On 08-07-2014 8:40, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Nonsense. What, you don't find quantum mechanics to be common-sense and
> wholly intuitive? ;)
After some time you just get used to it. :-)
--
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html
___
> Many write-ups of atomic/sub-atomic level phenomena seem to me to
> involve considerable deviations from our commonsense notions of
> reality. (-;
Nonsense. What, you don't find quantum mechanics to be common-sense and
wholly intuitive? ;)
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signatu
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Monday 7 July 2014 at 11:11:36 PM, in
, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> It's been done a few times but without results, which
> is unsurprising: on an atomic level gravity is
> ridiculously weak. It's still being researched. Smart
> money is th
On 7/7/2014 5:52 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> Wasn't there an experiment running, one or two years ago, about
> trying to make anti-electrons anti-gravitate? I don't remember of
> having read any result, though...
It's been done a few times but without results, which is unsurprising:
on an atomic leve
On Sun, Jul 06, 2014 at 12:21:13PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 7/6/2014 3:36 AM, The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm wrote:
> > Using GPG encryption is still good, although it's vulnerable to
> > quantum cryptodecryption.
>
> In point of fact, we don't know this.
>
> Theoretically, science-f
On 07-07-2014 10:09, The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm wrote:
> It depends on how important the data is. Of course, if the data is so
> important, when the expiration time comes, all the data encrypted with
> the old key need to be decrypted and encrypted with the new generated
> key.
However, if
On July 6, 2014 4:40:13 PM PDT, MFPA <2014-667rhzu3dc-lists-gro...@riseup.net>
wrote:
>-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
>Hash: SHA512
>
>Hi
>
>
>On Sunday 6 July 2014 at 3:25:57 PM, in
>, Johan Wevers wrote:
>
>
>
>> Since I don't know when I will consider a key
>> compromised or weak, I don't w
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 15:26:36 +0200
From: The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm
To: Peter Lebbing ;, gnupg-users@gnupg.org
Subject: Re: GPG's vulnerability to quantum cryptography
Message-ID: <20140707132636.ga64...@blinkenshell.org>
References:
<20140706073605.ga65...@bl
On 06/07/14 16:25, Johan Wevers wrote:
> I don't see the relation between these two.
I agree.
This conversation is still a mystery to me.
"The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm", it seems to me you advocate revoking
an encryption key, or letting it expire, when you suspect the key could
be cracked by
On Sun, Jul 06, 2014 at 07:35:05PM +0200, gnupg-users-requ...@gnupg.org wrote:
> On 06-07-2014 9:36, The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm wrote:
>
> > Using GPG encryption is still good, although it's vulnerable to quantum
> > cryptodecryption.
> > It's a good idea to set an expiration for each of yo
On Sun, Jul 06, 2014 at 12:53:26PM +0100, MFPA wrote:
> At the same time, would you advocate decrypting all your encrypted
> files and encrypting them to the new key? Or were you just referring
> to encrypted communications?
It depends on how important the data is. Of course, if the data is so
imp
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Sunday 6 July 2014 at 3:25:57 PM, in
, Johan Wevers wrote:
> Since I don't know when I will consider a key
> compromised or weak, I don't work with expiry dates but
> revoke the key in such a case.
I don't know quite what /The Fuzzy Whirl
On 7/6/2014 3:36 AM, The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm wrote:
> Using GPG encryption is still good, although it's vulnerable to
> quantum cryptodecryption.
In point of fact, we don't know this.
Theoretically, science-fiction level breakthroughs in quantum
computation would break RSA. But the prob
On 06-07-2014 9:36, The Fuzzy Whirlpool Thunderstorm wrote:
> Using GPG encryption is still good, although it's vulnerable to quantum
> cryptodecryption.
> It's a good idea to set an expiration for each of your GPG key.
> So that, when the expiration time comes, you'll be able to generate a
> new
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Sunday 6 July 2014 at 8:36:05 AM, in
, The Fuzzy Whirlpool
Thunderstorm wrote:
> Using GPG encryption is still good, although it's
> vulnerable to quantum cryptodecryption. It's a good
> idea to set an expiration for each of your GPG key. S
Using GPG encryption is still good, although it's vulnerable to quantum
cryptodecryption.
It's a good idea to set an expiration for each of your GPG key.
So that, when the expiration time comes, you'll be able to generate a
new GPG key to address a possibility of your old keys being cracked.
GPG i
On 04-07-2014 15:47, David Q. wrote:
> * Is there simply no general interest to address this at this time in the
> cryptographic/PGP community?
There exists public-key algorithms that are resistant against quantum
computers, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTRUEncrypt for example, an
overview c
>> But what about younger people here in their teens, 20s or 30s? What
>> am I missing?
(For the record: at 39 I am close to outside of David's target audience,
but I'm still within it. :) )
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lis
> Most of you don't seem worried about the possibility of 4096 qubits
> happening (i.e., of RSA-2048 being cracked) at all before you are
> dead.
Excited, maybe. Not worried.
> But what about younger people here in their teens, 20s or 30s? What
> am I missing?
I had an aunt that I was really c
(I'm continuing my thread from May 2014.)
I have been reading through this thread.
Most of you don't seem worried about the possibility of 4096 qubits
happening (i.e., of RSA-2048 being cracked) at all before you are dead.
But what about younger people here in their teens, 20s or 30s? What am I
I do however believe that factoring a product of two large
prime numbers might either be the subject of a sudden mathematical
breakthrough, or that the solution is already known to my
adversaries but this fact has been kept secret.
tl;dr summary of the rest of this email -- don't focus on
fact
On 05/13/2014 04:03 PM, David Q. wrote:
For this reason, what I do today is share long keys with people I know *in
person*. We then use regular AES-256 to encrypt/decrypt our messages back
and forth. Every 6 months we meet in person to renew our keys.
You are right, but, in my opinion, for the
(This mail originally got dropped by the list managing software because
I had accidentally misused a new webmail plugin. I'm resending it
with all original identifiers so it hopefully threads correctly. I'm
also completely ignoring section 3.6.6 of RFC 2822, but who cares? ;)
---
I suddenly
This is the last I will be saying on the subject. I am not interested
in teaching a course on thermodynamics.
> Well... A nuclear reactor produces 1GW, and thus produces 1PJ in
> 10^6 s, that is approx. 11 days 14 hrs. Sure, you may be very
> interested in Health & Safety compliance of nuclear re
First: I agree with everything skipped in the quotes.
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 07:31:26PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> > BTW: AFAICT, a nuclear warhead (depending on the warhead, ofc.) does
> > not release so much energy, it just releases it in a dead
Quantum cryptography was only discussed relating either to asymmetric
crypto, which AES isn't, or in relation to Grover's algorithm, which is
used to brute-force an algo.
Peter is correct, but a little clarification may be in order.
Grover's is not a brute-forcing algorithm: it's a search alg
On 16/05/14 14:37, Michael Anders wrote:
> In fact arriving at a realistic estimate for the energy needed to brute
> force AES is really hard work. (Besides: Who can say for sure that we
> cannot get some bits from cryptoanalytic progress(two bits already
> crumbled).
You cannot get bits of crypta
> Now where did you calculate that from?
Forgot one more reference -- look at Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_,
where he talks about the physical limits of the cosmos. He has a
physicist's error in his presentation (he's off by a factor of ln 2),
but he confirms the Second Law necessity of a hea
> Now where did you calculate that from?
$dS = \frac{\delta Q}{T}$
Second Law of Thermodynamics, which you just broke. Have a nice day.
And no, I am not going to explain this further. My reason for this is
simple: you need to take college-level courses in differential and
integral calculus, pa
On Wed, 2014-05-14 at 22:26 +0200, gnupg-users-requ...@gnupg.org wrote:
> If you want to run the temperature lower than the ambient
> temperature
> of the cosmos (3.2K), you have to add energy to run the heat pump --
> and the amount of energy required to run that heat pump will bring
> your
I notice that the Wikipedia article refers here to "thermodynamically
reversible" which is perhaps not the same thing as computationally
reversible. So I looked up "thermodynamically reversible" and found
At the level we're talking about, the distinction between
thermodynamics and computation
On 5/15/2014 8:30 AM, gnupg-users@gnupg.org wrote:
> The save of 64 bits to 1 bit loses you 6 bits exponential complexity,
> the increase of the expected number of tries increases it again by 1
> bit, so you have saved 2^5 = 32 = 10^1.5 on the numbers Rob gives. When
> I'm quickly reading through t
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 07:31:26PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
[snip]
> > * You state it is a lower bound on the energy consumed/generated by
> > bruteforcing. Having a closer look at the Wikipedia page, I just
> > found this sentence: "If no informat
On 5/14/2014 6:11 PM, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> Well... Apart from the assumption I stated just below (ie. single
> bit flip for AES), I cannot begin to think about an error I might
> have done with this one, apart from misunderstanding Wikipedia's
> statement that "The processing rate cannot be higher
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 01:15:40PM -0700, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> >First, the Margolus-Levitin limit: "6.10^33 ops.J^{-1}.s^{-1} maximum"
> >So, dividing the 2^128 by 6.10^33 gives me a bit less than 57000 J.s
> >(assuming testing an AES key is a single operation). So, that's less than
> >1min fo
10^10 * 10^6 = 10^16. So far your estimate is off by a factor of a
thousand trillion.
*Ten* thousand trillion. Sorry, that one's entirely my error.
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-us
First, the Margolus-Levitin limit: "6.10^33 ops.J^{-1}.s^{-1} maximum"
So, dividing the 2^128 by 6.10^33 gives me a bit less than 57000 J.s
(assuming testing an AES key is a single operation). So, that's less
than 1min for 1kJ. Pretty affordable, I believe.
No. But since I'm going to be giv
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:21:36PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> > Since the well known agency from Baltimore uses its influence to have
> > crypto standards coast close to the limit of the brute-forceable, 128
> > bit AES will be insecure not too far in the future.
>
> No.
>
> https://www.gnu
I might have to ask Robert how comfortable his new asbestos longjohns are.
Rather, as evidenced by my willingness to try and tackle this one.
To a first approximation, trust is confidence in the future's
predictability. My friends who grew up in dictatorships tell me the
uncertainty was fa
> Since the well known agency from Baltimore uses its influence to have
> crypto standards coast close to the limit of the brute-forceable, 128
> bit AES will be insecure not too far in the future.
No.
https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#brute_force
On 14/05/14 09:47, Michael Anders wrote:
> Since the well known agency from Baltimore uses its influence to have
> crypto standards coast close to the limit of the brute-forceable, 128
> bit AES will be insecure not too far in the future.
Brute-forcing a 128 bits key is, as far as we know, impossi
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Tuesday 13 May 2014 at 5:03:03 PM, in
,
David Q. wrote:
> GPG encrypted data (using RSA) can be collected today
> and easily decrypted after 50-100 years using a quantum
> computer.
I'm not likely to be alive by then.
> Why do you keep
What are your thoughts on these issues? Why do you keep using GPG, knowing
that your data may easily end up out in the open on Google or The Pirate
Bay a few decades from now?
Bluntly, my thoughts are that 99% of the people who talk about quantum
computation couldn't identify a Hadamard transf
43 matches
Mail list logo
