On 09-12-15 17:46, sb wrote:
> 
> In what follows, "(secure)" means authenticated DNSSEC response, 
> "(insecure)" means spoofable DNS response.
> 
>> ... Received: from spike.porcupine.org (spike.porcupine.org 
>> [IPv6:2604:8d00:189::2]) by english-breakfast.cloud9.net
>> (Postfix) with ESMTP id E5B44331FA3 for
>> <postfix-users@postfix.org>; Mon,  7 Dec 2015 13:19:20 -0500 
>> (EST) Received: by spike.porcupine.org (Postfix, from userid
>> 1001) id 3pDtFh4YYszJrQ6; Mon,  7 Dec 2015 13:19:20 -0500 (EST)
> 
>> unbound-host -rvD spike.porcupine.org
<snip>
>> unbound-host -rvD postfix.org
<snip>
> 
>> /opt/org.OpenServer/port-53/sbin/unbound-host -rvD
>> mail.cloud9.net
<snip>
> 

Most DNSxLs are ip based, not hostname based. The client's ip is
provided by the tcp/ip stack of our own server. No DNSSEC needed.

> 
> Is there a good DNSWL we can use?
> 
>> unbound-host -rvD 7.1.100.168.list.dnswl.org
> unbound-host -rvD 7.1.100.168.list.dnswl.org
<snip>
> 
> So, postfix.org e-mail originates from a non-whitelisted IP, 
> assuming we checked the right IPs for lack of DNSSEC.
> 

If you need more trust in DNSxL data retrieval, then sign up and pay
for list access, and be able to retrieve the data using a secure and
authenticated channel. Asking list providers to DNSSEC-sign their
zones would also be picked up a lot faster when you're a paying
customer (but I think that practical/technical reasons would make this
a hard nut to crack anyway).

If you're afraid that someone spoofs/hijacks DNSxL results, then
combine multiple DNSxL results into the decision using weighted
queries in postscreen. Spoofing/hijacking multiple DNSBLs is a lot
harder than a single one.

Your insistence on DNSSEC for DNSxL data is unnecessary and uncalled
for, IMHO.

> 
> Is there a good DNSBL we can use?
> 
> Let us check an IP that delivered spam.
> 
<snip>
> Perhaps a less known RNSBL would do?
> 
> http://multirbl.valli.org/lookup/78-134-2-123.v4.ngi.it.html
> 
> No, it does not.

However, it does list the ip address for multiple lists, 9 at this
moment (of which a few I would trust to use on my servers).

> 
> In summary, the spammer's reputation is neither good nor bad. Just
> like postfix, the filter would let the e-mail through.
> 

Anyway, DNSxL usage is not about a single edge case, it's about the
big numbers: if you're able to block 70% of incoming spam quickly
using DNSBLs, it means you can spend more resources of the remaining 30%.

Kind regards,
        Tom

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