Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-09-02 Thread Richard Gooch
Jamie Lokier writes: > Richard Gooch wrote: > > I agree. Firstly, you can't frob random memory with the MTRR driver, > > so it clearly doesn't need CAP_SYS_RAWIO. > > With it you can change the behaviour of other drivers by changing > the properties of their MMIO space. So it should need > CAP_S

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-09-02 Thread Jamie Lokier
Richard Gooch wrote: > I agree. Firstly, you can't frob random memory with the MTRR driver, > so it clearly doesn't need CAP_SYS_RAWIO. With it you can change the behaviour of other drivers by changing the properties of their MMIO space. So it should need CAP_SYS_RAWIO, IMHO. -- Jamie - To unsu

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-09-01 Thread Richard Gooch
Chris Evans writes: > > On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Tigran Aivazian wrote: > > > Actually, microcode driver checks CAP_SYS_RAWIO only on open() so it would > > allow access to the receiver of fd even he has no CAP_SYS_RAWIO > > privilege. Hmmm, maybe I should put it back into write() method, as Linus >

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Alan Cox
> speaking of /dev/kmem, I always wondered why Alan Cox (or someone > else?) objected to adding vwrite() ability to write to vmalloc'd addresses > via /dev/kmem and this discussion is as good as any to ask here :) If it can be done cleanly without races fore 2.4 then I dont see a problem. I also

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Tigran Aivazian
On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Chris Evans wrote: > I'm not sure about /proc/kcore (it looks to be read only), even reading from certaing ioremap'd areas is dangerous. (ok current /proc/kcore prevents that from happening by skipping such). > but /dev/mem > and /dev/kmem are good examples. speaking of /d

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Alan Cox
> > RAWIO is about hardware level access not Stephens O_DIRECT stuff > > So why is /proc/kcore access SYS_RAWIO then ? You can tamper with arbitary memory via it in theory > And why is nvram access not SYS_RAWIO ? You cant make the nvram tamper with arbitary memory - To unsubscribe from thi

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Chris Evans
On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Matthew Kirkwood wrote: > On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Andi Kleen wrote: > > > > > Clearly? How do MTRR changes relate to rawio ? > > > > > > RAWIO is about hardware level access not Stephens O_DIRECT stuff > > > > So why is /proc/kcore access SYS_RAWIO then ? > > I kind of overl

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Matthew Kirkwood
On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Andi Kleen wrote: > > > And why is nvram access not SYS_RAWIO ? > > > > You cant make the nvram tamper with arbitary memory > > But it is clearly hardware access isn't it ? So is /dev/fd0. And you can set a lot of interesting ioctl()s with a handle to that and CAP_SYS_AD

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Andi Kleen
On Thu, Aug 31, 2000 at 01:05:15PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote: > > And why is nvram access not SYS_RAWIO ? > > You cant make the nvram tamper with arbitary memory But it is clearly hardware access isn't it ? -Andi - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the bo

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Chris Evans
On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Tigran Aivazian wrote: > Actually, microcode driver checks CAP_SYS_RAWIO only on open() so it would > allow access to the receiver of fd even he has no CAP_SYS_RAWIO > privilege. Hmmm, maybe I should put it back into write() method, as Linus > (or someone else) did at some p

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Tigran Aivazian
On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Andi Kleen wrote: > On Thu, Aug 31, 2000 at 12:11:31PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote: > > > > These cases in mtrr.c are clearly CAP_SYS_RAWIO. > > > > > > Clearly? How do MTRR changes relate to rawio ? > > > > RAWIO is about hardware level access not Stephens O_DIRECT stuff > > S

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Matthew Kirkwood
On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Andi Kleen wrote: > > > Clearly? How do MTRR changes relate to rawio ? > > > > RAWIO is about hardware level access not Stephens O_DIRECT stuff > > So why is /proc/kcore access SYS_RAWIO then ? I kind of overloaded CAP_SYS_RAWIO to restrict access to bits of arbitrary memor

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Alan Cox
> > These cases in mtrr.c are clearly CAP_SYS_RAWIO. > > Clearly? How do MTRR changes relate to rawio ? RAWIO is about hardware level access not Stephens O_DIRECT stuff - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Plea

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Andi Kleen
On Thu, Aug 31, 2000 at 12:11:31PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote: > > > These cases in mtrr.c are clearly CAP_SYS_RAWIO. > > > > Clearly? How do MTRR changes relate to rawio ? > > RAWIO is about hardware level access not Stephens O_DIRECT stuff So why is /proc/kcore access SYS_RAWIO then ? And why i

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Andi Kleen
On Thu, Aug 31, 2000 at 11:27:17AM +0100, Matthew Kirkwood wrote: > > - if ( !suser () ) return -EPERM; > > + if ( !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ) return -EPERM; > > Please think further about these random changes. CAP_SYS_ADMIN > is already bloated with useless junk and these aren't helping > the

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Tigran Aivazian
On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Matthew Kirkwood wrote: > On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Tigran Aivazian wrote: > > > Actually, microcode driver checks CAP_SYS_RAWIO only on open() so it > > would allow access to the receiver of fd even he has no CAP_SYS_RAWIO > > privilege. Hmmm, maybe I should put it back into wri

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Matthew Kirkwood
On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Tigran Aivazian wrote: > Actually, microcode driver checks CAP_SYS_RAWIO only on open() so it > would allow access to the receiver of fd even he has no CAP_SYS_RAWIO > privilege. Hmmm, maybe I should put it back into write() method, as > Linus (or someone else) did at some po

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Matthew Kirkwood
On Wed, 30 Aug 2000, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote: > Please consider applying. And then please don't apply. >case MTRRIOC_ADD_ENTRY: > - if ( !suser () ) return -EPERM; > + if ( !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ) return -EPERM; Please think further about these random cha

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Tigran Aivazian
On Wed, 30 Aug 2000, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote: > -if ( !suser () ) return -EPERM; > +if ( !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ) return -EPERM; no, it should be CAP_SYS_RAWIO. I thought that is the convention for accessing chipset-specific io features. E.g. see arch/i386/kernel/microcode.c. Reg

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-31 Thread Tigran Aivazian
On Wed, 30 Aug 2000, Richard Gooch wrote: > Grumble. Someone tell me why we can't just remove the suser() calls > entirely and instead test if the file has write access? That's what > the permissions on the file are for. Read access lets people take a > look, but write access is required to change

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-30 Thread Richard Gooch
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo writes: > Em Wed, Aug 30, 2000 at 10:49:22PM -0400, Richard Gooch escreveu: > > Tigran Aivazian writes: > > > On Sat, 26 Aug 2000, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote: > > > > - if ((current->tty != tty) && !suser()) > > > > + if ((current->tty != tty) && !capable(C

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-30 Thread Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Em Wed, Aug 30, 2000 at 10:49:22PM -0400, Richard Gooch escreveu: > Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo writes: > > Hi, > > > > Please consider applying. > > > > - Arnaldo > > > > --- linux-2.4.0-test8-pre1/arch/i386/kernel/mtrr.c Thu Jul 13 01:58:41 2000 > > +++ linux

Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-30 Thread Richard Gooch
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo writes: > Hi, > > Please consider applying. > > - Arnaldo > > --- linux-2.4.0-test8-pre1/arch/i386/kernel/mtrr.cThu Jul 13 01:58:41 2000 > +++ linux-2.4.0-test8-pre1.acme/arch/i386/kernel/mtrr.c Wed Aug 30 20:52:48 >2000

[PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/

2000-08-30 Thread Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Hi, Please consider applying. - Arnaldo --- linux-2.4.0-test8-pre1/arch/i386/kernel/mtrr.c Thu Jul 13 01:58:41 2000 +++ linux-2.4.0-test8-pre1.acme/arch/i386/kernel/mtrr.c Wed Aug 30 20:52:48 2000 @@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ char *ptr; char line[