On Tue, Dec 10, 2002 at 11:50:59PM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Assuming that the default option is the status quo, that is, the
> currently selected option.
> And assuming that an option winning an election makes it the status quo,
> and hence the default option.
> And assuming the default optio
Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an
election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD
(and newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not.
This
On Tue, Dec 10, 2002 at 11:50:59PM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Assuming that the default option is the status quo, that is, the
> currently selected option.
> And assuming that an option winning an election makes it the status quo,
> and hence the default option.
> And assuming the default optio
Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an
election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD
(and newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not.
This
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an
> election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD (and
> newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not. This
> criteria 'Consi
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Consistancy Criteria - "If election X and election Y have identical
> votes and supermajority requirements, and election X has a default
> option of A, and election Y has a default option of B, and B is the
> winner of election X, t
Raul Miller wrote:
It's not fair to base an argument on an axiom which is known to be false.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:45:07PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It doesn't matter whether the axiom is false as written: it's trivial
to salvage its intended meaning (by either dropping quoru
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 07:57:09AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I am uncomfortable this for the axiom that the option ranked last must
> lose. It's just too arbitrary. For example, consider also a ballot with
> only one option (not that our current system allows this). The resulting
> statement i
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an
> election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD (and
> newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not. This
> criteria 'Consi
On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Consistancy Criteria - "If election X and election Y have identical
> votes and supermajority requirements, and election X has a default
> option of A, and election Y has a default option of B, and B is the
> winner of election X, t
Raul Miller wrote:
It's not fair to base an argument on an axiom which is known to be false.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:45:07PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
It doesn't matter whether the axiom is false as written: it's trivial
to salvage its intended meaning (by either dropping quorum r
> > It's not fair to base an argument on an axiom which is known to be false.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:45:07PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> It doesn't matter whether the axiom is false as written: it's trivial
> to salvage its intended meaning (by either dropping quorum requirements,
> or quali
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 07:57:09AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I am uncomfortable this for the axiom that the option ranked last must
> lose. It's just too arbitrary. For example, consider also a ballot with
> only one option (not that our current system allows this). The resulting
> statement i
> > It's not fair to base an argument on an axiom which is known to be false.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 04:45:07PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> It doesn't matter whether the axiom is false as written: it's trivial
> to salvage its intended meaning (by either dropping quorum requirements,
> or quali
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 07:44:55PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> > > with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
> On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:40:21AM +1000,
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 07:44:55PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> > > with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
> On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:40:21AM +1000,
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> > with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:40:21AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> That's not what's important: by his rules som
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
That's not what's important: by his rules some elections that _meet_
quorum don't have a "democratic" outcome. The
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> > with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 09:40:21AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> That's not what's important: by his rules som
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 12:12:48PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> I'm critiquing the axiom, not the example. By his rules some elections
> with quorums do not have a democratic outcome.
That's not what's important: by his rules some elections that _meet_
quorum don't have a "democratic" outcome. The
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 10:36:45AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > Proof that A.6 draft is undemocratic.
> > I'm ignoring your proof because you've left out something I consider to
> > be significant out of your axioms. [see above.]
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 02:10:18AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
>
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 10:36:45AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Proof that A.6 draft is undemocratic.
> I'm ignoring your proof because you've left out something I consider to
> be significant out of your axioms. [see above.]
I'm not sure that's fair, since quorum doesn't come into play in the e
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 01:56:01AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Firstly, I mistakenly defined the strength of defeats in my last
> definition, so I've changed rule (3) to match my implimentation.
> Strength is now measured by how many votes prefer A over B.
Ok. I've actually not taken the time
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 10:36:45AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > > Proof that A.6 draft is undemocratic.
> > I'm ignoring your proof because you've left out something I consider to
> > be significant out of your axioms. [see above.]
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 02:10:18AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
>
Firstly, I mistakenly defined the strength of defeats in my last
definition, so I've changed rule (3) to match my implimentation.
Strength is now measured by how many votes prefer A over B. In the
previous definition I defined the strength of defeats as the difference
between how many votes pre
On Sat, Dec 07, 2002 at 10:36:45AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > Proof that A.6 draft is undemocratic.
> I'm ignoring your proof because you've left out something I consider to
> be significant out of your axioms. [see above.]
I'm not sure that's fair, since quorum doesn't come into play in the e
On Sun, Dec 08, 2002 at 01:56:01AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> Firstly, I mistakenly defined the strength of defeats in my last
> definition, so I've changed rule (3) to match my implimentation.
> Strength is now measured by how many votes prefer A over B.
Ok. I've actually not taken the time
Firstly, I mistakenly defined the strength of defeats in my last
definition, so I've changed rule (3) to match my implimentation.
Strength is now measured by how many votes prefer A over B. In the
previous definition I defined the strength of defeats as the difference
between how many votes pre
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 06:02:12PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> Frankly, I don't think that special treatment of the default option
> is a good idea. We are already using supermajority rules, which gives the
> default option extra weight. Why would we want _another_ rule which does
> basically
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 03:13:59PM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> First, heres a definition of a rough proposal I've used in examples
> below, which I've called, for want of a better name, Considered CSSD
> (CCSSD). Its a clean up and patch of a similar earlier proposal.
I basically have a lot of
Hi,
Anthony Towns:
> (Raul doesn't eliminate defaults by the default option, 40:35 is the next
... defeats by ...
> weakest defeat)
>
I seem to have overlooked that.
Frankly, I don't think that special treatment of the default option
is a good idea. We are already using supermajority rules, whic
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 06:02:12PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> Frankly, I don't think that special treatment of the default option
> is a good idea. We are already using supermajority rules, which gives the
> default option extra weight. Why would we want _another_ rule which does
> basically
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 03:13:59PM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> First, heres a definition of a rough proposal I've used in examples
> below, which I've called, for want of a better name, Considered CSSD
> (CCSSD). Its a clean up and patch of a similar earlier proposal.
I basically have a lot of
Hi,
Anthony Towns:
> (Raul doesn't eliminate defaults by the default option, 40:35 is the next
... defeats by ...
> weakest defeat)
>
I seem to have overlooked that.
Frankly, I don't think that special treatment of the default option
is a good idea. We are already using supermajority rules, whic
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 09:23:27AM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> I'm going to walk through these examples and apply my preferred algorithm
> of "if an option wins but doesn't satisfy the supermajority requirement
> against the default option, drop it from the ballot and repeat".
> > Z is the de
On Fri, Dec 06, 2002 at 09:23:27AM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
> I'm going to walk through these examples and apply my preferred algorithm
> of "if an option wins but doesn't satisfy the supermajority requirement
> against the default option, drop it from the ballot and repeat".
> > Z is the de
Hi,
I'm going to walk through these examples and apply my preferred algorithm
of "if an option wins but doesn't satisfy the supermajority requirement
against the default option, drop it from the ballot and repeat".
The ones I've deleted stay the same.
Two of the results you get make no sense to
Hi,
I'm going to walk through these examples and apply my preferred algorithm
of "if an option wins but doesn't satisfy the supermajority requirement
against the default option, drop it from the ballot and repeat".
The ones I've deleted stay the same.
Two of the results you get make no sense to
First, heres a definition of a rough proposal I've used in examples
below, which I've called, for want of a better name, Considered CSSD
(CCSSD). Its a clean up and patch of a similar earlier proposal.
- A defeats B if more votes prefer A over B than B prefer over A.
- A challenges B if more t
First, heres a definition of a rough proposal I've used in examples
below, which I've called, for want of a better name, Considered CSSD
(CCSSD). Its a clean up and patch of a similar earlier proposal.
- A defeats B if more votes prefer A over B than B prefer over A.
- A challenges B if more th
On Sat, Nov 30, 2002 at 03:51:36AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Actually, A defeats B by 3:2. You meant:
> 3 ABD
> 1 BDA
> 1 DAB
Thanks for pointing this out.
I've modified my test program to dump defeats, and to mention the
ratio of the eliminated options, and I've verified that it gives the
sa
On Sat, Nov 30, 2002 at 03:51:36AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> Actually, A defeats B by 3:2. You meant:
> 3 ABD
> 1 BDA
> 1 DAB
Thanks for pointing this out.
I've modified my test program to dump defeats, and to mention the
ratio of the eliminated options, and I've verified that it gives the
sa
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