-------- In message <86d13kgnfh....@desk.des.no>, =?utf-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=C3=B8rgrav?= w rites: >"Poul-Henning Kamp" <p...@phk.freebsd.dk> writes: >> The only realistic way for the FreeBSD project to implement end-to-end >> trust, is HTTPS with a self-signed cert, distributed and verified >> using the projects PGP-trust-mesh and strong social network. > >Your suggestion does not remove implicit and possibly misplaced trust, >it just moves it from one place to another. Instead of trusting a >certificate authority and DNS, you trust the source of the public key, >and probably also DNS. As always, it boils down to a) key distribution >is hard and b) what's your threat model?
I don't think I agree with any of that ? With respect to authenticity of the FreeBSD SVN repo I cannot imagine anybody else being even one percent as qualified and trustworth as the FreeBSD projects own core-team. In particular I would never trust any "In the CA-racket for the money" organization to do so. If you are worried that the FreeBSD project "staff" cannot handle a root-cert competently, then the exposure is no smaller or larger than if it was a CA-signed cert they fumbled. Trusting DNS doesn't apply it if the project root-cert was stored on my local machine after I used my best judgement of PGP signatures to conclude that it was authentic. And I don't really see distribution of this particular key being difficult at all: We already PGP sign release checksums for authenticity and it the FreeBSD root-cert is just another file to get same treatment. Poul-Henning -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 p...@freebsd.org | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence. _______________________________________________ freebsd-security@freebsd.org mailing list https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-unsubscr...@freebsd.org"
