Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Friday, 3 May 2019 16:56:54 CEST Martin Rex wrote:
>> Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote:
>> > We've been over this Martin, the theoretical research shows that for
>> > Merkle- Damgård functions, combining them doesn't increase their security
>> > significantly.
>>
>> You are completely misunderstanding the results.
>>
>> The security is greatly increased!
>
> like I said, that were the follow up papers
>
> the original is still Joux:
> https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2004/31520306/multicollisions.pdf
Thanks to Peter Gutmann for the summary:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/g0MDCdZcHsvZefv4V8fssXMeEHs
which you may have missed.
>
>> TLSv1.2 (rsa,MD5) *cough* -- which a depressingly high number of clueless
>> implementers actually implemented, see SLOTH
>
> SLOTH?
SLOTH is a brainfart in the TLSv1.2 spec which is blatently obvious.
If (md5,rsa) was actually shipped in a TLSv1.2 implementation, it indicates
a dysfunctional (or crypto-clueless) QA for the project.
The erroneous implementation of (md5,rsa) was silently removed from openssl
*without* CVE, after I privately complained about this brainfart having
been added to openssl.
I ranted about the TLSv1.2 digitally_signed brainfart in rfc5246 on
the IETF TLS WG mailing list here (01-Oct-2013):
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/l_R94xX7myvL9x8I_7L7NiDjV9w
assuming that crypto clue and common sense should work.
Looking at what was still affected by the problem end of 2014,
it seems that you *MUST* hit TLS implementors with a CVE
https://www.mitls.org/pages/attacks/SLOTH#disclosure
and can not rely on crypto-clue and common sense.
-Martin
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