On Thu, Nov 17, 2005 at 08:17:07AM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> -fstack-protector-all (all protection) being superset of -fstack-protector
> (random protection) it should also define __SSP__ 1
The IBM patch that I followed did exactly what I implemented.
I see no compelling reason to change
On Thu, 17 Nov 2005, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 10:32:45PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > > what happens w/ -fstack-protector-all -fstack-protector (in this order) ?
> > > do we have (2) or (1)
> >
> > We have 1.
>
On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 10:32:45PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > what happens w/ -fstack-protector-all -fstack-protector (in this order) ?
> > do we have (2) or (1)
>
> We have 1.
>
> > so now it does
> > -fstack-protector #define __SSP__ 1
On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 10:32:45PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> what happens w/ -fstack-protector-all -fstack-protector (in this order) ?
> do we have (2) or (1)
We have 1.
> so now it does
> -fstack-protector #define __SSP__ 1 ; #undef __SSP_ALL__
> -fstack-protector-all #define __SSP_ALL_
On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 10:02:23PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
> >
> > > On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 08:40:11PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > > > On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
>
On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 10:02:23PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 08:40:11PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > > On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Tue, Nov 15, 2005 at 09:01:21PM +0100, P
On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 08:40:11PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
> >
> > > On Tue, Nov 15, 2005 at 09:01:21PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > > > I meant exactly this, gcc supports -fno-stack-p
On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 08:40:11PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Nov 15, 2005 at 09:01:21PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > > I meant exactly this, gcc supports -fno-stack-protector (although gcc
> > > defaults to no-ssp), so -fn
On Wed, 16 Nov 2005, Richard Henderson wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 15, 2005 at 09:01:21PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > I meant exactly this, gcc supports -fno-stack-protector (although gcc
> > defaults to no-ssp), so -fno-stack-protector-all should be there too
>
> Why? What option would it per
On Tue, Nov 15, 2005 at 09:01:21PM +0100, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> I meant exactly this, gcc supports -fno-stack-protector (although gcc
> defaults to no-ssp), so -fno-stack-protector-all should be there too
Why? What option would it perform?
r~
On Tue, 2005-11-15 at 12:01, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> I wanted to only know if there is a configuration/scenario where this
> really worked.
I haven't been involved with the stack protector development or usage,
but as far as I know, it works unless some one reports a bug, and the
only bug I c
On Tue, 15 Nov 2005, James E Wilson wrote:
> On Mon, 2005-11-14 at 22:45, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > I have really hoped that someone here can duplicate it in any environment
>
> In that case, I'd suggest creating a bugzilla bug report. The gcc list
> is really more of a self-help list for gc
On Mon, 2005-11-14 at 22:45, Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> I have really hoped that someone here can duplicate it in any environment
In that case, I'd suggest creating a bugzilla bug report. The gcc list
is really more of a self-help list for gcc developers. If you want to
try to debug the problem
On Mon, 14 Nov 2005, Eric Christopher wrote:
> >
> > this should also influence the -fstack-protector behaviour, but
> > that seems
> > to be OK.
> > __builtin_trap is used as I can see only if a vulnerability is
> > found, this
> > happens though on a simple hello world.
>
> Aaah. You'll pro
this should also influence the -fstack-protector behaviour, but
that seems
to be OK.
__builtin_trap is used as I can see only if a vulnerability is
found, this
happens though on a simple hello world.
Aaah. You'll probably need to step through the program in a debugger
then and find out
On Mon, 14 Nov 2005, Eric Christopher wrote:
> >
> >> apps built w/ -fstack-protector-all segfault
> >
> > You will have to give us more info. Most gcc developers probably
> > don't have a copy of UClibc, and plus it sounds like you have made
> &g
On Mon, 14 Nov 2005, Jim Wilson wrote:
> Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
> > -fno-stack-protector-all is not recognised/implemented
>
> You could just submit this as a bug report into bugzilla.
>
> > apps built w/ -fstack-protector-all segfault
>
> You will have t
apps built w/ -fstack-protector-all segfault
You will have to give us more info. Most gcc developers probably
don't have a copy of UClibc, and plus it sounds like you have made
gcc changes that weren't included in your message. So there isn't
much we can do here exce
Peter S. Mazinger wrote:
-fno-stack-protector-all is not recognised/implemented
You could just submit this as a bug report into bugzilla.
apps built w/ -fstack-protector-all segfault
You will have to give us more info. Most gcc developers probably don't
have a copy of UClibc, and pl
Hello!
gcc-4.1.20051105
-fno-stack-protector-all is not recognised/implemented
apps built w/ -fstack-protector-all segfault
test env:
- uClibc-svn
- guard is set up like glibc does in ld.so as non-TLS version
- libssp is not used, gcc's configure check was enabled to reco
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