On 11 December 2015 at 14:16, Tati Chevron wrote:
> But even if PKI were actively on fire at the moment (which it is not),
>> what's wrong with doing both?
>>
>
> Basically the gain verses the effort and resources expended.
>
> I agree that there is a value in distributing keys and source code in
On 11 December 2015 at 13:51, Tati Chevron wrote:
> ...and intercept the package being delivered to you?
>
> Yes, it's possible, but somebody who had the resources to go to that
> extreme, and a motive to single you out as a target, would presumably
> have other ways to invade your privacy and in
On 11 December 2015 at 13:17, Tati Chevron wrote:
> Would you really trust HTTPS more than a physical CD being mailed to
> you???
Yes.
Both provide some level of accountability, however with PKI you explicitly
trust a limited (though big) numer of third parties to do their job
properly, and in
On 11 December 2015 at 13:10, Tati Chevron wrote:
> In either case, I'd be willing to put my money where my mouth is.
>> Whom do I contact about running a site mirror?
>>
>
> Why would we trust your mirror?
Touché.
On 11 December 2015 at 12:28, Stefan Sperling wrote:
> I would consider signify keys printed on CDs and copied across several
> web sites safer than trusting the hundreds of CA certs shipped with a
> standard web browser.
On 11 December 2015 at 12:35, Tati Chevron wrote:
> The official CD set
On 11 December 2015 at 05:51, Andy Bradford
wrote:
> If one wants privacy on a website then more is required than just HTTPS.
>
Right. *I* just want a reasonable (256-bit) guarantee that the signify keys
on my screen are the ones the OpenBSD authors intended me to see.
I currently just assume t
In linux, umount has the -l option:
Lazy unmount. Detach the filesystem from the filesystem hierarchy now, and
> cleanup all references to the filesystem as soon as it is not busy anymore.
> (Requires kernel 2.4.11 or later.)
I've used this flag (in conjunction with -f) for this exact situation,
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