s were written between August 2011 and (likely upper bound)
February 2012; they are also rather sloppy:
https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2014-July/013940.html
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To
levant
parts for, e.g., Wikipedia.
[1] http://lenta.ru/articles/2013/04/26/anonymity/
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ypto Autokey variant) does not support NAT traversal in
either the server *or* the client, since both IP addresses are signed.
I guess the reason is that NTP has no clear distinction between client
and server.
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n tlsdate-0.0.6 is dying with a
segmentation fault after a while. Not surprised after seeing the code
— my experimentation with this gimmick is finally over. Turns out that
“throw something together and wait for patches” is not a sound
development approach.
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er 5 minutes logs into the portal,
establishing full connectivity?
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you do hard stuff, you
attract other people who can do hard stuff, whereas otherwise you
attract people who know how to tweak settings / apply patches, and not
much else.
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-July/024964.html
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opment is supposed to be exciting, not this… bureaucracy.
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persedes race or gender
oppression”? This is serious stuff!
https://help.riseup.net/en/social-contract
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aborative”
project:
https://github.com/grugq/portal
https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/289617118159319040
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27;s value comes from overall
tracking of users, not just anti-spam verification, so I doubt they
would find any anonymous deposits scheme valuable for the company.
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the ecosystem doesn't hold water [1]
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-October/026023.html
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On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 4:23 PM, basmati kasaar wrote:
> Is this informations still available somewhere else? Maybe a torproject.org
> URL?
UseMicrodescriptors 0?
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ion changes, but here is a botnet
advertisement that mentions I2P support:
http://uscyberlabs.com/blog/2012/09/24/dark-heart-botnet-tor-c2-bullet-proof-server-collector/
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use TCP? Or can it use e.g. UDP?
And last question, is there a reason that a line like
ClientTransportPlugin obfs2 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy --managed
causes Tor to always run an obfsproxy daemon, even if there are no obfs2
bridges defined in torrc?
Thanks,
Maxim
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tered by To/CC headers. Maybe I should invest more in
my filtering setup.
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Is it possible to configure the tor-talk mailing list to discard
messages not explicitly addressed to it? Like this nanog discussion.
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https
, as the OP is reusing an
old circuit despite establishing new circuits via NEWNYM (which most
likely differ in exit node IPs).
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issuing NEWNYM, it
is a sure sign of circuit reuse (or a bug in Tor). It is different
from infrequently getting same exit node on unrelated circuits.
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the frequency of this issue being brought up.
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think that a competent intelligence agency wouldn't pull
off something like that, and why. If you want to imagine them as some
omniscient entities as shown in the movies — fine, but please leave
the demagogy out of the discussion.
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n are ignorant of must be
“good”). In any case, this doesn't really matter — my point was that
the idea that Tormail is managed by any competent intelligence agency
is ridiculous, since they wouldn't disrupt the service in a way that
would risk fleeing userbase as a consequence.
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It appears this was a big mistake, the Russian
providers are much worse!”
Tormail is apparently just a couple of naive American kids.
[1] http://opusmagnus.wordpress.com/2012/04/21/tormail-net-has-moved/
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__
ug.cgi?id=395953
Wrt. this specific bug, perhaps you will want to use Anthony Basile's
solution instead of the patch in Debian:
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=636943
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attitude reminded me of the
following old story:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/901723.stm.
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Zone” applet that sets user's TZ environment variable [1].
[1] http://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/TZ-Variable.html
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ose users, and as a result, customers (advertisers in your
case).
[1] http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/72901
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accounts: $95 per 1k. (Annoying millions of users by ignoring their
desire for privacy: priceless.)
Looks like spammers don't value your phone verification efforts too much.
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far as I know.
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nging guards after a while?
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some granularity setting, and take
the top 3 distinct nodeIDs. With persistence, you can also ignore
nodeIDs newer than the seed's timestamp, although not doing that is
not critical.
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ents? Also, is making just /var/lib/tor/data/state persistent
(instead of the whole directory) enough at the moment to have
persistent guards?
[1]
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-better-guard-rotation-parameters
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l in the PDF.
I see now — so they break the assumption that one needs to provide a
correct password to open a volume in LUKS after it is closed, for
instance.
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hown with cryptsetup luksDump
--dump-master-key) is not stored in RAM by cryptsetup or by the kernel
anyway? I just tested with aes-xts-plain64, and the key appears in
QEMU's memory dump in 3 locations after the encrypted volume is
mounted.
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u are right, I didn't read §1.3 of the spec carefully enough. Hidden
service public key inside the descriptor is hashed.
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iscussion. Mean time to
seeing an .onion descriptor on an HSDir relay is 8 days at present. In
light of that, arguments for / against publishing crawled addresses
are meaningless, regardless of privacy expectations.
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/2012-August/025409.html
>From the script:
# Tor hashes ASN.1 RSAPublicKey instead of SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
# which contains RSAPublicKey at offset 22; it then converts the
# first half of SHA-1 hash to Base32
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nning a relay for a couple of months should
produce a nearly complete list of hidden service addresses, optionally
with some indicative access statistics [1, §1.6].
[1]
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=rend-spec.txt
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sl pkey -in /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/private_key -pubout
-outform der | tail -c +23 | sha1sum | head -c 20
(and convert to Base32)
[1] https://github.com/mkdesu/cables/blob/master/bin/gen-tor-hostname
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t
reducing correlation accuracy error to 10^-9 will give you 99.99%
confidence in end-to-end correlation match. I suspect that a few
seconds of interactive traffic will give you a correlation accuracy
that's much better than a 10^-9 error.
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deoffs: send chunks to rotating sets of nodes, increase recorded
traffic window (to be able to send old chunks to nodes that didn't see
traffic to a given IP yet), etc.
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doesn't work, whereas
“here is the exam you wrote for tomorrow, and here is the student who
stole it from your mailbox” works well. It seems that Tor is not yet
at the point where one can show such examples, although someone with a
few million $ to spare or to invest might to j
ARelay
[2] http://petworkshop.org/2007/papers/PET2007_preproc_Sampled_traffic.pdf
[3] http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/25/anon_cybercrime_investigator_leak/
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18.172.156
FR 213.251.185.74
US 69.42.212.2
FR 37.59.82.50
[1]
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/6443/exit-probability-cdf-2012-07-23-2.png
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-source project he likes.
What's the point of your posts? You don't *do* anything. There are
other venues where you can indulge in useless chit-chat. Please do not
reply until you have something worthwhile to contribute.
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_
ing list
is suitable for any discussion that assumes even the most basic
background.
> Exactly how strongly weighted by bandwidth is node selection these days?
It is linear, unless I missed something in the code. If it wouldn't be
linear, then nodes would be under- or over-utilized.
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ing different-family
circuit nodes skews the probabilities, but not by much, so I didn't
bother to account for that.
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Tor users visit, the
situation is even better — intercepting the same 25 Class-C networks
will let you see 72% of the traffic. Picking better non-Guard Exits
will improve this figure to 78%. That's right — 4/5th of Tor traffic
exits through just 25 LANs.
[1] http://pastebin.com/hgtXMSyx
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e a point in useless
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vities because of your
> person-specific interests."
Could be, but you have nothing of substance behind this suggestion. It
is criticism for the purpose of criticism — good for high-school
debates and for politicians, but of little value otherwise.
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ublishing files or simple sites on user's .onion
host. Don't invent use cases, because users have their own (which you
don't like and hence ignore) — facilitate network expansion which will
actually bring in new use cases.
[1]
http://web.archive.org/web/20051110053619/http://to
a good scientific experiment, if you can. I have went over
Tor and Rendevous specs, and several conference papers before writing
some of the posts. What have you done, expressed doubt and dislike? I
don't care — contribute something useful
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ed by various policy
people (i.e., EFF, etc.).
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-April/023837.html
[2]
http://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2009/09/02/doctoring-diversity-race-and-photoshop/
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an illustrative example), and have
nothing to contribute, just move on. I don't understand this need to
inject an opinion just because you don't like the conclusions. Find
something non-trivial to add to the discussion first.
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nd/or a port or destination IP wise statistic.
Some of that information is available in [1].
[1] http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/NSS.2010.47
(http://planete.inrialpes.fr/papers/TorTraffic-NSS10.pdf)
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be it a proposed method of statistical
analysis, a reference to Tor exit operator who actually sampled
accessed URLs, or anything else, then great, otherwise you are not
bringing any new information or non-trivial conclusions to the table.
Calling someone sharing their experience a troll or a f
.onion/wiki/
[2]
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=rend-spec.txt
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t; No, but I'd rather say nothing than say something that could be a lie.
So far you didn't say anything useful or non-obvious, so why did you
post? You didn't like someone's written experience, so he is
automatically a troll or a false flag — fine, bring your own
refere
as an example of user experience with running an
exit node and looking at the traffic. Do you have a better statistic?
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rrorism forums, just analyze those sites that are
accessed via exit nodes (where you also have the opportunity to MITM).
Terrorists are dumb, but some are bound to have the know-how to
install Tor.
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of
questionable nature.
[1]
http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/vdhs8/hi_iama_we_are_core_members_of_the_tor_project/c53jzqv
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thing twice. By the
way, I forgot to add [3], it should go at the end of first paragraph,
after “nevertheless”.
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[1] https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html
[2] https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html#WhatAboutCriminals
[3]
http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/vdhs8/hi_iama_we_are_core_members_of_the_tor_project/c53j9j9
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etuid executable.
(and "which" is not available on all platforms — e.g., "torify" does
not use it).
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in my previous email, all information was extracted from actual
scripts and libraries, not from manuals. All commands were also
tested.
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nd torsocks with
reasonable behavior if -v/--verbose or -h/--help arguments are
passed.”
I think it should stay, since there are probably quite a few scripts
relying on "torify". "usewithtor" still comes out as rather useless,
though.
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To me it seems like "usewithtor" should be removed from torsocks
package (its warning for missing /etc/torsocks.conf is duplicated by
libtorsocks.so anyway), "torsocks" is fine as a torsocks package-owned
abstraction for LD_PRELOAD, and "torif
S's usage of tlsdate is confirmed by
Google, or this information comes from a single pull request on
GitHub. In any case, I suspect that Chrome OS developers did not
properly explore the available time setting options.
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On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 12:35 AM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
wrote:
> It would be theoretically possible to speed up the process via GPU
> processing?
Yes, see the following thread:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-March/023805.html.
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sure what to use
> from that file or if I am on the complete wrong path. If you can help out
> with it, that'd be great!
Try the following commands on each of the certificates in the chain:
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text -pubkey
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Maxim
cation also has delivery verification and other
features. Note that PGP / S/MIME-type encryption is undesirable for
most users, since it ties authentication to non-repudiability [2].
[1] http://dee.su/cables
[2] http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/otr-wpes.pdf
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ially what Bitcoin relies on).
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le
approach is the same old “thanks everyone else for investing the time
to create interoperable packages of your software, but now we are
going to create a solid bundle, because it's easier, and because we
are special”.
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ic key + 1024-bit
signing public key) + a few extra bytes. I guess that I2P could
support a shorter hash for unique local IPv6 mappings — say, 95 bits.
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On Wed, Jun 27, 2012 at 11:49 AM, Bernd wrote:
> 2012/6/27 Maxim Kammerer :
> The reason for such bundles is to be user friendly.
That's the motivation, but not the reason for the misguided packaging
design. You can make a single installer that installs several packages
that are
ddress represents the same information. It apparently even complies
with the RFC, as .onion addresses satisfy the randomness requirement.
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--> Internet
Yes, and with plain Tor setup you don't need local DNS resolution at all.
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s mouse movement and other unique behavior, and then
classifies users by that data, for instance. Once some grad student
implements this approach, and thousands of sites adopt it as a
reliable fingerprinting technique, what will you do?
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gt; physical address? Are we talking that any 12 yr old w/ the right, free
> software can do this, or "theoretically"?
Theoretically.
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with PORT, which only happens with
--no-passive-ftp, and is kind of pointless.
Perhaps you have seen the behavior you talk about in Tails, back
before I convinced them that transparent proxying with iptables is a
bad idea? In that case, the problem is with transparent proxying, not
wget.
--
On Thu, Apr 19, 2012 at 02:55, Ondrej Mikle wrote:
> I've just checked wget, it does leak DNS even with http_proxy environment
> variable set.
Do you see wget actually connecting to the proxy? Wget terminal output
shows that.
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ever”? Note that I originally replied to a post by Runa
Sandvik which was entirely wrong and needed correction, and that you
are quoting a summary. What is your contribution to this thread
exactly?
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w that wget does not leak DNS requests when HTTP(S)
proxies are specified via environment variables.
TL;DR: wget is 100% safe to use with Tor and it does not leak DNS
(also true for curl, by the way).
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countries above. Most people don't change their
Internet usage patterns due to traffic interception laws, and Internet
criminals in Russia (e.g., carders) prefer double-VPN to Tor, from
what I heard.
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. But we should
> be very careful what we infer from it.
Well, I think that some educated guesswork is at least useful for
formulating a hypothesis.
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to
e already know
that internal security services and military intelligence will (and
do) intercept everything they can.
> By the way, good to see a fan of the Strugazkis on this list.
:)
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client traffic is routed via Tor (directly
or transparently) or blocked.
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question above:
git tags are not better than signed source tarballs for users who only
need to compile the source.
[1] http://eagain.net/articles/git-for-computer-scientists/
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who works at NRL, if I am not mistaken; did I
miss anyone else?
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; day for their work.
Law enforcement is no military intelligence — these people would do
anything, since the most they risk is a failed investigation.
--
Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute)
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r wiretapping laws in your country.
Well, you already have some statistics from personal interaction with
users, but you didn't want to share them on the “Tor users” page
(e.g., there is no
section about people using Tor to trade illegal drugs, although that
must be a sizable proportion of us
han the “Loonies”) in the
estimated breakdown above. I would also place human rights activists
somewhere at the bottom of the list. The “Militaries” section on the
“Tor users” page is most likely completely phony, though.
[1] http://www.springerlink.com/content/b7v2p84331286k0g/
--
Maxim Kammerer
I just don't think that this advantage is important
enough to trump the inefficiency inherent in running everything in a
VM for everyone.
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Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute)
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st popular uses? Would it be:
* Asians and Muslim use Tor to get on Facebook
* Loonies use Tor to hide from The Man
* Stoners use Tor to buy drugs
* Pedophiles use Tor to share videos
Or is that list completely wrong? Right now, it seems difficult to get
a reliable estimate.
--
Maxim Kammer
into
any of the subsequent categories on the Tor users page, that you have
interacted with, are actually paranoid? In my experience, it is rather
easy to spot such individuals by their inability to “let go”, and the
tendency to return to the subject that bothers them in circles,
regardless of the conversa
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 13:44, Robert Ransom wrote:
> There probably shouldn't be any release tarballs for TBB source code.
Not twice, at least. I didn't think it was worth posting the previous
time, but did no one notice that .gz and .gz.asc are the same file?
--
Maxim Kammerer
ped countries
* Small-scale trading of illegal drugs
* Viewing images and videos of pedophilia
[1] https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html
--
Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute)
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erhaps with the guy
from the bottom half of the following image as a thumbnail:
http://imgfave.com/view/1134647.
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Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute)
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e most straightforward way. You
can multiply once, and then add 2p for each hash. The overhead for a
GPU / FPGA implementation should be negligible, and the search can be
parallelized as well. If adding large multiples of p, the nodes can be
untrusted, too, I guess.
--
Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux (
nion address) produces the desired result.
If it does, check whether e is prime. Density of primes in the range
of e is ~1/512, so that's just 9 bits more of search space, and
primality checking efficiency doesn't matter much.
--
Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux (discussion / suppo
S, see my comment
here: https://forum.dee.su/topic/gui-isolation.
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Maxim Kammerer
Liberté Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute)
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