I believe all we need is a new draft that deals with the new "dynamic/mix-up" cases as these were not considered in the original spec process.
The updated by method works best for this. It also consolidates a lot of piecemeal specs into one consistent spec. Phil > On Apr 7, 2016, at 15:25, Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote: > > Yes - an intentionally conservative, implementation- and experience-driven > path. > > Revising OAuth 2.0 is a *big deal*. We shouldn't even be talking about it > until we've completed steps 1-5 below - *including* the "iterate" step, as > necessary. If we get this wrong, we'll fragment OAuth, which is a terrible > and irresponsible outcome we should consciously avoid at all costs. > > In particular, we should not recharter for an OAuth 2.1 until we already know > what will be in it and know from deployment experience that it's the right > stuff. > > -- Mike > > -----Original Message----- > From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:tors...@lodderstedt.net] > Sent: Thursday, April 7, 2016 3:16 PM > To: Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> > Cc: Samuel Erdtman <sam...@erdtman.se>; Anthony Nadalin > <tony...@microsoft.com>; oauth@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 > > Hi Mike, > > in my opinion, you described a possible path towards 2.1. Would you agree? > > best regards, > Torsten. > >> Am 07.04.2016 um 13:38 schrieb Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com>: >> >> I am strongly against creating a 2.1 spec until we have at least a year of >> deployment experience with the contents we're adding to 2.0, so as not to >> fragment the OAuth marketplace. >> >> I think we should: >> 1. Continue working on new security mitigations in new drafts (such >> as mix-up-mitigation, etc.) that add features to use with 2.0 2. >> Continue working on PoP specs (such as pop-key-distribution, etc.) >> that add features to use with 2.0 3. Continue working on other new >> specs (such as discovery, resource-indicators, etc.) that add features >> to use with 2.0 4. Learn from deployment experience with all of them >> 5. Iterate if the deployment experience tells us that we need to >> >> Only after we believe we have all the features right and we know that they >> work together well should we consider creating a 2.1. If we rush to a 2.1 >> and get it wrong, we'll lose developers' trust and we'll never get it back. >> >> -- Mike >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Samuel >> Erdtman >> Sent: Thursday, April 7, 2016 12:48 PM >> To: Anthony Nadalin <tony...@microsoft.com> >> Cc: oauth@ietf.org >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 >> >> +1 on a 2.1 version >> >> -1 on defining scopes more precisely in 2.1 >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On 7 apr. 2016, at 14:46, Anthony Nadalin <tony...@microsoft.com> wrote: >>> >>> I don't belive that scopes should be defined more precisely as this >>> opaqueness was a design feature, I'm not seeing the reason why scopes need >>> to be defined, as these are application specific. >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Torsten >>> Lodderstedt >>> Sent: Thursday, April 7, 2016 5:32 AM >>> To: George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com> >>> Cc: oauth@ietf.org >>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 >>> >>> Hi all, >>> >>> as I already said in the meeting: I would very much prefer to have an >>> extension/update of RFC 6819 covering all "new" threats, including: >>> - mix up >>> - code injection aka copy and paste >>> - open redirector at AS and client >>> - potential other threats in the context of "dynamic" OAuth >>> >>> I also assume mitigations for (at least some of) the threats need to go >>> into an update of RFC 6749 as normative text. To give an example: if we >>> agree on using the state parameter at the token endpoint to mitigate code >>> injection, this MUST be part of the core spec (request description and >>> security consoderations). Otherwise, noone will even consider it. >>> >>> We should also use the opportunity to improve/enhance the text of the spec. >>> In the course of the last years, we have learned a lot about ambiquities of >>> the text and how different implementations utilize OAuth. >>> >>> I think time is right to define scopes more precisely. As the discussions >>> in the last days proved again (at least for me), scope is not sufficiently >>> defined to come up with interoperable implementations. Additionally, there >>> seems to be a need to represent resource server locations (to not say >>> identities :-)) in this context. >>> >>> To bundle all changes in a version 2.1 would also make communication into >>> the market much easier. >>> >>> best regards, >>> Torsten. >>> >>>> Am 06.04.2016 um 16:05 schrieb George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com>: >>>> >>>> I'd definitely prefer a single solution document to many little ones that >>>> have to be combined to actually build a secure solution. It's already >>>> getting complex with the additional specs that have been added. >>>> >>>> Additionally, I'm not against working on OAuth 2.1. >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> George >>>> >>>>> On 4/6/16 2:06 PM, Phil Hunt (IDM) wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Existing implementations are for the large part ok and do not need these >>>>> mitigations. >>>>> >>>>> Only the new use cases we have been discussing (configure on the fly and >>>>> multi-as, etc) really need mitigation. >>>>> >>>>> The updated by approach seems like a good way to address the new cases. >>>>> >>>>> Phil >>>>> >>>>>> On Apr 6, 2016, at 14:35, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi all, >>>>>> >>>>>> today we discussed the OAuth Authorization Server Mixup draft. We >>>>>> were wondering what types of threats the document should find solutions >>>>>> for. >>>>>> >>>>>> We discussed various document handling approaches including >>>>>> * OAuth Mix-Up and Cut-and-Paste attacks documented in separate >>>>>> solution documents >>>>>> * combined solution document covering the OAuth Mix-Up and the >>>>>> Cut-and-Paste attacks. >>>>>> >>>>>> Barry pointed out that these documents could update the OAuth base >>>>>> specification. >>>>>> >>>>>> As a more radical change it was also suggested to revise RFC 6749 >>>>>> "OAuth >>>>>> 2.0 Authorization Framework" and RFC 6819 "OAuth 2.0 Threat Model >>>>>> and Security Considerations". >>>>>> >>>>>> Opening up the OAuth base specification obviously raises various >>>>>> other questions about cleaning up parts that go far beyond the AS >>>>>> mix-up and the cut-and-paste attacks. Other specifications, such >>>>>> as the Open Redirector, could be folded into such a new specification. >>>>>> >>>>>> Derek and I would appreciate your input on this topic before we >>>>>> make a decision since it has significant impact on our work. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ciao >>>>>> Hannes & Derek >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fw >>>>>> w >>>>>> w >>>>>> .ietf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40mi >>>>>> c >>>>>> r >>>>>> osoft.com%7cce8c942bed81437aca0408d35ee0be21%7c72f988bf86f141af91a >>>>>> b >>>>>> 2 >>>>>> d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=BqcE9eDhm8pgdoitrPFufouxS6qYndnkLgLa5SPk2HI% >>>>>> 3 >>>>>> d >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww. >>>>> ietf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40micr >>>>> o >>>>> s >>>>> oft.com%7cce8c942bed81437aca0408d35ee0be21%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d >>>>> 7 c >>>>> d011db47%7c1&sdata=BqcE9eDhm8pgdoitrPFufouxS6qYndnkLgLa5SPk2HI%3d >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww. >>>> i >>>> etf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40micros >>>> o >>>> f >>>> t.com%7cce8c942bed81437aca0408d35ee0be21%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd >>>> 0 >>>> 1 1db47%7c1&sdata=BqcE9eDhm8pgdoitrPFufouxS6qYndnkLgLa5SPk2HI%3d >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww. >>> i >>> etf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40microso >>> f >>> t.com%7cce8c942bed81437aca0408d35ee0be21%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd0 >>> 1 1db47%7c1&sdata=BqcE9eDhm8pgdoitrPFufouxS6qYndnkLgLa5SPk2HI%3d >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
