Thursday 13th March at 4.15pm in the graduate common room at the Philosophy Faculty Prof Jim Franklin (New South Wales) Keynes was right: probability is logic
Abstract: Before he moved on to easier topics like economics, Keynes spent years of effort on the philosophy of probability, culminating in his Treatise on Probability (1921). He argued that probability is fundamentally non-deductive logic, a kind of partial implication. Thus "proof beyond reasonable doubt" is really a kind of proof, just not absolutely cogent proof. The talk defends (most of) Keynes' view - more exactly, the thesis of "objective Bayesianism with imprecise probabilities". The main reasons for that thesis area explained, with examples such as the proportional syllogism and evidence for conjectures in pure mathematics. Objections are considered, such as problems with the "principle of insufficient reason". Sent with AquaMail for Android http://www.aqua-mail.com _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
