Sam Hocevar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 15, 2007, Barak A. Pearlmutter wrote:
> > You make another point, which is interesting, but which actually
> > when carried to its logical conclusion ends up being in support of
> > Range Voting over Condorcet. If you continue with the logic
>
On Fri, Jun 15, 2007, Barak A. Pearlmutter wrote:
> You make another point, which is interesting, but which actually when
> carried to its logical conclusion ends up being in support of Range
> Voting over Condorcet. If you continue with the logic asking what
> happens when Range Voting voters vo
Barak A. Pearlmutter writes:
> You also make the point
>
>> 60x A=60,B=40
>> 40x B=60,A=40
>
>> It only takes six of the second group to vote B=99,A=0 to change the
>> outcome, which is a major victory for the extreme supporters but a
>> loss for honest moderates.
>
> I think your point
You also make the point
> 60x A=60,B=40
> 40x B=60,A=40
> It only takes six of the second group to vote B=99,A=0 to change the
> outcome, which is a major victory for the extreme supporters but a
> loss for honest moderates.
I think your point is that, with Range Voting, if *some* of t
> It always amuses me how people pull out these examples close to
> Condorcet cycles as examples of strategy in Condorcet methods while
> ignoring the strategy issues in even simpler Range Voting elections
> that push it towards Approval-style voting.
Well (a) that wasn't *my* example, and (b) it
"Barak A. Pearlmutter" writes:
> The example you give is a perfect instance of the DH3 problem.
>
> You have a population of voters whose true preferences are
>
> 31x A>C>B>X>D
> 32x B>C>A>X>D
> 37x C>B>A>X>D
It always amuses me how people pull out these examples close to
Condorcet cycle
The example you give is a perfect instance of the DH3 problem.
You have a population of voters whose true preferences are
31x A>C>B>X>D
32x B>C>A>X>D
37x C>B>A>X>D
Assuming the B supporters know that C is the front runner, some of
them might notice that if a handful of the B supporters
> However, computer simulations seem to show that they are much less
> harmful (less likely, and when they occur less likely to result in a
> really poor candidate being elected) than analogous circumstances with
> Condorcet.
Usually the best statistics are those which were faked by yourself, so
On Tue, Jun 05, 2007 at 12:16:29PM +0100, Barak A. Pearlmutter wrote:
> Oops: what I said here:
>
> > there are no circumstances in which a rational (in the game
> > theoretic sense of that term) Range Voting voter will cast an
> > anti-veridical ballot.
>
> is not true when there are N>3 candida
"Barak A. Pearlmutter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> It is pretty straightforward to add some extra candidates whose
> existence causes voters to "use up" their default option elsewhere on
> the ballot, below the dark horse candidate.
I'm still a bit in the dark. Why would a voter want to vote ADX
> I still fail to understand how Condorcet with the default option
> suffers from the DH3 pathology (I did understand how Condorcet
> without the default option does suffer from DH3). Could you
> enlighten me?
It is pretty straightforward to add some extra candidates whose
existence causes voters
Oops: what I said here:
> there are no circumstances in which a rational (in the game
> theoretic sense of that term) Range Voting voter will cast an
> anti-veridical ballot.
is not true when there are N>3 candidates. There do exist
circumstances etc.
However, computer simulations seem to show
"Barak A. Pearlmutter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> (a) Condorcet is not actually "gaming resistant" in this sense. See
> the DH3 pathology for an example.
I still fail to understand how Condorcet with the default option
suffers from the DH3 pathology (I did understand how Condorcet without
> Your fundamental fallacy is that you treat `the voters' as a unified
> entity - which they are not.
I don't see how you could think that, given the text of my last
message on this topic. I explicitly assume the reverse. That is what
it means to say: "Complete honesty is not a stable strategy."
Barak A. Pearlmutter writes ("Re: Range Voting - the simpler better alternative
to Condorcet voting"):
> So (aside from calling me names) it seems like your argument boils
> down to the idea that somehow Range Voting causes voters to be less
> honest than they are with Cond
Let me see if I have this straight.
We would both agree that:
- Range Voting is more expressive than Condorcet. (In the sense that
it is possible for a voter who so desires to more precisely express
their true opinion.)
- Range Voting is simpler (easier to understand) than Condorcet.
le Sun, Jun 03, 2007 at 04:48:49AM -0700 par Steve Langasek :
> On Sun, Jun 03, 2007 at 11:22:06AM +0100, Barak A. Pearlmutter wrote:
> > > Ireland uses STV, which is not a Condorcet voting system.
>
- there have been an experiment in France during recent election,
conducted by researchers from p
On Sun, Jun 03, 2007 at 11:22:06AM +0100, Barak A. Pearlmutter wrote:
> > Ireland uses STV, which is not a Condorcet voting system.
> Although true, from a voter's perspective they're pretty much
> identical:
>From the ignorant voter's perspective, yes. Given your previous post, I
understand com
> Ireland uses STV, which is not a Condorcet voting system.
Although true, from a voter's perspective they're pretty much
identical: rank the candidates, any left unranked are implicitly at
the bottom. Furthermore, I would dare to venture that even our
sophisticated Debian Developer voters by-and
On Saturday 02 June 2007 22:47, Philippe Cloutier wrote:
> > Moreover, the lack of expressiveness of Condorcet
> > makes is impossible to cast a ballot saying: "I think A and B are
> > really good, with A just slightly better than B, while I think C and D
> > are both pretty bad, and E and F are bo
On Sat, Jun 02, 2007 at 08:13:52PM +0100, Barak A. Pearlmutter wrote:
> I'm living in Ireland and there was a major election here just a few days
> ago using a Condorcet system.
Ireland uses STV, which is not a Condorcet voting system.
Nice try though, it was a very good troll otherwise.
--
St
And Debian
Developers certainly do vote strategically in DPL elections, although
they wouldn't call it that; they'd call it "ranking people they really
don't want to see elected below wacko cranks and people they've never
heard of before."
What's wrong with DDs ranking people they really don't wan
> http://rangevoting.org/vsi.html itself makes it clear that honest
> voting in Condorcet performs better than strategic Range Voting.
Right, there are a variety of asymmetric conditions under which
Condorcet may perform better than Range Voting. You came up with one
such condition:
Steve Langasek <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> This discussion doesn't belong on debian-policy. The policy maintainers
-policy dropped.
On Sat, May 26, 2007 at 05:19:26PM -0700, CLAY S wrote:
> which system is in use. That's not a reasonable assumption, because *Range
> Voting rewards attempts at
This discussion doesn't belong on debian-policy. The policy maintainers
have no authority over Debian's voting procedure, which is codified in the
Debian constitution.
On Sat, May 26, 2007 at 05:19:26PM -0700, CLAY S wrote:
> >Warren Smith's copious arguments to the contrary, it's not entirely
>
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