Dear Cambridge philosophers of science,

Tomorrow (today as most of you read this), 29 November, is the eighth 
meeting for CamPoS, at 1 p.m. in the HPS department in seminar room  2 
in the basement.  Alisa Bokulich of Boston University will speak on 
‘Representing and Explaining:  The Eikonic Conception of Explanation’.  
Her abstract is below.

Sincerely,
J. Brian Pitts

Abstract:
The widely-accepted ontic conception of explanation, according to which 
explanations are "full-bodied things in the world," is fundamentally 
misguided.  I argue instead for what I call the eikonic conception of 
scientific explanation, according to which explanations are an epistemic 
activity involving representations of the phenomena to be explained.  
What is explained, in the first instance, is not the phenomenon in the 
world itself, but a particular representation of that phenomenon, which 
is contextualized within a particular research program and explanatory 
project.  I conclude that this eikonic conception of explanation has the 
following five virtues:  first, it is able to better make sense of 
scientific practice; second, it allows us to talk normatively about 
explanations; third, it makes sense of explanatory pluralism; fourth, it 
helps us better understand the role of mathematics, models, and fictions 
in scientific explanation; and fifth, it makes room for the full range 
of constraints (e.g., ontic, epistemic, and communicative) on scientific 
explanation.



-- 
J. Brian Pitts
Senior Research Associate
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
[email protected]

Ph.D., Philosophy/History & Philosophy of Science, University of Notre 
Dame
Ph.D., Physics, University of Texas at Austin


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