On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote: > In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an > election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD (and > newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not. This > criteria 'Consistancy', is basically that if an option wins when it is > not the default option, it should win when it is the default option.
What's the rationale for this system? In other words, you're stipulating that for an election where A has 3:1 supermajority, and D is the default option, and the votes are 100 ABD 35 BAD that B should win, even though every voter considers A to be an acceptable option. Why is this a good idea? That said, here's how the test case you've proposed here plays out with the draft I submitted today: ______________________________________________________________________ A is the default option 4 CBA 3 BAC 2 ACB B defeats A 7:2 C defeats B 6:3 A defeats C 5:4 eliminate 5:4 B defeats A 7:2 C defeats B 6:3 C wins ______________________________________________________________________ B is the default option 4 CBA 3 BAC 2 ACB B defeats A 7:2 C defeats B 6:3 A defeats C 5:4 eliminate 5:4 B defeats A 7:2 C defeats B 6:3 C wins ______________________________________________________________________ Finally, as an aside: I've been avoiding the beatpath strength mechanism because I'm not confident of the logic which proves it's equivalent to CpSSD in an election with supermajorities. Good enough? Thanks, -- Raul -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
