Just to clarify Kris, you are _asking_ if there is a plan? I don't know
if Quynh can comment but
Yes, I was wondering if there is a concrete plan to relax the ordering
requirement. After yesterday's meeting, I understood
that this is something NIST may consider.
[1] See Mike's notes
https://ma
On Thursday, 17 October 2024 18:31:05 CEST, John Mattsson wrote:
We should have a consistent ordering of [EC, PQ] in both the
names and the key schedule. I.e., the code should be
>consistent with the naming and either the EC or the PQC ought
to always come first.
+1
(if FIPS leads to weird
Hiya,
On 10/17/24 16:37, David Benjamin wrote:
Specifically the X25519MLKEM768 is widely deployed already. I'm not aware
of any deployments of the other hybrids. I am very strongly opposed to
incompatible changes to the widely deployed one for something this trivial
and unimportant.
+1
S.
_
> There will need to be key exchange groups that are FIPS compatible,
so either it will happen in this i-d, or a new one will be published.
> I'm of the opinion that it's better to have fewer codepoints to test
interoperability of.
> Especially if the change is completely inconsequential to peopl
>Yes, I was wondering if there is a concrete plan to relax the ordering
>requirement. After >yesterday's meeting, I understood that this is something
>NIST may consider.
I think it would make even more sense if NIST just approved X25519 and X448.
The vast majority of TLS/HTTPS/QUIC/SSH connecti
On Thu, 17 Oct 2024, Sean Turner wrote:
On Oct 17, 2024, at 15:29, Paul Wouters
wrote:
RFC8996 seems to be a broken reference ? Might be a tooling issue but it is
already broken in the xml file on the datatracker.
I’ll check on this.
https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
The following errata report has been held for document update
for RFC8448, "Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3".
--
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5645
--
Status: Held for Doc
The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to
consider the following document: - 'The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.3'
as Proposed Standard
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. P
