On Thu, 31 Aug 2000, Tigran Aivazian wrote: > Actually, microcode driver checks CAP_SYS_RAWIO only on open() so it would > allow access to the receiver of fd even he has no CAP_SYS_RAWIO > privilege. Hmmm, maybe I should put it back into write() method, as Linus > (or someone else) did at some point (and I removed it)... Please don't put it back into write(). One of the powerful uses of passing fds is across privilege boundaries. We don't want that to suddenly stop working. Look at it this way: if anyone passes a privileged fd, they either know what they are doing, or get what they deserve. Cheers Chris - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
- [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Richard Gooch
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Richard Gooch
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Tigran Aivazian
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Matthew Kirkwood
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capabl... Tigran Aivazian
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Chris Evans
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capabl... Richard Gooch
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/c... Jamie Lokier
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/sus... Richard Gooch
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Tigran Aivazian
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Matthew Kirkwood
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Andi Kleen
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capable/ Alan Cox
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/capabl... Andi Kleen
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/suser/c... Matthew Kirkwood
- Re: [PATCH] mtrr: s/sus... Chris Evans