> Ireland uses STV, which is not a Condorcet voting system. Although true, from a voter's perspective they're pretty much identical: rank the candidates, any left unranked are implicitly at the bottom. Furthermore, I would dare to venture that even our sophisticated Debian Developer voters by-and-large do not understand the minutia of our particular Condorcet resolution mechanism.
I will however admit that I've been told by a number of Irishmen that one reason for the use of STV here is that it makes for a lot of fun in the post-voting and postmortem parts of the elections. > Nice try though, it was a very good troll otherwise. If by "trolling" you mean "pointing out when Steve Langasek makes an invalid argument", then I plead guilty as charged. To quote the relevant lines from http://rangevoting.org/vsi.html where VSI is the Voter Satisfaction Index, > Voting system VSI A VSI B > > Magically elect optimum winner 100.00% 100.00% > Range (honest voters) 96.71% 94.66% > Condorcet-LR (honest voters) 85.19% 85.43% > Range (strategic exaggerating voters) 78.99% 77.01% > Condorcet-LR (strategic exaggerating voters) 42.56% 41.31% > ... These experimental results also strongly suggest that range > voting is the least susceptible to strategic voting, of these common > methods. It would appear that in this table, when voters merely exaggerate their preferences, which is a natural human tendency, Range Voting degrades from ~95% VSI to ~78% VSI while Condorcet-LR degrades from 85% to 42%. OUCH! It seems like even a small amount of strategic voting in Condorcet would push its performance below that of Range voting with fully strategic voting. -- Barak A. Pearlmutter Hamilton Institute & Dept Comp Sci, NUI Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland http://www.bcl.hamilton.ie/~barak/ -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
