Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Martin Rex / Hubert Kario wrote: [...] We went through the same thing, in the same thread, with the same people, a few months ago. Perhaps we could just replay the messages and everyone else could sit back and watch? And since Hubert has brought up the same bogus argument as last time, perh

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hubert Kario wrote: > On Wednesday, 1 May 2019 01:49:52 CEST Martin Rex wrote: >> >> It is formally provable that from the three protocol versions: >> >> TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 >> >> the weakest one is TLSv1.2, because of the royally stupid downgrade >> in the strength of digitally signed.

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

To close the loop on this, the chairs think this draft should remain solely focused on deprecating legacy TLS versions, not legacy hash functions. Algorithm deprecation may happen elsewhere, be it in draft-lvelvindron-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate or another draft. Best, Chris, Joe, and Sean On Mon,

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Martin Rex writes: >BEAST is an attack against Web Browsers (and the abuse known as SSL-VPNs), it >is *NO* attack against TLS That actually applies to an awful lot of recent attacks on TLS - they're attacks that rely on web software that's actively cooperating with the attacker, not attacks on

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hubert Kario wrote: > > there are attacks, like BEAST, that TLS 1.0 is vulnerable to that > TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 are not - that's a fact there are ciphersuites > that are invulnerable to Lucky13 and similar style of attacks that > can not be used with TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 - that's a fact BEAST is a

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Tuesday, 14 May 2019 16:52:49 CEST Martin Rex wrote: > Hubert Kario wrote: > > Martin Rex wrote: > >> Hubert Kario wrote: > >>> MD5 was deprecated and removed by basically every library > >>> and can't be used in TLS 1.2, I specifically meant SHA1 > >> > >> MD5 deprecated ? Nope, glaring emt

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 12:33 PM David Benjamin wrote: > > which exact piece of popular software actually still does that? >> > It ain't curl, it ain't Chrome, it ain't Firefox. >> >> It definitely was implemented in Chrome and Firefox, which is how this >> poor document got onto standards track:

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

> > > which exact piece of popular software actually still does that? > > It ain't curl, it ain't Chrome, it ain't Firefox. > > It definitely was implemented in Chrome and Firefox, which is how this > poor document got onto standards track: > >https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7507 > > TLS Fallba

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hubert Kario wrote: > Martin Rex wrote: >> Hubert Kario wrote: >>> MD5 was deprecated and removed by basically every library >>> and can't be used in TLS 1.2, I specifically meant SHA1 >> >> MD5 deprecated ? Nope, glaring emtpy: >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Friday, 10 May 2019 00:24:49 CEST Martin Rex wrote: > Hubert Kario wrote: > > MD5 was deprecated and removed by basically every library > > and can't be used in TLS 1.2, I specifically meant SHA1 > > MD5 deprecated ? Nope, glaring emtpy: > https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_searc

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Martin Rex writes: >What *WOULD* provide *HUGE* benefit, would be to remove the dangerous >"protocol version downgrade dance" from careless applications, that is the >actual problem known as POODLE, because this subverts the cryptographic >procection of the TLS handshake protocol. Is there anyth

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hubert Kario wrote: >On Wednesday, 8 May 2019 02:31:57 CEST Martin Rex wrote: >> Hubert Kario wrote: Thanks to Peter Gutmann for the summary: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/g0MDCdZcHsvZefv4V8fssXMeEHs which you may have missed. >>> >>> yes, Joux paper also sho

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Wednesday, 8 May 2019 02:31:57 CEST Martin Rex wrote: > Hubert Kario wrote: > >> Thanks to Peter Gutmann for the summary: > >> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/g0MDCdZcHsvZefv4V8fssXMeEHs > >> > >> which you may have missed. > > > > yes, Joux paper also shows that attacking MD5||

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Thu, May 9, 2019, at 16:09, Peter Gutmann wrote: > You could just say "use SHA-2", which covers the whole family. Now in > practice "SHA-2" means "SHA-256" so it'll be the same as saying SHA-256 > directly, but the more generic SHA-2 leaves it open to interpretation for the > three people who u

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Benjamin Kaduk writes: >We'd probably want to wordsmith it a bit more, as there's not exactly a >strict ordering on hash function strength, and "minimum requirement" could be >taken to mean "MUST use SHA-256", which is presumably not the intent. You could just say "use SHA-2", which covers the w

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hubert Kario wrote: >> >> Thanks to Peter Gutmann for the summary: >> >> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/g0MDCdZcHsvZefv4V8fssXMeEHs >> >> which you may have missed. > > yes, Joux paper also shows that attacking MD5||SHA1 is harder than attacking > SHA1 alone > > but that does

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Tuesday, 7 May 2019 01:57:30 CEST Martin Rex wrote: > Hubert Kario wrote: > > On Friday, 3 May 2019 16:56:54 CEST Martin Rex wrote: > >> Hubert Kario wrote: > >> > We've been over this Martin, the theoretical research shows that for > >> > Merkle- Damgård functions, combining them doesn't incr

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

David Benjamin writes: >It meant bugs like OpenSSL's get papered over with SHA-1 That affects a whole lot more than just OpenSSL, a bit like ECDSA means P256 so hash means SHA-1. Try switching to SHA-2 (in non-TLS usage) and you'll find all the implementations that simply default to SHA-1, or,

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hubert Kario wrote: > On Friday, 3 May 2019 16:56:54 CEST Martin Rex wrote: >> Hubert Kario wrote: >> > We've been over this Martin, the theoretical research shows that for >> > Merkle- Damgård functions, combining them doesn't increase their security >> > significantly. >> >> You are completely

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:43 PM Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 01:50:42PM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > > > Is this better suited for another (short) draft? > > SHA-1 certificates are history now. If we're raising the floor, > it should IMHO be safe to deprecate the MD5 and

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 01:50:42PM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > Is this better suited for another (short) draft? SHA-1 certificates are history now. If we're raising the floor, it should IMHO be safe to deprecate the MD5 and SHA-1 signature algorithms from TLS 1.2. Does anyone have evidenc

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

> On May 6, 2019, at 7:18 AM, Hubert Kario wrote: > > ncatenation: To strengthen protocols against collisions in any one > hash function, it may be tempting to use a combination of two > independent hash functions. For example, TLS versions up to 1.1 use a > concatenation

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:45 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL < u...@ll.mit.edu> wrote: > On 5/6/19, 7:22 AM, "TLS on behalf of Hubert Kario" on behalf of hka...@redhat.com> wrote: > > Sure, and that was the really strange thing with TLS 1.2, why not > just say > > SHA-2 or better only, r

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On 5/6/19, 7:22 AM, "TLS on behalf of Hubert Kario" wrote: > Sure, and that was the really strange thing with TLS 1.2, why not just say > SHA-2 or better only, rather than adding mechanisms that were much, much > weaker than its predecessors? So the simple fix is just to use SHA-2 onl

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 10:39 AM Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > On Sat, May 04, 2019 at 09:00:17AM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 10:46 PM Peter Gutmann > > > wrote: > > > > > Kathleen Moriarty writes: > > > > > > >MD5 is not discussed in the current version of RFC7525. > >

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Sat, May 04, 2019 at 09:00:17AM -0400, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 10:46 PM Peter Gutmann > wrote: > > > Kathleen Moriarty writes: > > > > >MD5 is not discussed in the current version of RFC7525. > > > > I would add it, if this is guidance for general use then it should

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 8:31 PM Peter Gutmann wrote: > why not also add MUST NOT MD5 and SHA1 in TLS 1.2 to the text? Because the document has now such a direct and ambitious title that ~most of the target audience won't even read the text beyond the title, hence this message won't be delivered.

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Friday, 3 May 2019 19:30:38 CEST Peter Gutmann wrote: > Benjamin Kaduk writes: > >I'll make the obligatory note that SHA-2 is fine > > Sure, and that was the really strange thing with TLS 1.2, why not just say > SHA-2 or better only, rather than adding mechanisms that were much, much > weaker

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Friday, 3 May 2019 16:56:54 CEST Martin Rex wrote: > Hubert Kario wrote: > > We've been over this Martin, the theoretical research shows that for > > Merkle- Damgård functions, combining them doesn't increase their security > > significantly. > > You are completely misunderstanding the results

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Sat, May 4, 2019, at 23:01, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > WG decision is appreciated on this point and proposed text for RFC 7525. > > Proposed: When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using > certificates with >at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key. In addition, the use >

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 10:46 PM Peter Gutmann wrote: > Kathleen Moriarty writes: > > >MD5 is not discussed in the current version of RFC7525. > > I would add it, if this is guidance for general use then it should cover > all > the bases, if SHA-1 is a MUST NOT then MD5 is a REALLY REALLY REALLY

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Kathleen Moriarty ​ writes: >MD5 is not discussed in the current version of RFC7525. I would add it, if this is guidance for general use then it should cover all the bases, if SHA-1 is a MUST NOT then MD5 is a REALLY REALLY REALLY MUST NOT. (Technically SHA-1 is still safe for ephemeral signing,

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 4:09 PM Kathleen Moriarty < kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Sent from my mobile device > > On May 3, 2019, at 3:56 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 10:31 AM Peter Gutmann > wrote: > >> Having said that, given an RFC saying MUST NOT 1.0

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Sent from my mobile device > On May 3, 2019, at 3:56 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > >> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 10:31 AM Peter Gutmann >> wrote: >> Having said that, given an RFC saying MUST NOT 1.0 and 1.1 which is what the >> original discussion was about, why not also add MUST NOT MD5 and

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 10:31 AM Peter Gutmann wrote: > Having said that, given an RFC saying MUST NOT 1.0 and 1.1 which is what > the > original discussion was about, why not also add MUST NOT MD5 and SHA1 in > TLS > 1.2 to the text? > This seems like a reasonable proposal. -Ekr > Peter. > >

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

> On May 3, 2019, at 1:30 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > > Having said that, given an RFC saying MUST NOT 1.0 and 1.1 which is what the > original discussion was about, why not also add MUST NOT MD5 and SHA1 in TLS > 1.2 to the text? And perhaps MUST EtM, ... which starts to look a lot like "must TL

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Benjamin Kaduk writes: >I'll make the obligatory note that SHA-2 is fine Sure, and that was the really strange thing with TLS 1.2, why not just say SHA-2 or better only, rather than adding mechanisms that were much, much weaker than its predecessors? So the simple fix is just to use SHA-2 only

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Fri, May 03, 2019 at 04:53:44PM +, Peter Gutmann wrote: > Hubert Kario writes: > > >And the practical research: > >https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/131.pdf > >https://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2009/59120136/59120136.pdf > >only confirms that. > > That would be the practical research that

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hubert Kario writes: >And the practical research: >https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/131.pdf >https://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2009/59120136/59120136.pdf >only confirms that. That would be the practical research that says: Due to these constraints, the practical impact of our second preimage

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Friday, 3 May 2019 16:56:54 CEST Martin Rex wrote: > Hubert Kario wrote: > > We've been over this Martin, the theoretical research shows that for > > Merkle- Damgård functions, combining them doesn't increase their security > > significantly. > > You are completely misunderstanding the results

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hubert Kario wrote: > > We've been over this Martin, the theoretical research shows that for Merkle- > Damgård functions, combining them doesn't increase their security > significantly. You are completely misunderstanding the results. The security is greatly increased! Nobody is afraid of the

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Thu, May 2, 2019 at 7:51 PM Martin Thomson wrote: > Thanks Kathleen, these look like good changes. > > Nits in the proposed BCP195 section: Lose the "p" in mpost and s/off of/on/ > Thank you, Martin! > > On Fri, May 3, 2019, at 01:12, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > > Thank you for your feedback

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Wednesday, 1 May 2019 01:49:52 CEST Martin Rex wrote: > Martin Thomson wrote: > > On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, at 07:29, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > >> The sound-bite version is: first raise the ceiling, *then* the floor. > > > > Yep. We've done the ceiling bit twice now. > > Once in 2008 when we publi

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Thanks Kathleen, these look like good changes. Nits in the proposed BCP195 section: Lose the "p" in mpost and s/off of/on/ On Fri, May 3, 2019, at 01:12, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > Thank you for your feedback in this review. Responses inline as to how > I propose it is addressed: > > On Sat,

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hello Martin, On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 7:50 PM Martin Rex wrote: > Martin Thomson wrote: > > On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, at 07:29, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > >> The sound-bite version is: first raise the ceiling, *then* the floor. > > > > Yep. We've done the ceiling bit twice now. > > Once in 2008 when

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 5:29 PM Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > On Apr 26, 2019, at 11:24 AM, Salz, Rich wrote: > > > > If they haven’t already moved off TLS 1 then maybe this document will > give the right people a push to do so. > > > > Nobody is going to arrest an MTA for non compliance. > > Of co

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Victor, Thank you very much for your work and pushing the points on uses of TLS outside of web as this is an important point. On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 9:30 PM Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > On Apr 12, 2019, at 7:28 PM, Christopher Wood > wrote: > > > > This is the working group last call for the "D

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hi Gary, Thanks for your review and support. I'll respond inline and if Stephen disagrees, he will chime in :-) On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 9:51 AM Gary Gapinski wrote: > On 4/12/19 7:28 PM, Christopher Wood wrote: > > This is the working group last call for the "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1”

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Maarten, On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 3:43 AM Maarten Aertsen (NCSC-NL) wrote: > Hi, > > On 13-4-2019 01:28, Christopher Wood wrote: > > This is the working group last call for the "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and > TLSv1.1” draft available at: > > > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldver

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Thank you for your feedback in this review. Responses inline as to how I propose it is addressed: On Sat, Apr 13, 2019 at 12:16 AM Martin Thomson wrote: > Section 1.1 doesn't say *how* those listed documents are updated. Might > pay to include a few works on how. > Thank you, that was helpful

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 2:50 AM Martin Rex wrote: > It is formally provable Everything must be accounted for as provable until it's proved unless it's proved to be false. Do you possess an external (academic?) reference? -- Töma ___ TLS mailing list T

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Martin Thomson wrote: > On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, at 07:29, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: >> The sound-bite version is: first raise the ceiling, *then* the floor. > > Yep. We've done the ceiling bit twice now. > Once in 2008 when we published TLS 1.2 and then in 2018 > with the publication of TLS 1.3. I'd

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

> On Apr 28, 2019, at 7:26 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: > >> The sound-bite version is: first raise the ceiling, *then* the floor. > > Yep. We've done the ceiling bit twice now. Once in 2008 when we published > TLS 1.2 and then in 2018 with the publication of TLS 1.3. I'd say we're > overdue f

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

The WGLC is finished with no substantial blockers. We'll work with the authors in moving this document to the next stage in the process. Thanks to everyone who reviewed and commented on this document. Best, Chris, Joe, and Sean On Fri, Apr 12, 2019, at 4:28 PM, Christopher Wood wrote: > This i

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, at 07:29, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > The sound-bite version is: first raise the ceiling, *then* the floor. Yep. We've done the ceiling bit twice now. Once in 2008 when we published TLS 1.2 and then in 2018 with the publication of TLS 1.3. I'd say we're overdue for the floo

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

This is of cause true. The MTA will not be arrested the question is if somebody will arrest the administrator or the owner. This will become part of the "push" the right people. Regards, Roland Am 26.04.2019 um 17:24 schrieb Salz, Rich: If they haven’t already moved off TLS 1 then maybe t

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

> On Apr 26, 2019, at 11:24 AM, Salz, Rich wrote: > > If they haven’t already moved off TLS 1 then maybe this document will give > the right people a push to do so. > > Nobody is going to arrest an MTA for non compliance. Of course. And as I said, I'd like to see the document move forward, I

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

If they haven’t already moved off TLS 1 then maybe this document will give the right people a push to do so. Nobody is going to arrest an MTA for non compliance. ___ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Peace, On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 6:08 PM Hubert Kario wrote: > I think it's fine as it is. This use case is very specific and the impact > for > it is limited. So yes, I think that the delay between publishing and now > will > change the situation even more out of favour of TLS 1.0. > Exactly my th

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

I think it's fine as it is. This use case is very specific and the impact for it is limited. So yes, I think that the delay between publishing and now will change the situation even more out of favour of TLS 1.0. On Friday, 26 April 2019 03:30:00 CEST Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > On Apr 12, 2019,

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

I also believe that it's ready. On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 5:49 AM Daniel Migault wrote: > > I believe the doc is fine as it is. > Yours, > Daniel > > On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 9:30 PM Viktor Dukhovni > wrote: >> >> > On Apr 12, 2019, at 7:28 PM, Christopher Wood wrote: >> > >> > This is the workin

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

I believe the doc is fine as it is. Yours, Daniel On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 9:30 PM Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > On Apr 12, 2019, at 7:28 PM, Christopher Wood > wrote: > > > > This is the working group last call for the "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and > TLSv1.1” draft available at: > > > > > https://datat

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

> On Apr 12, 2019, at 7:28 PM, Christopher Wood wrote: > > This is the working group last call for the "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1” > draft available at: > >https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/ > > Please review the document and send your comments to

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Thanks, Gary and others for the helpful feedback and support! I like Stephen can look at integrating the suggestions this weekend/early next week. Please do keep the comments coming. Best regards, Kathleen On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 9:51 AM Gary Gapinski wrote: > On 4/12/19 7:28 PM, Christopher

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On 4/12/19 7:28 PM, Christopher Wood wrote: This is the working group last call for the "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1” draft available at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/ Please review the document and send your commen

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hiya, On 24/04/2019 08:42, Maarten Aertsen (NCSC-NL) wrote: > Hi, > > On 13-4-2019 01:28, Christopher Wood wrote: >> This is the working group last call for the "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and >> TLSv1.1” draft available at: >> >> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-depr

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Hi, On 13-4-2019 01:28, Christopher Wood wrote: This is the working group last call for the "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1” draft available at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/ Please review the document and send your comments to the list by April

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Publish! --- Sent from Workspace ONE Boxer On 13 April 2019 at 01:29:59 CEST, Christopher Wood wrote: This is the working group last call for the "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1” draft available at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ol

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

Section 1.1 doesn't say *how* those listed documents are updated. Might pay to include a few works on how. Section 2 can be cut down a lot. The quote from another document is longer than the rest of the text. In many ways, saying that the IETF is moving last is not a great thing to memoriali

Re: [TLS] WGLC for "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1"

On Fri, Apr 12, 2019, 4:28 PM Christopher Wood wrote: > This is the working group last call for the "Deprecating TLSv1.0 and > TLSv1.1” draft available at: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/ > > Please review the document and send your comments to the l