Hey guys, thanks for putting this together. I am concerned with the real world impact of imposing sender constraint | rotation as a MUST on refresh tokens in every scenario. Sender constraint isn't immediately actionable - we just had the discussion for dPOP, hence I won't go in the details here. Rotation isn't something that can be added without significant impact on development and runtime experiences:
- on distributed scenarios, it introduces the need to serialize access to shared caches - network failures can lead to impact on experience- stranding clients which fail to receive RTn+1 during RTn redemption in a limbo where user interaction might become necessary, disrupting experience or functionality for scenarios where the user isn't available to respond. - On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 5:28 PM Aaron Parecki <aa...@parecki.com> wrote: > I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first > draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on > the list and incorporated that into the draft. > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01 > > A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be > found in section 12, and I've copied them here below. > > > This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749), > > OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange > > (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps > > (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current > > Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage > > (RFC6750). > > > > Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the > > original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with > > the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed > > entirely. > > > > A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below: > > > > * The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality > > from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the > > authorization code grant according to this specification requires > > the addition of the PKCE mechanism > > > > * Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per > > Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > > > > * The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this > > specification as per Section 2.1.2 of > > [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > > > > * The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this > > specification as per Section 2.4 of > > [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > > > > * Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query > > string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of > > [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > > > > * Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use > > as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12 > > I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a > pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that > this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future > discussions! > > ---- > Aaron Parecki > aaronparecki.com > @aaronpk > > P.S. This notice was also posted at > https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1 > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
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