otecting People Who Can Sue Use For Big Damages
data, we wouldn't need to run a Root CA to that practice, which is mostly
about Blame Allocation and very little about actual security.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 9
t make infosec decisions without having at least a vague
>outline of a threat model.
Absolutely.
But just to sum up: We are talking about anonymous checkouts of
our source tree, and as far as my analysis goes, we are long past
this point:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X0bWWt
use you now lead people to
>*believe* they have a secure means of tracking the project's bits but
>that's factually false.
+1
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tah
gn and
>verify updates or dump it for something that can and use that existing
>mechanism (e.g. git)
As I mentioned humoursly to you in private email, I don't think
this particular problem will reach consensus any sooner if you
also tangling it in the SVN vs GIT political iss
In message <86d13kgnfh@desk.des.no>, =?utf-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=C3=B8rgrav?= w
rites:
>"Poul-Henning Kamp" writes:
>> The only realistic way for the FreeBSD project to implement end-to-end
>> trust, is HTTPS with a self-signed cert, distributed and ver
In message <20171211182031.jhgansyyw7xrk4il@localhost>, Matthew Finkel writes:
>Most of the relays are in Europe now [...]
Thank goodness nobody shady can rent cloud servers in Europe!
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP
al network.
Anything else is just pretend-security today.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequ
rk in TCP timers revealed
that a LOT of the Tor network is on a longitude compatible with a
"Bandit of The Beltway" location.
If you still, elleven years later, seriously belive that Tor is
trustworthy, you shouldn't be allowed near any kind of security
decision.
--
Poul-Henning K
didn't use the word "easy".
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
___
es and routers of the
>
>So you're fine w/ all the Comcast users having to switch ISPs? Because
>Comcast modifies traffic. So you're now saying that if you use FreeBSD
>you can't use Comcast as your ISP?
Comcast modifying traffic is a political problem.
Encryption does
hat you got to the right place
rather than Taiwanese or Turkish government telling you that you
got to what they think is the right place.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
d it back when HTTPS was tolerated by governments,
because everybody could see that banking and e-commerce needed it,
over the situation now, where HTTPS is so trojaned, that my webbank
is no longer trustworthy via HTTPS.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org
the FreeBSD project to take a politically
stupid position in the war between IT-liberalists and all the worlds
governments ?
No thanks.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
In message <2a6d123c-8ee5-8e1e-d99b-4bce02345...@rawbw.com>, Yuri writes:
>The unfortunate FreeBSD user who updated his source tree through
>Tor [...]
Why would anybody do that in the first place ?
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org
ty is
>the only protection against MITM eavesdropping or tampering.
Or more generally:
If you dont/cant trust the other end, why would you trust them to
keep the communication secret ?
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBS
In message <1294e5c4-9554-b9f5-8ea9-13aca5411...@rawbw.com>, Yuri writes:
>On 12/05/17 14:43, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote:
>> The vastly oversold "security" of HTTPS is entirely borrowed from
>> a confederation of root-CA's which no non-deluded person ca
n't bad enough, the misguided and
simple-minded IT-liberalistic "Encrypt everything" campaign is,
100% as predicted, pushing governments to neuter encryption in
order to keep the court systems working.
"IETF and what army?"
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p.
In message , Eric McCorkl
e writes:
>On 10/28/2017 09:15, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote:
>>
>> In message <20171028123132.gf96...@kduck.kaduk.org>, Benjamin Kaduk writes:
>>
>>> I would say that the 1.1.x series is less bad, especially on the las
is certainly a laudable goal for OpenSSL, I hope
FreeBSD has higher ambitions.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequat
port lifecycles.
That's not why I want OpenSSL gone from the tree.
My reason is that I think OpenSSLs architecture, (to the extent you
can talk about OpenSSL having one), APIs and the source code are
all horrible.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org
e
boatloads of crap OpenSSL drags in, or if we would be in a better
position with something simpler and saner ?
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can
want to add a futher layer of complications to the the already
far too complicated user/group/authentication code in FreeBSD,
just because you don't want to look at Puppets Ruby code ?
Really ?
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
Free
rack changes in
network delay which ruins both stability and accuracy.
The best explanation of all this is John R. Vig's Quartz Tutorial
which is freely available on the web - highly recommended:
http://www.am1.us/Local_Papers/U11625%20VIG-TUTORIAL.pdf
Poul-Henning
--
Poul-Henning K
politics.
That means voting for the right politicians.
If no candidates are suitable, inspire people to become candidates.
If that fails too: Become a candidate yourself.
If you feel you have more important things to do than engange in
politics, then you will have to live with the consequences.
In message <20150309202308.64dfbb...@mail.bitblocks.com>, Bakul Shah writes:
>On Mon, 09 Mar 2015 19:52:04 -0000 "Poul-Henning Kamp"
>wrote:
>Hopefully ECC memory protects against such exploits (at least
>makes them a lot less vulnerable).
ECC only makes i
In message , Dmitry Morozo
vsky writes:
>On Mon, 9 Mar 2015, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote:
>
>> >any thoughts we're vulnerable to this?
>>
>> It's a hardware problem, *everybody* are vulnerable.
>
>Well, it seems I used somewhat incorrect wordings
In message , Dmitry Morozo
vsky writes:
>Dear colleagues,
>
>any thoughts we're vulnerable to this?
It's a hardware problem, *everybody* are vulnerable.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 95
izing electronics gets you hazardous waste under EU's ROHS/WEEE
rules. Throwing away the AES key gives you run-of-the-mill electronic
garbage.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-t
g* for MITM resistance.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
__
or the ntimed-client program can almost be
summarized as "Replacement for NTPD in FreeBSD's base system".
I don't think it makes sense to take the discussion if we should
import Ntimed into FreeBSD's source tree, until I have the first
production release ready. There are g
! One can no longer trust what reports itself to be
> eg a keyboard to actually Be a keyboard, etc.
"no longer" ?
When you could you *ever* trust a USB device about anything ?
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
t willing to vouch for the
>> trustworthiness of any CA, and I don't think the Project should either.
I think this makes a lot of sense: FreeBSD is not in the trust-business
and have no benefit from trying to enter it.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freeb
is indeed
set to something you can use.
If your "security" source code does not have at least 10% assert
lines, you're not really serious about security.
And of course, if you compile the asserts out for "production"
you are downright moronic about security :-)
--
Poul-Henning
deny udp from any to any dst-port 123 iplen 0-75
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained
it should not
be necessary to do so in present company.
And BTW: That XXX comment is 10 years old.
No, I say with conviction, based on personal inspection and experience,
that OpenSSL is crap.
And as Garrett Wollman correctly pointed out on twitter: It remains
yet to be seen if any implementatio
of crap.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
___
freebsd-se
In message
, Oliver Pinter writes:
>I found this today on FD:
>
>http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Aug/4
I bet the OpenBSD people are busy bolting a communique together ...
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 95
being cryptography.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
_
In message
, Marin Atanasov Nikolov writes:
>Then from the host machine I've moved this folder to the cwd.
>[...]
>Not sure if it is sudo or jail issue, and would be nice if someone
>with more experience can check this up :)
That's an "error-42" issue.
--
Poul
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
___
freebsd-security@freebsd.org ma
In message , Sean writes:
>It's been part of the language standard for over 20 years now, [...]
Much longer, it's specifically mentioned in the old testament.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committe
r less
random pieces of magic to the kernel.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
law in a custom web app, just newly setting up the machine and
>resetting the passwords is not going to make it all go away.
And you should seriously consider putting everything you can into
jails, to contain any future damage.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@fr
In message , Nick
Knight writes:
>I've just found a problem with ssh on one of my servers, I'm hoping someone
>can give me some insight into what's caused the problem.
You've been hacked.
Reinstall from trusted media.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog
>"normal" for Tripwire and FreeBSD ? (RELENG_7)
Yes, device numbers in freebsd carry no meaning, unless it is
a compat /dev directory to boot ancient systems (SunOS, very
old FreeBSD etc) diskless.
In general, tripwire should ignore devfs and possibly all pseudo-fs
mount-points.
--
Po
g some card-carrying
cryptographers for the correct way to employ a crypto-hash algorithm
in a way that does soak up some CPU time.
8. A number of interesting ideas was battered about back when $1$
was introduced, check mail archives and read the OpenBSD paper,
even though it is mostly plaga
/config file:
Host foobar
port 122
so you don't have to remember it.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequatel
a how to break that, short of brute force.
Poul-Henning
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explai
t we would feel really miserable.
Well, we don't.
The FreeBSD project has been attempted blackmailed many times over
the year, and it havn't worked yet, and it won't ever, if I can
prevent it.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP
uot;Blackmailing for dummies",
as I can see that you make several classical beginner mistakes in
this attempt.
Better luck next time.
Poul-Henning
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tah
the files anyway.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
___
ements that the hardware not be configured
in certain parts of spectrum or power levels.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately
w is an important
>concept in FOSS quality (and security) it would be desirable
>to have free code.
While that is certainly true, I also feel that the fact that
Atheros has actively tried to work with the FOSS people to get
a good driver should be credited to them.
Other vendors have been to
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Barkley Vowk writes:
>On Thu, 10 Aug 2006, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote:
>
>> The Atheros driver in FreeBSD is maintained and compiled by Sam Leffler,
>> who has been around since BSD 4.2 in the early eighties sometimes.
>>
>> I tr
maintained and compiled by Sam Leffler,
who has been around since BSD 4.2 in the early eighties sometimes.
I trust Sam.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "R. B. Rid
dick" writes:
>Wasn't is usual some years ago to switch the boot disc hardware to "read only"
>mode?
Some CF cards have that.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | T
access to the disk
image to feed into sha256
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
__
algorithm you
could care for on the image, store the results and return them
with trojans.
Copying the sha256 binary over is no guarantee against a kernel
embedded trojan.
But then again, how paranoid one has to be is a matter of preference.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.2
s to try :-)
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
___
freebs
, but I'd like
to review the patch before it gets committed because there are a
large number of dragons.
In P4:phk_gbde there is the beginning of hw-crypto support through
opencrypto(9), if somebody wants to work on that, get in touch with
me.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus
most people just worry about their data if the machine gets
stolen.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
see the same "spirit" at work here:
"Dennis and Ken didn't approve of sudo, it is not documented
in any POSIX_MISTAKE, and I never got around to get used
to use it, so of course we cannot let it into FreeBSD!"
Minimalism is good, but taken it to far i
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Chris writes:
>I am somewhat confused by applying the patch, does this disable HTT
>functionality? or does a patched server close the issue and keep HTT
>enabled?
It disabled HTT functionality.
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Z
already had a pretty dud feature on their hands; just ask anyone
>in the architecture community (probably including those who work for
>Intel).
While quite likely true, that is not really the issue here.
The question is what it will take to make Intel warn their customers.
--
Poul-Hennin
restrict HTT to be
used only for threads from the same process.
The political problem is that if all operating systems do that,
Intel has a pretty dud feature on their hands, and they are not
particularly eager to accept that fact.
Poul-Henning
--
Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, David Schultz writes:
>But isn't this a well-known and fundamental problem with SMT?
Yes.
The news being only the speed: you can get 300 bits of the 512 bit
RSA key in a single observation of a single shot run of the crypto.
--
Poul-Henning Kam
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