The following errata report has been held for document update for RFC8448, "Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3".
-------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5645 -------------------------------------- Status: Held for Document Update Type: Technical Reported by: Anthony Mai <mai_anth...@hotmail.com> Date Reported: 2019-02-28 Held by: Paul Wouters (IESG) Section: 2 Original Text ------------- Ephemeral private keys are shown as they are generated in the traces. Corrected Text -------------- Ephemeral private keys are shown as they are generated in the traces. Note that X25519 private keys are trimmed in accordance to [RFC 7748] Section 5, before use. This is done by clearing bit 0 to 2 of the first byte and bit 7 of the last byte. And then set bit 6 of the last byte. Notes ----- On page 3,5,16,20,29,43,44,55,57, there are ten X25519 ephemeral private keys listed. None of these private key value, when used directly in X25519 calculation, will yield the associated public key listed. These private key values are not the actual values used. Instead up to 5 bits are modified as recommended by RFC 7748 section 5. Some implementations may choose NOT to do such trimming, and it does not affect the connectivity, as the private keys are never sent over the wire and does not affect network behavior. Not clarifying how the X25519 private keys were modified before using could cause serious confusion. I personally struggled for a day before figuring out this little obscure detail. -------------------------------------- RFC8448 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors-07) -------------------------------------- Title : Example Handshake Traces for TLS 1.3 Publication Date : January 2019 Author(s) : M. Thomson Category : INFORMATIONAL Source : Transport Layer Security Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
