[TLS] Re: The TLS WG has placed draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement in state "Call For Adoption By WG Issued"

2025-04-02 Thread Sophie Schmieg
I support adoption. I don't think we having a (non-recommended!) scheme available that does not support hybrids is a problem, there are legitimate reasons to want that kind of key exchange, and as time progresses, non-hybrid key exchanges will become more and more commonplace, so why not have it a

[TLS] Dnsdir telechat review of draft-ietf-tls-esni-24

2025-04-02 Thread R. Gieben via Datatracker
Reviewer: R. Gieben Review result: Ready Hello, I'm the designated reviewer from dnsdir for this draft. I've reviewed -23 and looked at the diff with -24. My previous comments/nits are fixed in version -24, thus ready from that perspective. Regards, Miek ___

[TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

2025-04-02 Thread Deirdre Connolly
The IANA codepoints allocated in the current draft are all 'Recommended: N' On Tue, Apr 1, 2025, 8:59 PM Martin Thomson wrote: > Like other pure ML-KEM uses, I am OK with adoption, though I might oppose > Recommended: Y when it comes to that. I also share John's concerns about > key reuse, but

[TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

2025-04-02 Thread Jan Schaumann
Sean Turner wrote: > We are continuing with our pre-announced tranche of > WG adoption calls; see [0] for more information. > This time we are issuing a WG adoption call for the > ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3 I-D > [1]. If you support adoption and are willing to > review and contr

[TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

2025-04-02 Thread Deirdre Connolly
> rather than a safer hybrid As a coauthor on hybrid publications and I-Ds, I do not agree that hybrids are categorically safer. The -tls-hybrid-design for hybrids is pretty great... if you use secure component algorithms. On Wed, Apr 2, 2025, 12:24 PM Bellebaum, Thomas < thomas.belleb...@aisec.f

[TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

2025-04-02 Thread Bellebaum, Thomas
> I believe that adopting the draft will allow those who > wish to use pure PQC (for whatever reasons they may > have) to do so while at the same time not in any way > impacting anybody else who doesn't want to do that. Those who wish to use pure PQC do not need permission. This is about IET

[TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

2025-04-02 Thread Filippo Valsorda
I support adoption. I also would like to prohibit key reuse, but opposing adoption feels like a bad way to reach that outcome: if the document is published by the ISE or just lives on as a widely deployed draft, the WG will have no say in what requirements it has. It also seems clear to me the

[TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

2025-04-02 Thread Filippo Valsorda
2025-04-02 17:39 GMT+02:00 Salz, Rich : > Opposing adoption to force the document to be published in a way that can't > be "Recommended: Y" feels like (unnecessarily) meta-gaming the IETF process. > > I am not aware of any of those opposed who are doing it for this reason. > Perhaps speculating

[TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

2025-04-02 Thread Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
> I believe that adopting the draft will allow those who > wish to use pure PQC (for whatever reasons they may > have) to do so while at the same time not in any way > impacting anybody else who doesn't want to do that. Those who wish to use pure PQC do not need permission. This is about IETF

[TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

2025-04-02 Thread Yaakov Stein
I support adoption of pure PQC KEMs drafts with Intended status: Informational (meaning that the IETF is not recommending using). Any IPR that can be asserted against Kyber can be asserted against already adopted hybrid methods incorporating Kyber. If anything, one may attempt to argue that hybri