Re: Current status

2019-02-14 Thread Eric S. Raymond via devel
Hal Murray via devel : > Are we interested in client certificates? If so, why? > > struct ntsconfig_t has: > /* Configuration data for an NTS server or client instance */ > char *ca; /* site default */ > char *cert; /* site default */ > > I assume that c

Re: Current status

2019-02-13 Thread Gary E. Miller via devel
Yo Hal! On Wed, 13 Feb 2019 15:18:17 -0800 Hal Murray via devel wrote: > >> I'm calling that "cert and other certs" a chain. > > Except that is not the definition of a cert full chain file. > > Please don't make up new terms for long standing, well settled, > > concepts. > > I didn't call i

Re: Current status

2019-02-13 Thread Hal Murray via devel
>> I'm calling that "cert and other certs" a chain. > Except that is not the definition of a cert full chain file. > Please don't make up new terms for long standing, well settled, concepts. I didn't call it a "full" chain file. I pulled the term "chain file" from the API. If you have a URL fo

Re: Current status

2019-02-13 Thread Gary E. Miller via devel
Yo Hal! On Wed, 13 Feb 2019 13:27:09 -0800 Hal Murray via devel wrote: > That's sufficiently complicated that I'm not going to think about it > now. If somebody thinks it is interesting enough, they should put it > on the list. Maybe an issue, but Eric likes to delete those rather > then use th

Re: Current status

2019-02-13 Thread Hal Murray via devel
Thanks. Gary said: >> Unless somebody objects or has a better idea, I'll implement Richard >> Laager suggestion to disable the NTS-KE server if it can't read the >> certificate and key. > I can't think of any other option. Is there? Sure. Run without a certificate. That won't get very far if

Re: Current status

2019-02-13 Thread Gary E. Miller via devel
Yo Hal! On Tue, 12 Feb 2019 23:14:47 -0800 Hal Murray via devel wrote: > Gary said: > >> The server reads the certificate chain from /etc/ntp/cert-chain.pem > >> The server reads the private key from /etc/ntp/key.pem > > Which will, eventually, need to be configurable. Plus, when > > needed,

Re: Current status

2019-02-12 Thread Hal Murray via devel
Gary said: >> The server reads the certificate chain from /etc/ntp/cert-chain.pem >> The server reads the private key from /etc/ntp/key.pem > Which will, eventually, need to be configurable. Plus, when needed, the key > to the kep.pem file, somewhere. The code to configure file names is in the

Re: Current status

2019-02-12 Thread Gary E. Miller via devel
Yo Hal! On Mon, 11 Feb 2019 21:49:46 -0800 Hal Murray via devel wrote: > There is the start of the NTS-KE client and server. The client does > the TLS handshake, saves the cookies, sets up C2S and S2C, then > ignores them. The server returns fake cookies. Cool. Nice start. > They are using

Re: Current status

2019-02-11 Thread Richard Laager via devel
On 2/11/19 11:49 PM, Hal Murray via devel wrote: > OpenSSL has separate slots for root-cert dir and file. How should I tell > which? Should we have separate config options? It's not absolutely necessary to support both. One or the other is sufficient. If you're only going to support one, the fi

Current status

2019-02-11 Thread Hal Murray via devel
There is the start of the NTS-KE client and server. The client does the TLS handshake, saves the cookies, sets up C2S and S2C, then ignores them. The server returns fake cookies. They are using TCP port 123. It's the minimal I could get away with and get this far. It doesn't pay attention

Current status:. post removal of autorevision.sh

2018-03-13 Thread Hal Murray via devel
I'm putting together a new system. ntpq dies with: ntpq: can't find Python NTP library -- check PYTHONPATH. No module named util Note is says "util", not "ntp.util". I've got ntpsec.pth and it works well enough to fix the initial can't find error. The build directory contains util.py and util

Re: receive time stamps - current status

2017-06-11 Thread Eric S. Raymond via devel
Hal Murray : > > I remove the SO_BINTIME mode. It's only supported by FreeBSD and they don't > support it for IPv6. They do support SO_TIMESTAMP. > > The downside of that is reduced resolution on the time stamps. BINTIME gives > 32 bit fractions of a second while TIMESTAMP gives microseconds

receive time stamps - current status

2017-06-11 Thread Hal Murray via devel
I remove the SO_BINTIME mode. It's only supported by FreeBSD and they don't support it for IPv6. They do support SO_TIMESTAMP. The downside of that is reduced resolution on the time stamps. BINTIME gives 32 bit fractions of a second while TIMESTAMP gives microseconds (roughly 20 bits). We

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-28 Thread Achim Gratz
Kurt Roeckx writes: > So as one of the OpenSSL people, it seems unrealistic to even have > a compile time option to remove MD5 and SHA-1 at this time. Both > are needed for TLS 1.0. It seems unrealistic that we can drop > support for that in the next 5 years. We still support SSLv3, but > it's disa

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Greg Rubin
While I cannot speak specifically to NTP, SHA (without any suffix) has been used on other contexts to mean SHA-1. I've also never encountered SHA-0 being used in any standard. So, if NTP is actually using it and it's not just a misunderstanding, that would be a first for me. I suspect it is SHA-1 t

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond
Matthew Selsky : > Where do we get SHA-0, aka "sha", keytype support from if we remove the > in-tree public domain version? To my knowledge the only SHA we have in tree is SHA-1. I think you can only get SHA-0 via OpenSSL. -- http://www.catb.org/~esr/";>Eric S. Raymond _

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Gary E. Miller
Yo Matthew! On Fri, 27 Jan 2017 21:19:55 -0500 Matthew Selsky wrote: > > I can only find SHA1 in ntpsec. what am I missing? > See NID_sha in tests/libntp/ssl_init.c I just removed a bunch of unused SSL stuff. There is still a ton of tests for things ntpd never does. I see no other use of N

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Matthew Selsky
On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 05:20:48PM -0800, Gary E. Miller wrote: > Yo Matthew! > > On Fri, 27 Jan 2017 20:05:14 -0500 > Matthew Selsky wrote: > > > LibreSSL dropped support for SHA-0 in 2.4.2, and that breaks the > > build on OpenBSD 6.0 > > I can only find SHA1 in ntpsec. what am I missing? H

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Gary E. Miller
Yo Matthew! On Fri, 27 Jan 2017 20:05:14 -0500 Matthew Selsky wrote: > LibreSSL dropped support for SHA-0 in 2.4.2, and that breaks the > build on OpenBSD 6.0 I can only find SHA1 in ntpsec. what am I missing? RGDS GARY -

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Matthew Selsky
On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 03:57:36PM -0500, Daniel Franke wrote: > On 1/27/17, Eric S. Raymond wrote: > > Daniel Franke : > >> Where is this notion coming from that OpenSSL is going to drop MD5 or > >> SHA1 > >> support any time soon? That's inconceivable to me. > > > > I think it was either Achim G

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 03:42:09PM -0500, Eric S. Raymond wrote: > Daniel Franke : > > Where is this notion coming from that OpenSSL is going to drop MD5 or SHA1 > > support any time soon? That's inconceivable to me. > > I think it was either Achim Gratz or Kurt Roecx (I can't easily search to fin

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond
Daniel Franke : > I just checked with an OpenSSL dev to make certain: dropping MD5 and > SHA1 from libcrypto is not even remotely under consideration. All right. I'm off to Friday night gaming, but given what Mark has said I'm going to take this as my cue to remove the local copies when I get bac

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Daniel Franke
On 1/27/17, Mark Atwood wrote: > Daniel, if we make OpenSSL a requirement, can we drop libsodium? Yes. > Daniel, which rev of OpenSSL should we require? (Not 0.9.x et al) 1.0.1 and prior are no longer supported upstream so I'm not going to make any effort to support them either. I don't think

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Daniel Franke
On 1/27/17, Eric S. Raymond wrote: > Daniel Franke : >> Where is this notion coming from that OpenSSL is going to drop MD5 or >> SHA1 >> support any time soon? That's inconceivable to me. > > I think it was either Achim Gratz or Kurt Roecx (I can't easily search to > find > out right now). Somebod

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond
Daniel Franke : > Where is this notion coming from that OpenSSL is going to drop MD5 or SHA1 > support any time soon? That's inconceivable to me. I think it was either Achim Gratz or Kurt Roecx (I can't easily search to find out right now). Somebody serious, anyway. This is not an area in which I

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Mark Atwood
OpenSSL is not going to drop them anytime soon. if/when they do, we can add back inline support in better understood ways. Daniel, if we make OpenSSL a requirement, can we drop libsodium? Daniel, which rev of OpenSSL should we require? (Not 0.9.x et al) If/when we encounter a target without Op

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Daniel Franke
Where is this notion coming from that OpenSSL is going to drop MD5 or SHA1 support any time soon? That's inconceivable to me. On Jan 27, 2017 3:21 PM, "Eric S. Raymond" wrote: > Mark Atwood : > > We do need to get wacking on the weeds on removing more of this thicket. > > Here are our constraint

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond
Mark Atwood : > We do need to get wacking on the weeds on removing more of this thicket. Here are our constraints: * Daniel has stated that he prefers the OpenSSL implementations of MD5 and SHA-1. He's our crypto expert, so he gets to make that call and I would have no grounds to even argue w

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Gary E. Miller
Yo Eric! On Fri, 27 Jan 2017 14:42:16 -0500 "Eric S. Raymond" wrote: > Gary E. Miller : > > And, don't forget, libisc is still in the tree with its own copies > > of md5 and sha1. Nuke it! > > Er, we can't do tha id we wabt the OpenSSL deoendency to be optional. So why does openssl need to

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond
Gary E. Miller : > And, don't forget, libisc is still in the tree with its own copies of > md5 and sha1. Nuke it! Er, we can't do tha id we wabt the OpenSSL deoendency to be optional. Otherwise, I'd be happy to get rid of that code. -- http://www.catb.org/~esr/";>Eric S. Raymond

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Mark Atwood
WolfSSL has a "we are compatible with any OSI approved license" codecil to their license. I can get a formal signed commitment and document from the CEO reinforcing it. We do need to get wacking on the weeds on removing more of this thicket. ..m On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 10:38 AM Gary E. Miller

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Gary E. Miller
Yo Mark! On Fri, 27 Jan 2017 18:14:15 + Mark Atwood wrote: > If we are going to have an SSL dependency, I have a pretty strong > preference towards WolfSSL It may be the best, but it is not in Gentoo. I suspect few distros have it. As we see from the libsodium mess, using non standard lib

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Daniel Franke
On 1/27/17, Mark Atwood wrote: > If we are going to have an SSL dependency, I have a pretty strong > preference towards WolfSSL WolfSSL is full GPLv2 with no or-any-lrater-version provision. Are you comfortable with having a dependency licensed under those terms? Possibly more importantly, Wolf

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Mark Atwood
If we are going to have an SSL dependency, I have a pretty strong preference towards WolfSSL if we are going to have an OpenSSL dependency, it needs to be to the latest stable OpenSSL release. What would be using an SSL library for, that libsodium does not already provide? What all are we using

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond
Eric S. Raymond : > Daniel Franke : > > If SHA-0 has ever been used in NTP that's news to me. It was broken pretty > > quickly after publication and never saw much use. Pretty sure any > > documentation which refers to it is confused. > > There were repeated references to "SHA and SHA-1". I don't

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond
Daniel Franke : > If SHA-0 has ever been used in NTP that's news to me. It was broken pretty > quickly after publication and never saw much use. Pretty sure any > documentation which refers to it is confused. There were repeated references to "SHA and SHA-1". I don't see how that could reasonablt

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Daniel Franke
If SHA-0 has ever been used in NTP that's news to me. It was broken pretty quickly after publication and never saw much use. Pretty sure any documentation which refers to it is confused. I would prefer that OpenSSL implementations of primitives get used when available, for performance reasons whic

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond
Mark: Heads up! PR issue. Matthew Selsky : > On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 11:47:01PM -0800, Hal Murray wrote: > > > > [From gitlab] > > > It uses SHA1 but not SHA0 - SHA1 is an option for packet MACs. There > > > should > > > be no problem with using the ISC version unconditionally. > > https://do

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-27 Thread Eric S. Raymond
Hal Murray : > > [From gitlab] > > It uses SHA1 but not SHA0 - SHA1 is an option for packet MACs. There should > > be no problem with using the ISC version unconditionally. > > I though I saw something about getting rid of --enable-crypto It's gone. It actually turned out to be a no-op - I thi

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-26 Thread Matthew Selsky
On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 11:47:01PM -0800, Hal Murray wrote: > > [From gitlab] > > It uses SHA1 but not SHA0 - SHA1 is an option for packet MACs. There should > > be no problem with using the ISC version unconditionally. https://docs.ntpsec.org/latest/ntpq.html's keytype lists "SHA". Does that m

Re: Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-26 Thread Gary E. Miller
Yo Hal! On Wed, 25 Jan 2017 23:47:01 -0800 Hal Murray wrote: > [From gitlab] > > It uses SHA1 but not SHA0 - SHA1 is an option for packet MACs. > > There should be no problem with using the ISC version > > unconditionally. > > I though I saw something about getting rid of --enable-crypto Ye

Current status of --enable-crypto

2017-01-25 Thread Hal Murray
[From gitlab] > It uses SHA1 but not SHA0 - SHA1 is an option for packet MACs. There should > be no problem with using the ISC version unconditionally. I though I saw something about getting rid of --enable-crypto We currently require libsodium. Do we require libssl? If so, we can drop the I