Dear Lotfi,
For years I have seen your fuzzy theory used improperly. That is,
practitioners use it to model problems that should be modeled with
probability theory. Then other researchers come along and slam fuzzy
theory because probability can be used to model the problem. The
difficulty, how
Dear Aleks:
Thank you for your insightful comment. Your comment reflects a
prevailing view--a strongly held belief that standard probability theory
is all that is needed to deal with any kind of uncertainty and any issue
related to uncertainty, e.g. the issue of determinism vs. chance
Marcus, Kathy, I guess `just is' is a more appropriate term when we are considering all 4 dimensions the same, but, like Kathy says, it means about the same thing. The most classical approach to frequentist probability is von Mises' approach, which assumes the relative frequency does approa
Hi,
> And exactly how "just is" any more useful or satisfying than "just
> happens"?
> I guess `just is' is a more appropriate term when we are considering
> all 4 dimensions the same, but, like Kathy says, it means about the same
> thing.
0) As I explained, it leads to different (philosophical
Hi Rich et al,
1) I think a philosophically more useful picture of the Universe
than that something "happens" is that the 4-dimensional space-time
Universe just "is" (like an archived movie roll, rather than a
life performance). Under this perspective it is not at all
compelling why a 3D slice U(t
Marcus et al -
>1) I think a philosophically more useful picture of the Universe
>than that something "happens" is that the 4-dimensional space-time
>Universe just "is" (like an archived movie roll, rather than a
>life performance).
And exactly how "just is" any more useful or satisfying than "ju
Kathy and my final discussion on determinism follows (her response to
me shows first). I want to thank those who participated in answering
my query. This discussion made me think again about `just happens',
and I am not all that uncomfortable with the notion any more. After
all, causation and d
ed, Wheeler's delayed choice
experiment might suggest.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of Rich
Sent: Saturday, August 26, 2006 11:06 AM
To: Kathryn Blackmond Laskey; Doug Morgan; Kathryn Blackmond Laskey
Cc: uai@engr.orst.edu
Subject: Re:
Dear Kathy,
I think Doug pretty much articulated my position. You (Kathy) said
the following (in reverse order):
KATHY:
"But a meaningful definition of "full knowledge" for a probability
assessment would have to include only events occurring at times
before the event in question. I suspect Ca
I've discovered that things that are blinding obvious to me are not
necessarily blinding obvious to other people. :-)
I agree with you that we can't rule out intrinsically deterministic
theories. You say it would "probably not be hard" to postulate a
deterministic theory that matches the pr
Kathy,
A blinding obvious answer is that both "sides" are completely jumping the gun
in
making any choice on these issues. Quantum field theory is intrinsically
probabilistic. However, it is just a good (OK, spectacular) model. It doesn't
mean that there isn't something entirely determinist
>§ Incidentally, isn't Pearl's theory of
>causality deterministic but yet probabilistic?
Pearl's early work dealt with causal Bayesian
networks with intrinsically stochastic causal
mechanisms, but in his later work he moved toward
Laplacian determinism and the view that
probability re
Dear Rich,
This is probably much more than you bargained for, but you asked for it! :-)
The Oxford American Dictionary defines objective as "having real
existence outside a person's mind." Strict subjectivists such as de
Finetti and Savage regard probabilities as entirely subjective
except f
Rich,
Today's best models for detailed physical behavior involve the step of
collapsing a wave function upon making any measurement. This step is modeled
as
a draw from a random distribution computed from the wave function. The wave
function may be a Feynman path integral or a solution to th
ents)
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
Konrad Scheffler
Sent: Tuesday, August 15, 2006 4:43 AM
To: Marcus Hutter
Cc: uai@engr.orst.edu
Subject: Re: [UAI] Determinism verses chance
Hi Marcus,
Indeed it is not a novel line of
Peter McBurney,
University of Liverpool, UK
- Original Message -
From: "Rich" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Friday, August 11, 2006 6:10 PM
Subject: [UAI] Determinism verses chance
> My
Hi Marcus,
Indeed it is not a novel line of thought - you will find many related
ideas in the work of Jaynes, which proposes a form of (objective)
probability theory without the concept of randomness. I have also seen
arguments for interpretations of quantum theory without the concept of
rando
Explanation need not be fitting an event type into
a deterministic nexus. See Wes Salmon.
chrs, Kevin
___
uai mailing list
uai@ENGR.ORST.EDU
https://secure.engr.oregonstate.edu/mailman/listinfo/uai
Hi Rich,
> plagued many of us, at least since Laplace: Is the universe
> deterministic or is there something truly probabilistic going on
Here is an argument that the *belief* in a truly random
universe, i.e. the belief in objective probabilities, is
"unscientific", independent of whether it's
My interests have recently been roused again by the question that has
plagued many of us, at least since Laplace: Is the universe
deterministic or is there something truly probabilistic going on
(whatever that means)? Actually it is my inability to resolve this
matter that has made me suspect h
20 matches
Mail list logo