless (and potentially dangerous - see
>>> hvmemul_virtual_to_linear())
>>> to set mem_access_emula
an and should. Thoughts?
FWIW, I agree, and it's also appropriate to add:
Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Thanks,
Razvan
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On 04/27/2016 10:14 AM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 04/27/2016 09:22 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 26.04.16 at 19:23, wrote:
>>> On 04/26/16 19:03, George Dunlap wrote:
>>>> On 19/04/16 17:35, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>>> Razvan Cojo
On 05/03/2016 05:30 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 03.05.16 at 16:20, wrote:
>> I've kept experimenting with the patch but can't quite figure out why
>> minimizing the lock scope to the writeback part would not be sufficient,
>> but it isn't.
>>
>> I.e. with this code:
>>
>> 3824 writeback:
>> 38
On 05/03/2016 06:13 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 03.05.16 at 16:41, wrote:
>> On 05/03/2016 05:30 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 03.05.16 at 16:20, wrote:
I've kept experimenting with the patch but can't quite figure out why
minimizing the lock scope to the writeback part would not
On 05/04/2016 04:26 PM, Julien Grall wrote:
> I may misunderstand some parts of the vm event subsystem. To get/set the
> full set of registers, the user will have to use the
> DOMCTL_{set,get}vcpucontext, correct? So why does Xen expose a part of
> the vCPU context through the vm_event?
Because DO
On 05/04/2016 05:45 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 29.04.16 at 08:03, wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
>> @@ -22,6 +22,104 @@
>> #include
>> #include
>>
>> +int arch_monitor_init_domain(struct domain *d)
>> +{
>> +if ( !d->arch.monitor_msr_bitmap )
>
On 05/04/2016 04:42 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 04.05.16 at 13:32, wrote:
>> But while implementing a stub that falls back to the actual LOCK CMPXCHG
>> and replacing hvm_copy_to_guest_virt() with it would indeed be an
>> improvement (with the added advantage of being able to treat
>> non-emula
t_request as
> monitor_guest_request from vm_event to monitor.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel
> ---
> Cc: Stefano Stabellini
> Cc: Julien Grall
> Cc: Jan Beulich
> Cc: Andrew Cooper
> Cc: Razvan Cojocaru
> ---
> xen/arch/arm/Makefile | 1 +
> xen/arch/arm/h
c: Julien Grall
> Cc: Razvan Cojocaru
>
> v3: Split parts off as separate patches
> Union for arm32/64 register structs in vm_event
> Cosmetic fixes
> ---
> xen/arch/arm/monitor.c| 49
> +++
> xen/arch/arm/tra
On 05/04/2016 05:51 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel
> ---
> Cc: Razvan Cojocaru
> Cc: Ian Jackson
> Cc: Wei Liu
> ---
> tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c | 32 ++--
> 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deleti
On 05/04/2016 05:51 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> Mechanical renaming to better describe that the code in hvm/event is part of
> the monitor subsystem.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel
> Acked-by: Kevin Tian
> ---
> Cc: Jan Beulich
> Cc: Andrew Cooper
> Cc:
gt; Cc: Tim Deegan
> Cc: Wei Liu
> ---
> MAINTAINERS | 12 ++--
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru
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t; match the various events that can be passed with it. We also introduce the
> necessary monitor_op domctl's to enable subscribing to the events.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel
> ---
> Cc: Ian Jackson
> Cc: Wei Liu
> Cc: Razvan Cojocaru
> Cc: Jan Beulich
>
On 05/04/2016 05:45 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> +*msr &= 0x1fff;
>> > +return &d->arch.monitor_msr_bitmap->high;
>> > +
>> > +default:
>> > +return NULL;
>> > +}
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static int monitor_enable_msr(struct domain *d, u32 msr)
>> > +{
>> > +u32 *bitmap
vents" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Acked-by: Wei Liu
Acked-by: Kevin Tian
---
Changes since V7:
- Added Kevin Tian's ack.
- Moved memset()s from arch_monitor_init_domain() to
arch_monitor_cleanup_domain(), as suggested by Jan Beulich.
- Now using sizeof() instead of
vents" patch.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Acked-by: Wei Liu
Acked-by: Kevin Tian
---
Changes since V8:
- Now using DECLARE_BITMAP() for the monitor bitmaps.
- Const-ified monitored_msr().
---
tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 9 ++-
tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c | 6 +-
xe
On 04/14/2017 09:08 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:20 AM, Razvan Cojocaru
> mailto:rcojoc...@bitdefender.com>> wrote:
>
> On 04/12/2017 08:11 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Mon
ncomplete and has trouble with
emulating competing writes in SMP scenarios, the new tests are
only meant for debugging issues.
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
Changes since V1:
- Moved emulate_write and emulate_exec to the x86-only part of
the code.
- Stopped pointlessly setting after_fi
hanges. I don't think acks from Tamas
> and George are strictly required.
FWIW:
Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Thanks,
Razvan
___
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
695399/functions/signal.html
>>
>> This removes the warning:
>> #warning redirecting incorrect #include to
>> when building with the musl C-library.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis
>
> Acked-by: Wei Liu
FWIW:
Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Thank
On 04/18/2017 01:32 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> This is an optional feature and hence we should check for it before
> use.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
> ---
> v2: Re-do detection of availability, resulting in almost all of the
> changes done here being different than in
ent).
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 35 +++
xen/arch/x86/vm_event.c| 22 ++
xen/common/vm_event.c | 14 +++---
xen/include/asm-x86/vm_event.h | 2 ++
4 fi
On 04/27/17 11:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 27.04.17 at 09:22, wrote:
>> The introspection agent can reply to a vm_event faster than
>> vmx_vmexit_handler() can complete in some cases, where it is then
>> not safe for vm_event_set_registers() to modify v->arch.user_regs.
>
> This needs more exp
On 04/27/17 11:18, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 27.04.17 at 10:11, wrote:
>> On 04/27/17 11:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 27.04.17 at 09:22, wrote:
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -473,6 +473,39 @@ static bool hvm_get_pending_event(struct vcpu *v,
>>>
On 04/27/17 12:00, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 27.04.17 at 10:34, wrote:
>> On 04/27/17 11:18, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 27.04.17 at 10:11, wrote:
On 04/27/17 11:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 27.04.17 at 09:22, wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/
On 04/28/2017 09:25 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 27.04.17 at 19:31, wrote:
>> On 27/04/17 09:52, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 27.04.17 at 10:34, wrote:
On 27/04/2017 09:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 27.04.17 at 09:22, wrote:
>> --- a/xen/common/vm_event.c
>> +++ b/xen/common/
n might fail, as gva_to_ipa uses the
> guest's translation tables, access to which might be restricted by the
> active VTTBR. To address this issue, we perform the gva to ipa
> translation in software.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sergej Proskurin
> ---
> Cc: Razvan Cojocaru
c on CPU 5:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: 830492cbb447
(XEN) ****
Reported-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
xen/common/hvm/save.c |
On 05/02/17 16:41, Tim Deegan wrote:
> Hi,
>
> At 16:25 +0300 on 02 May (1493742339), Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> hvm_save_cpu_ctxt() does a memset(&ctxt, 0, sizeof(ctxt)), which
>> can lead to ctxt.cur being 0. This can then crash the hypervisor
>> (with FATAL PAGE F
On 05/02/17 16:48, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 02.05.17 at 15:25, wrote:
>> hvm_save_cpu_ctxt() does a memset(&ctxt, 0, sizeof(ctxt)), which
>> can lead to ctxt.cur being 0. This can then crash the hypervisor
>> (with FATAL PAGE FAULT) in hvm_save_one() via the
>> "off < (ctxt.cur - sizeof(*desc))"
On 05/02/17 17:09, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 02.05.17 at 15:54, wrote:
>> On 05/02/17 16:48, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 02.05.17 at 15:25, wrote:
--- a/xen/common/hvm/save.c
+++ b/xen/common/hvm/save.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ int hvm_save_one(struct domain *d, uint16_t typecode,
>>
ff830492cbb447
(XEN)
Reported-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru
---
Changes since V1:
- Corrected patch description.
- Now checking whether the function got back any data at all, prior to
(XEN)
>> (XEN) Pagetable walk from 830492cbb447:
>> (XEN) L4[0x106] = dbc36063
>> (XEN) L3[0x012] =
>> (XEN)
>> (XEN)
>> (XEN) Panic on CPU 5:
>> (XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
>> (XEN) [error_
On 05/02/2017 07:11 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 02/05/17 17:02, Tim Deegan wrote:
>> At 18:21 +0300 on 02 May (1493749307), Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>> hvm_save_cpu_ctxt() returns success without writing any data into
>>> hvm_domain_context_t when all VCPUs are o
This small series first creates hvm/vm_event.{h,c}, in order to bring
under vm_event maintainership the code that has previously lived in
hvm_do_resume(), and then fixes a __context_switch()-related race
condition when attempting to set registers via vm_event reply.
Previously this has been a sing
dditionally removes the sync_vcpu_execstate(v) call from
vm_event_resume(), which is no longer necessary, which removes the
associated broadcast TLB flush (read: performance improvement).
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vm_even
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