Please remove pgp.mit.edu from keys.gnupg.net

hi gnupg folks-- I just noticed that the keys.gnupg.net pool currently contains pgp.mit.edu as one of the members. This keyserver is not properly syncing with the rest of the global pool. For example, there are keys that have been in the global pool for several weeks that have not migrated into

changing usage flags on a primary key

Hi GnuPG Folks-- Let's say i have an OpenPGP primary key with usage flags ECSA set (some keys like this have been known to be generated by GUI tools). Say i wanted to convert this key into a decent primary key with a reasonable/standard set of usage flags (e.g. CS or just C); is this something i

Re: changing usage flags on a primary key

On 11/10/2010 12:53 PM, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > That's fairly easy by hacking the code and resigning. hrm, even if i can do this, it probably isn't very convincing for most people following gnupg-users :( > Have a look the the archive, it was mentioned before how it works. do you have

gpg --verify detached signature from two file descriptors?

Hi GnuPG folks-- i'd like to use gpg to verify a detached signature, but for various reasons i don't want to put either part (the body or the signature) in the filesystem (i have the data queued in two otherwise anonymous file descriptors). if i put the body on FD 0, i can verify the detached sig

Re: gpg --verify detached signature from two file descriptors?

Hi Robert-- On 11/11/2010 11:44 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 11/11/2010 11:19 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> i'd like to use gpg to verify a detached signature, but for various >> reasons i don't want to put either part (the body or the signature) in >>

Re: gpg --verify detached signature from two file descriptors?

On 11/12/2010 07:28 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > 1. Don't optimize code that isn't a bottleneck -- there's nothing wrong > with making GnuPG do unnecessary work so long as that part isn't the > bottleneck. i was actually hoping to avoid *me* having to do the extra work of figuring out how to con

Re: gpg --verify detached signature from two file descriptors?

On 11/13/2010 02:16 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 12 Nov 2010 05:19, d...@fifthhorseman.net said: > >> i'd like to use gpg to verify a detached signature, but for various >> reasons i don't want to put either part (the body or the signature) in >> the filesystem (i have the data queued in two o

Re: gpg --verify detached signature from two file descriptors?

On 11/13/2010 02:26 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> gpg --enable-special-filenames --verify --batch -&5 -&6 >> >> Assuming you have them in fds 5 and 6. > > thanks, this is exactly what i needed! Hrm, but it doesn't seem to work for me to use the spec

Re: gpg --verify detached signature from two file descriptors?

On 11/19/2010 04:26 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > The usual options vs. file name problem. Add the option stopper: > > gpg --enable-special-filenames --verify \ > --batch -- '-&4' '-&3' 3 signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnup

OT: unusual mail reply header templates [was: Re: Gpg4Win 2.0.4 with GnuPG 1.4.11??]

On 11/20/2010 06:24 PM, Jerry wrote: > He prefixed the groups mailing address: with > "Jerry on GnuPG-Users". Yes MFPA always seems to do that, for no reason that i understand. I find it unusual, unhelpful, and disorienting, but: meh. Not worth fighting about, and it's certainly not on-topic f

gpg --verify behaves differently when multiple signatures present with --batch

GNUPG:] GOODSIG FAF286F977F50B3B fake user > [GNUPG:] VALIDSIG FCD3E0AFA74EE527C61E0D34FAF286F977F50B3B 2010-11-21 > 1290318596 0 4 0 1 10 01 FCD3E0AFA74EE527C61E0D34FAF286F977F50B3B > [GNUPG:] TRUST_UNDEFINED > [GNUPG:] BADSIG CCD2ED94D21739E9 Daniel Kahn Gillmor > ==BA== > [GNUPG:] BA

Re: GPF Crypto Stick vs OpenPGP Card

On 12/03/2010 11:32 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > What might work are JPEGs - > but who wants to sign a JPEG file and have recipients work with an image > of your text? JPEGs themselves are problematic because of the ability to embed arbitrary data in the metadata fields (EXIF, etc [0]). So unless Are

Re: GPF Crypto Stick vs OpenPGP Card

On 12/03/2010 12:45 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > So unless Are you willing to try to display [...] > my laptop display is pretty small, and i read what i sign on it ;) sigh. I may read what i sign, but apparently either my grammar or my proofreading skills are still below

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

On 12/09/2010 09:08 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 12/9/2010 1:14 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote: >> I am giving very serious thought to creating new keys and >> doing a (long-term) transition to them. This is partly to respond to >> known flaws with SHA-1 and take advantage of SHA-256 and higher. > >

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

On 12/09/2010 01:30 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > Ah, a debate, excellent. Now let's make it a little more > entertaining, :P > where do you see RIPEMD-160 in the scheme of things? RIPEMD-160 is another 160-bit hash, same size as SHA-1. I don't think that it has undergone as extensive cryptanalysi

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

On 12/09/2010 03:09 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > Is this why a revoked key can still be used to decrypt data that was > encrypted with a non-revoked copy of the key? the things that get revoked are OpenPGP certificates. the certificates themselves contain key material. The math that makes the key

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

On 12/09/2010 02:17 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > IMO, quite high. If you use the same key material, then if the old > OpenPGP certificate format ever becomes weak an attacker can simply take > an old certificate of yours, upgrade it to the new format, and bang > they're off to the races. Maybe w

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

On 12/09/2010 04:33 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Someone else exploits the old, insecure cert format in a way you don't > like. Again, can you give an example of such an exploit? > Now you're stuck arguing, "wait, that's not my cert... well, it > /is/ my cert, it's the same cert material, but i

Re: multiple subkeys and key transition

On 12/11/2010 06:22 PM, MFPA wrote: > A question on the subject of SSL/TLS certificates and HTTPS: often > there is no user requirement to "authenticate" the identity of the > server, but rather a simple requirement to prevent snooping; why does > this need a certificate? "prevent snooping" means

Re: Best Practices

On 12/11/2010 11:24 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > A certificate is just a block of key material plus some associated data. > SHA-1 is used internally by the certificate to sign some parts of the > data Really? i've got several certifications over my key's user IDs that i'm pretty sure don't use

Re: Best Practices

On 12/12/2010 11:21 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 12/12/2010 10:23 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> What part of OpenPGP certificates require SHA-1? > > ... At first blush, V4 certificate checksums, what do you mean by "V4 certificate checksums"? > symmetr

Re: Best Practices

On 12/12/2010 03:51 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 12/12/2010 3:03 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> what do you mean by "V4 certificate checksums"? > > Read the RFC. It's in there, and does a better job than I can do of > explaining it. Section 5.5.3. i th

Re: Best Practices

On 12/12/2010 11:03 PM, David Shaw wrote: > The fingerprint issue is more than just making a new packet for a new MDC > or revocation subpacket, though. There is no concept in OpenPGP of a flag > telling an implementation how to calculate the fingerprint - or rather > there IS a flag: the version

Re: Best Practices

On 12/13/2010 11:16 AM, David Shaw wrote: > it seems to me you are focusing on one specific part of > the design (the secret key format), forcing it to remain unchanged, FWIW, i don't particularly care about the secret key packet format. My focus in this discussion has been on the certificate for

Re: Best Practices

On 12/13/2010 01:13 PM, David Shaw wrote: > Why is it that using the method you advocate, there is a graceful > changeover between fingerprint formats, but a change in the > certificate format requires a "hard cut-over" with "global > interruption of existing networks..." ? I was assuming that new

Re: multiple trust signatures

Hi Imran-- you're asking good questions, but your example might be more complicated than you need it to be. More interleaved below: On 12/20/2010 12:58 PM, Imran Khan wrote: > Can someone please guide me, if there are multiple trust > signatures(tsign) with different trust values and trust depth

Re: multiple trust signatures

On 12/20/2010 04:06 PM, Imran Khan wrote: > you mentioned some metrics, like (min(level_m,level_n), > min((depth_n-1),depth_m)) and in other place u stated, "Combining the two > paths should leave us with the strongest trust". Are these your > own intuition or these things are mentioned in GPG cod

Re: Is self-signing necessary? Basic questions.

On 01/02/2011 10:01 AM, David Shaw wrote: > The only significant use of the direct-key signature is for key owners > to add designated revokers to their key. Designated revokers are carried > in a subpacket on a direct key signature. I think a revocation certificate (that is, revoking the primary

Re: defaults / homedir / loal variable / option file etc

On 01/03/2011 11:05 AM, Neil Phillips wrote: > it says i can place stuff in a file called gpg.conf that is located in my > C:\Profiles\xxx\Application Data\gnupg folder. > well there is no gpg.conf file there :( You've found the right location, i think. You should be able to just create the file

Re: What is the benefit of signing an encrypted email

On 01/12/2011 10:57 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Speaking for Enigmail, it's because 99% of the time signatures are worthless. > They contribute to the illusion of data integrity while actually providing no > guarantees. It's best if you only sign messages you deliberately intend to > sign, messa

Re: What is the benefit of signing an encrypted email

On 01/12/2011 11:39 AM, Hauke Laging wrote: > a) usual ("not thought about") email, just as a first hard line of defense > against forgery What do you think you would gain from a signature made by an individual if they did not think they were making it? How is this a "hard line of defense agains

Re: What is the benefit of signing an encrypted email

On 01/12/2011 12:10 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > I mean: It is POSSIBLE to steal my secret key but it is not EASY. For normal > email communication I regard this as enough. For signing treaties or other > keys I use other keys (and a different environment). yes, that's true; but here we've been tal

Re: What is the benefit of signing an encrypted email

On 01/12/2011 11:13 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Show me the worth in a signed message that has any of (a) an incorrect > signature, (b) from an invalid key, or (c) from someone you believe is > utterly untrustworthy. As a devil's advocate, i'd point out that a message signed with a valid key kno

Re: parsing gpg-key block

Hi Ole-- On 01/13/2011 12:59 PM, Ole Rixmann wrote: > this is my first post ;) welcome! > I need to check gpg-rsa-signatures in JavaScript and for this to happen > i have > to parse key blocks produced with > "gpg --armor --export-options export-minimal --export 0xid". > To do the checking i nee

signed headers for OpenPGP [was: Re: What is the benefit of signing an encrypted email]

On 01/19/2011 01:29 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > I'd like to see a feature in MUAs to wrap the entire mail as presented > in the composer into a message/rfc822 container and send the actual > message out with the same headers as in the rfc822 container. This > allows to sign the entire mail including

Re: Problem with keyserver

On 01/26/2011 01:14 PM, Jerry wrote: > Does anyone know if there is a problem with the following keyserver: > > hkp://keys.gnupg.net > > I have not been able to connect with it for several days now. keys.gnupg.net is a DNS round robin. if one of them fails, the other ones should be responsive

Re: Problem with keyserver

On 01/26/2011 05:13 PM, Jerry wrote: > Thanks, I have added that URL. Now, if I might ask a stupid question, > is there a specific port number that is used? I just want to make sure > my firewall is setup correctly. Presently I have it setup to allow any > port # for those URLs. hrm, sounds like y

Re: two out of three keys.gnupg.net keyservers down?

On 01/31/2011 06:14 AM, Jerry wrote: > In essence, I reported this exact same problem last week. I am not sure > why the unresponsive servers cannot be fixed; however, as a work > around, I simple started using a new server as my default: > > keyserver hkp://wwwkeys.us.pgp.net if you want t

learning which symmetric cipher via --status-fd when --decrypting

D3EC21484CFF Daniel Kahn Gillmor > > [GNUPG:] NEED_PASSPHRASE C61BD3EC21484CFF CCD2ED94D21739E9 1 0 > [GNUPG:] GOOD_PASSPHRASE > gpg: encrypted with 4096-bit RSA key, ID 21484CFF, created 2007-06-02 > "Daniel Kahn Gillmor " > [GNUPG:] BEGIN_DECRYPTION >

Re: learning which symmetric cipher via --status-fd when --decrypting

On 02/03/2011 03:01 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Thu, 3 Feb 2011 08:28, d...@fifthhorseman.net said: > >> is there a way for a program that parses --status-fd to get this > > Not yet. > >> information, or does the program need to parse --logger-fd as well to > > better don't do that; the messag

moving user ID Comments to --expert mode

Hi folks-- I'd like to propose that GnuPG only prompt the user for a "Comment" for their User ID under --expert mode. Here's why: * most people just need a simple identity-driven OpenPGP certificate, one that matches their name and e-mail address. * new users see the prompt and think they nee

Re: learning which symmetric cipher via --status-fd when --decrypting

On 02/03/2011 04:19 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Thu, 3 Feb 2011 21:13, d...@fifthhorseman.net said: > >> This looks great. Thanks, Werner! Can we expect this in the 1.x and >> 2.0.x branches as well? > > Hmmm. If you really want that please out it into the tracker; there is > a topic keyword

Re: moving user ID Comments to --expert mode

On 02/03/2011 04:07 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 2/3/11 3:59 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> * most people just need a simple identity-driven OpenPGP certificate, >> one that matches their name and e-mail address. > > Whenever people talk about what "most users&q

Re: moving user ID Comments to --expert mode

ts are in the user IDs. By certifying the full user ID > you are also certifying the comment. Just to clarify this point: If i meet Robert in person, show him my gov't IDs, my fingerprint, and we exchange e-mails, Robert would probably be fine certifying this User ID: Daniel Kahn Gillmor

Re: moving user ID Comments to --expert mode

On 02/04/2011 01:12 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > Many might nor know that > there is a help feature for every input field: Indeed, i had no idea that this was the case. Thanks for the tip. > but many more users are using a GUI for key generation and thus it is up > to the GUI to preset the comment f

Re: moving user ID Comments to --expert mode

On 02/06/2011 02:08 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 4 Feb 2011 16:51, d...@fifthhorseman.net said: > >> Some translation changes might still be worth doing; I would like to see >> the example User ID lose the comment (including "(Der Dichter)" in an >> english prompt is not helpful), and i think

Re: moving user ID Comments to --expert mode

On 02/06/2011 07:01 PM, MFPA wrote: > What's a "legitimate User ID?" My understanding is that, whilst the de > facto standard is a name and an email address, there is no compulsion > over what string to choose. Here are some legitimate User IDs that do not correspond to a single individual: * "d

Re: moving user ID Comments to --expert mode

On 02/07/2011 03:07 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > In OpenPGP parlance the term "key" is used as a synonym for the term > "keyblock" which in turn is the OpenPGP saying for a "certificate". While i think this terminology is unfortunate (how do we refer to the key without any additional metadata attache

gpg --check-sigs should indicate if a signature is made by a revoked/compromised key

gpg --check-sigs produces information about whether a certification was revoked, but not whether the certification was made by a key which itself was revoked. This seems troublesome to me. Consider this scenario: Alice has key A, and Bob has key B. Alice's key gets compromised by Mallory. Alic

Re: gpg --check-sigs should indicate if a signature is made by a revoked/compromised key

On 02/09/2011 03:27 PM, Grant Olson wrote: > The man page does say that this is intentionally not done for > performance reasons: > > --check-sigs >Same as --list-sigs, but the signatures are verified. Note that >for performance reasons the revocation status of a signing key >

Re: how to store the public keys in a db?

On 02/14/2011 03:58 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Sun, 13 Feb 2011 13:34, ikrabbe@gmail.com said: > >> don't think that it will result into a bottleneck before reaching >> 10^6-10^12 keys (I didn't prove this statement!). > > This won't work. We do a sequential scans of the pubring.gpg all the

Re: how to store the public keys in a db?

On 02/14/2011 12:35 PM, Werner Koch wrote: > On Mon, 14 Feb 2011 15:20, d...@fifthhorseman.net said: > >> processor, 1GiB RAM), but it's bad enough that i've taken the step of >> setting no-auto-check-trustdb, and running --check-trustdb manually from >> a nightly cronjob. otherwise, with the amo

Re: GPG (MingW32) defaults to revoked key/uid

On 02/14/2011 09:59 AM, M. Henry wrote: > Now, when I use gpg to look up a key by any part of a uid (for example when > using --edit- > key), it automatically selects the first-created _revoked_ key, not the sole > non-revoked one. I > have tried revoking and deleting specific uids from the revo

on possible ambiguity in Key IDs [was: Re: Help with OpenPGP plugin in Mozilla Thunderbird and Claws Mail]

On 02/15/2011 09:22 PM, lists.gn...@mephisto.fastmail.net wrote: > If you have your public key published somewhere, such as on a key > server, the Key ID is a way for other people to unambiguously look up > the full key. You're quite correct that the key ID provides a handle that references the ac

Re: Default hash

On 02/24/2011 04:03 AM, Doug Barton wrote: > On 02/23/2011 22:26, Aaron Toponce wrote: >> Given the release of v1.4.10, the SHA256 hashing algorithm is preferred >> over SHA1. Yet, after updating my default preferences with 'setpref' and >> signing some text, SHA1 is still used as the default hashi

Re: Rebuilding the private key from signatures

On 02/24/2011 09:09 AM, Aaron Toponce wrote: > What is the likelihood that an attacker could rebuild a private key from > a collections of signed mail, and would it depend on the hash used in > the algorithm? It doesn't depend as much on the digest algorithm used as it does on the type of public k

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

On 02/24/2011 08:22 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On Android's mail application, PGP/MIME attachments are nigh-unusable. > It won't render even the plaintext portions: it has to be downloaded and > opened with a text reader. If you're concerned about your mail being > readable on a mobile device (

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

On 02/24/2011 08:22 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On Android's mail application, PGP/MIME attachments are nigh-unusable. > It won't render even the plaintext portions: it has to be downloaded and > opened with a text reader. If you're concerned about your mail being > readable on a mobile device (

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

On 02/24/2011 11:15 PM, M.R. wrote: > On 02/25/2011 03:15 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> I do *not* consider PGP/MIME harmful for mobile. > > They might not be harmfull for ~your~ mobile... heh. i don't have a "mobile", so i can guarantee that :) > Any mail

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

On 02/25/2011 12:11 PM, Martin Gollowitzer wrote: > * Patrick Brunschwig [110225 10:10]: >> The only mail client on Android I know of to handle OpenPGP messages is >> K9 (together with APG). But K9 only supports inline-PGP, PGP/MIME >> messages are not displayed. > > This is true, but K9 at least

Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile

On 02/25/2011 01:37 PM, Martin Gollowitzer wrote: > Sorry for the misunderstanding: The message body is being displayed, but > the signature is not verified. K9 is the only e-mail client for Android > that I consider usable. I just received corroboration of a successful read (albeit without signat

[was: Re: PGP/MIME considered harmful for mobile]

On 02/27/2011 08:31 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > the default mail app on a Verizon Droid X running Android 2.2 has broken MIME > support. Please post this bit of useful details to the "Android PGP/MIME test results" thread started by Grant Olson, which actually has an acceptable signal-to-noise

Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?

On 02/28/2011 06:38 PM, David Shaw wrote: > I think the problem here is the large size of the deployed infrastructure > that expects user IDs to have email addresses in them combined with the > relatively few people who are asking for this feature. To make this change, > you'd have to have a ke

Re: Restarting gnupg-agent inside X session

On 02/28/2011 06:49 PM, David Tomaschik wrote: > Each process has its own copy of the environment inherited from its > parent, so it's not possible to change the GPG_AGENT_INFO variable for > all processes. You could start gpg-agent with --use-standard-socket, > and programs should fall back to th

hashed user IDs [was: Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?]

On 02/28/2011 07:44 PM, Grant Olson wrote: > I think something similar could be done with hashed emails. Just some > (non)standard like: > > hashed_uid://$SHA1_OF_EMAIL/$RIPEMD_OF_EMAIL > > But using something better than my obviously naive hash-collision > prevention algorithm. this is (very r

Re: Restarting gnupg-agent inside X session

On 02/28/2011 08:41 PM, David Tomaschik wrote: > Other than on systems where $HOME is on a filesystem that does not > support sockets (e.g., NFS/CIFS/etc.), is anyone aware of an issue with > the use of --use-standard-socket? Seems like it would make restarting > GPG an easier task. I occasionall

Re: hashed user IDs [was: Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?]

On 03/01/2011 08:05 PM, MFPA wrote: > My analogy, admittedly not a direct comparison, would be having a > phone number that is ex-directory. It is no defence against random > dialling, nor against your number being recorded from outgoing calls > if you don't take steps such as withholding the CLI,

Re: hashed user IDs [was: Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?]

On 03/02/2011 02:25 PM, MFPA wrote: > For somebody who uses the same email address to communicate with many > contacts and keeps the same email address for a long time, that is > true. For somebody like me who uses various different email addresses > and replaces some of them on a regular basis it

how to find gnupg's DETAILS [was: Re: Non-interactive use of gen-key]

On 03/03/2011 07:52 PM, michaelquig...@theway.org wrote: > I'm looking to automate key generation for gpg. I found this link in the > list archive: > http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2007-February/030330.html The > message suggests using the --batch option and either feeding paramet

Re: hashed user IDs [was: Re: Security of the gpg private keyring?]

On 03/10/2011 03:09 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > You have validated my key (among others) and I (among others) have validated > Ben's. Now you want to validate Ben's key indirectly. Ben's key has ten > signatures, the one by my key is the only one usable for you. The next person > who tries to vali

non-exportable OpenPGP certifications [was: Re: hashed user IDs ]

On 03/11/2011 01:44 AM, Ben McGinnes wrote: > Ah, this is what I've been looking around for! For the sake of the > archives, how does one provide a non-exportable certification? > Obviously the export flag won't cut it. non-exportable OpenPGP certifications are also known as "local" certification

Re: Revoke signature from key

On 03/21/2011 04:05 PM, David Shaw wrote: > While the common usage for regular users is to sign based on checking > identity, signatures can be just as well used as a token to indicate > membership. For example, the PGP product has the concept of a "Corporate > Signing Key", which is used to s

Re: Revoke signature from key

On 03/21/2011 04:51 PM, Grant Olson wrote: > On 03/21/2011 04:18 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> If i was going to try to indicate more than a simple identity binding >> with an OpenPGP signature, i'd define an OpenPGP notation [0] and >> include the relevant

Re: Signing a key (meaning)

On 04/07/2011 12:06 PM, Charly Avital wrote: > In another forum, one of the members signed my public key and uploaded > it to the keyservers with his/her signature, without asking nor > notifying me (the key was already on the key servers, but without this > added signature) > > I didn't invite th

Re: gpg: encryption failed: public key not found

On 04/07/2011 02:55 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > The easiest way to solve this should be to import the public key as root Or, have your cronjob switch to being the correct non-privileged user before doing any of the rest of its work. > and mark it as "trusted-key" in the config file. I don't think

How to verify the e-mail address when certifying OpenPGP User IDs [was: Re: Signing a key (meaning)]

On 04/07/2011 07:33 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote: > The reason I asked this quetion is that I wonder how I can check whether the > email address in the ID realy belongs to the keyowner. The standard way i've seen e-mail address verification done is with caff ("certificate authority fire and forge

Re: How to verify the e-mail address when certifying OpenPGP User IDs [was: Re: Signing a key (meaning)]

On 04/07/2011 08:05 PM, Jan Janka wrote: > thanks for the answer, but it seems to me with this procedure you only > checkwhetherthe person has access to the email address, you > don't check whether this access is illegal, don't you? I have made no claims anywhere about legality or illeg

Do not conflate key+userID certification with "vouching" [was: Re: How to verify the e-mail address when certifying OpenPGP User IDs]

On 04/07/2011 09:37 PM, Grant Olson wrote: > Keep in mind that the web-of-trust isn't the mafia. If you 'vouch' for > someone and they turn out to be a rat, nobody's going to two bullets in > your chest, and one in your head. "Vouching" for someone usually means that you think you can rely on the

Re: Do not conflate key+userID certification with "vouching"

On 04/08/2011 02:38 PM, Grant Olson wrote: > Two definitions of vouch: > > 1. Assert or confirm as a result of one's own experience that something > is true or accurately so described. > 2. Confirm that someone is who they say they are or that they are of > good character: "someone could vouch fo

Re: Signing a key (meaning)

On 04/08/2011 06:02 PM, Jan Janka wrote: > I think there's no benefit, because everybody who issueses a key (even an > attacker) wants to receive information encrypted with that key, - otherwise > he wouldn't issue it. Thus he will place an email address in the ID he has > access to. So I think

default keyserver-options [was: Re: keys not available for signed messages in this maillist]

On 04/08/2011 02:19 PM, John Clizbe wrote: > There are additional options for the keyserver-options line. I recommend > adding > ' include-subkeys include-revoked import-clean'. See the gpg man page. Thanks for these pointers, John. If you think these are good options, maybe we should advocate f

Re: default keyserver-options [was: Re: keys not available for signed messages in this maillist]

On 04/09/2011 10:48 AM, David Shaw wrote: > I agree that include-subkeys should be on by default. That only makes sense, > especially now that subkeys are frequently used for signing. yep. > I'm not so sure about include-revoked, though. [...] > remember that anyone can fake a revocation for

Re: Creating signatures with expiration time

On 04/13/2011 10:43 PM, Jesus Cea wrote: > My idea was to create a signature with a expiration date, so signatures > should be renewed every year. The OpenPGP Standard documents this type > of signature , but > GPG doesn't seems to have the optio

Re: Batch gpg encryption : prompt

On 04/19/2011 09:21 PM, Yard, John wrote: > I am doing scriptewd/batch gpg encryption , and I am > getting the following repeated prompts: > > It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named > in the user ID. If you *really* know what you are doing, > you may answer the next question

Re: Question about details of key sigining

On 04/23/2011 06:11 AM, Quequanys wrote: > When you sign someones keys, does it > mean that their public key (with uids) is hashed > and the hash is encrypted, or maybe there is no > hashing and signing means only encryption of the > public keys and uids? Could you point me to > specific port

Re: Updating signature cert-level

On 04/26/2011 04:06 PM, Aaron Toponce wrote: > I signed a key, of which defaulted to cert-level 0 (I will not answer), > which must be the default. When signing the key, GunPG didn't ask me about > any checking. However, I would like to update the cert-level to 2 (I have > done casual checking), bu

Re: Syncing Keys between multiple computers?

On 05/01/2011 03:49 PM, Christopher Tran wrote: > Whats the easiest way to keep GPG keys synced between my computers? Like, I > have my MacBook, which is usually my main machine, but I also have my netbook > which I prefer carrying around and sometimes I update my key with User IDs on > either

Re: Syncing Keys between multiple computers?

On 05/02/2011 06:21 PM, Sean Rima wrote: > Just throwing this to the mix, but what about services like dropbox and > point gnupg to the shared dropbox folder I wouldn't consider this a reasonable approach if any secret keys are involved. Keep your secret keys private! Dropbox exposes your secret

Re: Storing secrets on other people's computers

On 05/04/2011 11:34 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > For the better part of a decade now I've volunteered to publish my private > certificate in the _New York Times_ if someone will pay for the advertising > space. With a strong passphrase that's not known to anyone else, the private > certificate

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/06/2011 03:47 AM, Doug Barton wrote: > There's also another element, the expiration date is irrelevant if the > key is actually compromised. If Eve has your secret key she can simply > update or remove the expiration date, and upload the new version of the > public key to the public keyserver

https://lists.gnupg.org X.509 certificate is expired

When i point a web browser at https://lists.gnupg.org, i get a warning that the server's X.509 certificate is expired (it has a CN of trithemius.gnupg.org and several subjectAltNames, including lists.gnupg.org). I'm not a fan of the CA cartel, but it would be nice to have some up-to-date way of ve

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/10/2011 12:01 AM, Jerome Baum wrote: > c) Program the smart-card so it doesn't sign sub-keys? I'm not familiar with > the internals of smart-card implementations but the OpenPGP sub-key > signatures are of a different type than the data signatures. The smart-card > can probably recognize if i

Re: Best practice for periodic key change?

On 05/10/2011 12:32 AM, Jerome Baum wrote: > Is that an implementation problem? i.e. is it possible to write an > implementation that does distinguish, or is it technically impossible w/out > processing the entire data on-card? As i understand the process, i think it would be necessary to pass all

Re: More than 1 secret key: how do I specify which one --sign uses?

On 05/12/2011 11:48 AM, pjcs wrote: > > I have 3 secret keys in my keyring for different purposes. If I --sign a > document, is there any way to specify which key is to be used? The man page suggests --default-key or --local-user: > --default-key name > Use name as the defa

bug: gpg fails to allow update of OpenPGP certification after expiration

My certification on a key+userID recently expired. I went to re-certify it, and gpg failed to allow the re-certification, with the following interaction: > "foo (redacted)" was already signed by key D21739E9 > Your current signature on "foo (redacted)" > has expired. > Do you want to issue a new

Re: GPG keys listed are not correct.

Hi Lucelio-- On 05/17/2011 07:56 PM, Lucélio Gomes de Freitas wrote: > I have Virtualbox-4.0.6 installed ok on my Linux machine, but on > updating to the newest one . . . . > I got the following messages using(KDE) kpackage kit: [...] > Sorry for this question but: > How to install the correct GP

Re: I can't stop encryption being done with a wrong key

On 05/27/2011 11:19 AM, Anne Wilson wrote: > I eventually found where I could disable the key both in Thunderbird and in > KMail, so all is now well. I'm glad you got it resolved! I think this is more of a demonstration that fixing this to do the Right Thing by default in gpg itself would have b

Re: A better way to think about passwords

On Sun, 17 Apr 2011 15:49:58 -0700, Doug Barton wrote: > Summary: A 3-word password (e.g., "quick brown fox") is secure against > cracking attempts for 2,537 years. > > http://www.baekdal.com/tips/password-security-usability A computational linguist's rebuttal to Baekdal's post: http://trochee

Re: Problem with faked-system-time option

On 06/05/2011 03:15 PM, Amano Corunga wrote: > Those are a lot of questions, but I'm still highly sceptical towards > that GPG2 monster and would prefer to stay with my more manageable > GPG1, if it only had that faked-system-time option. Is there room for > hope to get it enhanced that way? If y

Re: Working with a system-shared keyring

On 06/10/2011 02:43 PM, Doug Barton wrote: > Actually I'm very careful to avoid doing just that. :) I have various > command-line aliases to move keys between rings depending on their > status, de-duplicate on import, and cross-check to make sure that I > haven't missed something. Could you share

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